/* ssl/s3_clnt.c */
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
 * All rights reserved.
 *
 * This package is an SSL implementation written
 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
 * 
 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
 * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
 * 
 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
 * the code are not to be removed.
 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
 * 
 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
 * are met:
 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
 *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
 *    must display the following acknowledgement:
 *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
 *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
 *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
 *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 
 *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
 *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
 * 
 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
 * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
 * SUCH DAMAGE.
 * 
 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
 * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
 * copied and put under another distribution licence
 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
 */
/* ====================================================================
 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
 *
 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
 * are met:
 *
 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
 *
 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
 *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
 *    distribution.
 *
 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
 *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
 *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
 *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
 *
 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
 *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
 *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
 *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
 *
 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
 *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
 *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
 *
 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
 *    acknowledgment:
 *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
 *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
 *
 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 * ====================================================================
 *
 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
 * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
 *
 */
/* ====================================================================
 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
 *
 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by 
 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
 *
 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
 * license provided above.
 *
 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
 *
 */
/* ====================================================================
 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
 *
 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
 * license.
 *
 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
 *
 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
 *
 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
 * to make use of the Contribution.
 *
 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
 * OTHERWISE.
 */

#include <stdio.h>
#include "ssl_locl.h"
#include "kssl_lcl.h"
#include <openssl/buffer.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/md5.h>
#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
#include <openssl/fips.h>
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
#include <openssl/dh.h>
#endif
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
#include <openssl/engine.h>
#endif

static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_client_method(int ver);
static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME * const *a,const X509_NAME * const *b);

static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_client_method(int ver)
	{
	if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
		return(SSLv3_client_method());
	else
		return(NULL);
	}

IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_client_method,
			ssl_undefined_function,
			ssl3_connect,
			ssl3_get_client_method)

int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
	{
	BUF_MEM *buf=NULL;
	unsigned long Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
	void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
	int ret= -1;
	int new_state,state,skip=0;

	RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
	ERR_clear_error();
	clear_sys_error();

	if (s->info_callback != NULL)
		cb=s->info_callback;
	else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
		cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
	
	s->in_handshake++;
	if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s); 
#if 0	/* Send app data in separate packet, otherwise, some particular site
	 * (only one site so far) closes the socket.
	 * Note: there is a very small chance that two TCP packets
	 * could be arriving at server combined into a single TCP packet,
	 * then trigger that site to break. We haven't encounter that though.
	 */
	if (SSL_get_mode(s) & SSL_MODE_HANDSHAKE_CUTTHROUGH)
		{
		/* Send app data along with CCS/Finished */
		s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED;
		}
#endif

#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
	/* If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we
	 * already got and don't await it anymore, because
	 * Heartbeats don't make sense during handshakes anyway.
	 */
	if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
		{
		s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
		s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
		}
#endif

	for (;;)
		{
		state=s->state;

		switch(s->state)
			{
		case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
			s->renegotiate=1;
			s->state=SSL_ST_CONNECT;
			s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate++;
			/* break */
		case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
		case SSL_ST_CONNECT:
		case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_CONNECT:
		case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_CONNECT:

			s->server=0;
			if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);

			if ((s->version & 0xff00 ) != 0x0300)
				{
				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
				ret = -1;
				goto end;
				}
				
			/* s->version=SSL3_VERSION; */
			s->type=SSL_ST_CONNECT;

			if (s->init_buf == NULL)
				{
				if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
					{
					ret= -1;
					goto end;
					}
				if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
					{
					ret= -1;
					goto end;
					}
				s->init_buf=buf;
				buf=NULL;
				}

			if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) { ret= -1; goto end; }

			/* setup buffing BIO */
			if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,0)) { ret= -1; goto end; }

			/* don't push the buffering BIO quite yet */

			ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);

			s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A;
			s->ctx->stats.sess_connect++;
			s->init_num=0;
			break;

		case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A:
		case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B:

			s->shutdown=0;
			ret=ssl3_client_hello(s);
			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
			s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A;
			s->init_num=0;

			/* turn on buffering for the next lot of output */
			if (s->bbio != s->wbio)
				s->wbio=BIO_push(s->bbio,s->wbio);

			break;

		case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A:
		case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B:
			ret=ssl3_get_server_hello(s);
			if (ret <= 0) goto end;

			if (s->hit)
				{
				s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
				if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
					{
					/* receive renewed session ticket */
					s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
					}
#endif
				}
			else
				s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A;
			s->init_num=0;
			break;

		case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A:
		case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B:
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
			ret=ssl3_check_finished(s);
			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
			if (ret == 2)
				{
				s->hit = 1;
				if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
					s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
				else
					s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
				s->init_num=0;
				break;
				}
#endif
			/* Check if it is anon DH/ECDH */
			/* or PSK */
			if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
			    !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
				{
				ret=ssl3_get_server_certificate(s);
				if (ret <= 0) goto end;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
				if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
					s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A;
				else
					s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
				}
			else
				{
				skip = 1;
				s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
				}
#else
				}
			else
				skip=1;

			s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
#endif
			s->init_num=0;
			break;

		case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A:
		case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B:
			ret=ssl3_get_key_exchange(s);
			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
			s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A;
			s->init_num=0;

			/* at this point we check that we have the
			 * required stuff from the server */
			if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s))
				{
				ret= -1;
				goto end;
				}
			break;

		case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A:
		case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B:
			ret=ssl3_get_certificate_request(s);
			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
			s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A;
			s->init_num=0;
			break;

		case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A:
		case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B:
			ret=ssl3_get_server_done(s);
			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
			if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP)
				{
				if ((ret = SRP_Calc_A_param(s))<=0)
					{
					SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT,SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC);
					ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
					goto end;
					}
				}
#endif
			if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req)
				s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A;
			else
				s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A;
			s->init_num=0;

			break;

		case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A:
		case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B:
		case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C:
		case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D:
			ret=ssl3_send_client_certificate(s);
			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
			s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A;
			s->init_num=0;
			break;

		case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A:
		case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B:
			ret=ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(s);
			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
			/* EAY EAY EAY need to check for DH fix cert
			 * sent back */
			/* For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain
			 * of nothing is sent, but no verify packet is sent */
			/* XXX: For now, we do not support client 
			 * authentication in ECDH cipher suites with
			 * ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates.
			 * We need to skip the certificate verify 
			 * message when client's ECDH public key is sent 
			 * inside the client certificate.
			 */
			if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1)
				{
				s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A;
				}
			else
				{
				s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
				s->s3->change_cipher_spec=0;
				}
			if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY)
				{
				s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
				s->s3->change_cipher_spec=0;
				}

			s->init_num=0;
			break;

		case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A:
		case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B:
			ret=ssl3_send_client_verify(s);
			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
			s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
			s->init_num=0;
			s->s3->change_cipher_spec=0;
			break;

		case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A:
		case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B:
			ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
				SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B);
			if (ret <= 0) goto end;


#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
			s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
#else
			if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
				s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A;
			else
				s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
#endif
			s->init_num=0;

			s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
			s->session->compress_meth=0;
#else
			if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
				s->session->compress_meth=0;
			else
				s->session->compress_meth=
					s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
#endif
			if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
				{
				ret= -1;
				goto end;
				}

			if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
				SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
				{
				ret= -1;
				goto end;
				}

			break;

#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
		case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A:
		case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B:
			ret=ssl3_send_next_proto(s);
			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
			s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
			break;
#endif

		case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A:
		case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B:
			ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
				SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B,
				s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label,
				s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len);
			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
			s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH;

			/* clear flags */
			s->s3->flags&= ~SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER;
			if (s->hit)
				{
				s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
				if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED)
					{
					s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
					s->s3->flags|=SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER;
					s->s3->delay_buf_pop_ret=0;
					}
				}
			else
				{
				if ((SSL_get_mode(s) & SSL_MODE_HANDSHAKE_CUTTHROUGH) && SSL_get_cipher_bits(s, NULL) >= 128
				    && s->s3->previous_server_finished_len == 0 /* no cutthrough on renegotiation (would complicate the state machine) */
				   )
					{
					if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED)
						{
						s->state=SSL3_ST_CUTTHROUGH_COMPLETE;
						s->s3->flags|=SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER;
						s->s3->delay_buf_pop_ret=0;
						}
					else
						{
						s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_CUTTHROUGH_COMPLETE;
						}
					}
				else
					{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
					/* Allow NewSessionTicket if ticket expected */
					if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
						s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
					else
#endif
						s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
					}
				}
			s->init_num=0;
			break;

#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
		case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A:
		case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B:
			ret=ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(s);
			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
			s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
			s->init_num=0;
		break;

		case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A:
		case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B:
			ret=ssl3_get_cert_status(s);
			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
			s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
			s->init_num=0;
		break;
#endif

		case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A:
		case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B:

			ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A,
				SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B);
			if (ret <= 0) goto end;

			if (s->hit)
				s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
			else
				s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
			s->init_num=0;
			break;

		case SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH:
			s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
			if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0)
				{
				ret= -1;
				goto end;
				}
			s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
			s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
			break;

		case SSL3_ST_CUTTHROUGH_COMPLETE:
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
			/* Allow NewSessionTicket if ticket expected */
			if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
				s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
			else
#endif
				s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;

			/* SSL_write() will take care of flushing buffered data if
			 * DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED is set.
			 */
			if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED))
				ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
			ret = 1;
			goto end;
			/* break; */

		case SSL_ST_OK:
			/* clean a few things up */
			ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);

			if (s->init_buf != NULL)
				{
				BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
				s->init_buf=NULL;
				}

			/* If we are not 'joining' the last two packets,
			 * remove the buffering now */
			if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER))
				ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
			/* else do it later in ssl3_write */

			s->init_num=0;
			s->renegotiate=0;
			s->new_session=0;

			ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
			if (s->hit) s->ctx->stats.sess_hit++;

			ret=1;
			/* s->server=0; */
			s->handshake_func=ssl3_connect;
			s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_good++;

			if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);

			goto end;
			/* break; */
			
		default:
			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
			ret= -1;
			goto end;
			/* break; */
			}

		/* did we do anything */
		if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
			{
			if (s->debug)
				{
				if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
					goto end;
				}

			if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
				{
				new_state=s->state;
				s->state=state;
				cb(s,SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP,1);
				s->state=new_state;
				}
			}
		skip=0;
		}
end:
	s->in_handshake--;
	if (buf != NULL)
		BUF_MEM_free(buf);
	if (cb != NULL)
		cb(s,SSL_CB_CONNECT_EXIT,ret);
	return(ret);
	}


int ssl3_client_hello(SSL *s)
	{
	unsigned char *buf;
	unsigned char *p,*d;
	int i;
	unsigned long Time,l;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
	int j;
	SSL_COMP *comp;
#endif

	buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
	if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
		{
		SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
		if ((sess == NULL) ||
			(sess->ssl_version != s->version) ||
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
			!sess->session_id_length ||
#else
			(!sess->session_id_length && !sess->tlsext_tick) ||
#endif
			(sess->not_resumable))
			{
		        if (!s->session_creation_enabled)
				{
				ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_SESSION_MAY_NOT_BE_CREATED);
				goto err;
				}
			if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,0))
				goto err;
			}
		/* else use the pre-loaded session */

		p=s->s3->client_random;
		Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);			/* Time */
		l2n(Time,p);
		if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
			goto err;

		/* Do the message type and length last */
		d=p= &(buf[4]);

		/* version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
		 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
		 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
		 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
		 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
		 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
		 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
		 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
		 * 1.0.
		 *
		 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
		 * 	1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
		 * 	2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
		 *	3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
		 * 	4. Handhaked proceeds using TLS 1.0.
		 *	5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
		 *	6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
		 *	   know that is maximum server supports.
		 *	7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
		 *	   containing version 1.0.
		 *
		 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
		 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
		 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
		 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
		 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
		 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
		 * the negotiated version.
		 */
#if 0
		*(p++)=s->version>>8;
		*(p++)=s->version&0xff;
		s->client_version=s->version;
#else
		*(p++)=s->client_version>>8;
		*(p++)=s->client_version&0xff;
#endif

		/* Random stuff */
		memcpy(p,s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
		p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;

		/* Session ID */
		if (s->new_session)
			i=0;
		else
			i=s->session->session_id_length;
		*(p++)=i;
		if (i != 0)
			{
			if (i > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
				{
				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
				goto err;
				}
			memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,i);
			p+=i;
			}
		
		/* Ciphers supported */
		i=ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s,SSL_get_ciphers(s),&(p[2]),0);
		if (i == 0)
			{
			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
			goto err;
			}
#ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
			/* Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes
			 * as hack workaround chop number of supported ciphers
			 * to keep it well below this if we use TLS v1.2
			 */
			if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
				&& i > OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH)
				i = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1;
#endif
		s2n(i,p);
		p+=i;

		/* COMPRESSION */
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
		*(p++)=1;
#else

		if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
					|| !s->ctx->comp_methods)
			j=0;
		else
			j=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
		*(p++)=1+j;
		for (i=0; i<j; i++)
			{
			comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,i);
			*(p++)=comp->id;
			}
#endif
		*(p++)=0; /* Add the NULL method */

#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
		/* TLS extensions*/
		if (ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
			{
			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
			goto err;
			}
		if ((p = ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL)
			{
			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
			goto err;
			}
#endif
		
		l=(p-d);
		d=buf;
		*(d++)=SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
		l2n3(l,d);

		s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B;
		/* number of bytes to write */
		s->init_num=p-buf;
		s->init_off=0;
		}

	/* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
	return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
err:
	return(-1);
	}

int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
	{
	STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
	const SSL_CIPHER *c;
	unsigned char *p,*d;
	int i,al,ok;
	unsigned int j;
	long n;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
	SSL_COMP *comp;
#endif

	n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
		SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A,
		SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B,
		-1,
		20000, /* ?? */
		&ok);

	if (!ok) return((int)n);

	if ( SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
		{
		if ( s->s3->tmp.message_type == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST)
			{
			if ( s->d1->send_cookie == 0)
				{
				s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
				return 1;
				}
			else /* already sent a cookie */
				{
				al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
				goto f_err;
				}
			}
		}
	
	if ( s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO)
		{
		al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
		goto f_err;
		}

	d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;

	if ((p[0] != (s->version>>8)) || (p[1] != (s->version&0xff)))
		{
		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
		s->version=(s->version&0xff00)|p[1];
		al=SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
		goto f_err;
		}
	p+=2;

	/* load the server hello data */
	/* load the server random */
	memcpy(s->s3->server_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
	p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;

	/* get the session-id */
	j= *(p++);

	if ((j > sizeof s->session->session_id) || (j > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE))
		{
		al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
		goto f_err;
		}

#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
	/* check if we want to resume the session based on external pre-shared secret */
	if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb)
		{
		SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher=NULL;
		s->session->master_key_length=sizeof(s->session->master_key);
		if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
					     &s->session->master_key_length,
					     NULL, &pref_cipher,
					     s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg))
			{
			s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
				pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, p+j);
			}
		}
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */

	if (j != 0 && j == s->session->session_id_length
	    && memcmp(p,s->session->session_id,j) == 0)
	    {
	    if(s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
	       || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx,s->sid_ctx,s->sid_ctx_length))
		{
		/* actually a client application bug */
		al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
		goto f_err;
		}
	    s->hit=1;
	    }
	else	/* a miss or crap from the other end */
		{
		/* If we were trying for session-id reuse, make a new
		 * SSL_SESSION so we don't stuff up other people */
		s->hit=0;
		if (s->session->session_id_length > 0)
			{
		        if (!s->session_creation_enabled)
				{
				ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SESSION_MAY_NOT_BE_CREATED);
				goto err;
				}
			if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,0))
				{
				al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
				goto f_err;
				}
			}
		s->session->session_id_length=j;
		memcpy(s->session->session_id,p,j); /* j could be 0 */
		}
	p+=j;
	c=ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s,p);
	if (c == NULL)
		{
		/* unknown cipher */
		al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
		goto f_err;
		}
	/* TLS v1.2 only ciphersuites require v1.2 or later */
	if ((c->algorithm_ssl & SSL_TLSV1_2) && 
		(TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION))
		{
		al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
		goto f_err;
		}
	p+=ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s,NULL,NULL);

	sk=ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
	i=sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk,c);
	if (i < 0)
		{
		/* we did not say we would use this cipher */
		al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
		goto f_err;
		}

	/* Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
	   and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that
	   cipher_id is set and use it for comparison. */
	if (s->session->cipher)
		s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
	if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id))
		{
/* Workaround is now obsolete */
#if 0
		if (!(s->options &
			SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG))
#endif
			{
			al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
			goto f_err;
			}
		}
	s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
	/* Don't digest cached records if TLS v1.2: we may need them for
	 * client authentication.
	 */
	if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
		goto f_err;
	/* lets get the compression algorithm */
	/* COMPRESSION */
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
	if (*(p++) != 0)
		{
		al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
		goto f_err;
		}
	/* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
	 * using compression.
	 */
	if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
		{
		al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
		goto f_err;
		}
#else
	j= *(p++);
	if (s->hit && j != s->session->compress_meth)
		{
		al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED);
		goto f_err;
		}
	if (j == 0)
		comp=NULL;
	else if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
		{
		al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED);
		goto f_err;
		}
	else
		comp=ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods,j);
	
	if ((j != 0) && (comp == NULL))
		{
		al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
		goto f_err;
		}
	else
		{
		s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
		}
#endif

#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
	/* TLS extensions*/
	if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
		{
		if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n, &al))
			{
			/* 'al' set by ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext */
			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
			goto f_err; 
			}
		if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
			{
			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
				goto err;
			}
		}
#endif

	if (p != (d+n))
		{
		/* wrong packet length */
		al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
		goto f_err;
		}

	return(1);
f_err:
	ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
err:
	return(-1);
	}

int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL *s)
	{
	int al,i,ok,ret= -1;
	unsigned long n,nc,llen,l;
	X509 *x=NULL;
	const unsigned char *q,*p;
	unsigned char *d;
	STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
	SESS_CERT *sc;
	EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
	int need_cert = 1; /* VRS: 0=> will allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */

	n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
		SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A,
		SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B,
		-1,
		s->max_cert_list,
		&ok);

	if (!ok) return((int)n);

	if ((s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) ||
		((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) && 
		(s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE)))
		{
		s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
		return(1);
		}

	if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
		{
		al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
		goto f_err;
		}
	p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;

	if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
		{
		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
		goto err;
		}

	n2l3(p,llen);
	if (llen+3 != n)
		{
		al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
		goto f_err;
		}
	for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
		{
		n2l3(p,l);
		if ((l+nc+3) > llen)
			{
			al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
			goto f_err;
			}

		q=p;
		x=d2i_X509(NULL,&q,l);
		if (x == NULL)
			{
			al=SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
			goto f_err;
			}
		if (q != (p+l))
			{
			al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
			goto f_err;
			}
		if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
			{
			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
			goto err;
			}
		x=NULL;
		nc+=l+3;
		p=q;
		}

	i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
	if ((s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE) && (i <= 0)
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
	    && !((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5) &&
		 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
		)
		{
		al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
		goto f_err; 
		}
	ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */

	sc=ssl_sess_cert_new();
	if (sc == NULL) goto err;

	if (s->session->sess_cert) ssl_sess_cert_free(s->session->sess_cert);
	s->session->sess_cert=sc;

	sc->cert_chain=sk;
	/* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's
	 * certificate, which we don't include in s3_srvr.c */
	x=sk_X509_value(sk,0);
	sk=NULL;
 	/* VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end*/

	pkey=X509_get_pubkey(x);

	/* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
	need_cert = ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5) &&
	            (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
	            ? 0 : 1;

#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
	printf("pkey,x = %p, %p\n", pkey,x);
	printf("ssl_cert_type(x,pkey) = %d\n", ssl_cert_type(x,pkey));
	printf("cipher, alg, nc = %s, %lx, %lx, %d\n", s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->name,
		s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth, need_cert);
#endif    /* KSSL_DEBUG */

	if (need_cert && ((pkey == NULL) || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)))
		{
		x=NULL;
		al=SSL3_AL_FATAL;
		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
			SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
		goto f_err;
		}

	i=ssl_cert_type(x,pkey);
	if (need_cert && i < 0)
		{
		x=NULL;
		al=SSL3_AL_FATAL;
		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
			SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
		goto f_err;
		}

	if (need_cert)
		{
		sc->peer_cert_type=i;
		CRYPTO_add(&x->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
		/* Why would the following ever happen?
		 * We just created sc a couple of lines ago. */
		if (sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509 != NULL)
			X509_free(sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509);
		sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509=x;
		sc->peer_key= &(sc->peer_pkeys[i]);

		if (s->session->peer != NULL)
			X509_free(s->session->peer);
		CRYPTO_add(&x->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
		s->session->peer=x;
		}
	else
		{
		sc->peer_cert_type=i;
		sc->peer_key= NULL;

		if (s->session->peer != NULL)
			X509_free(s->session->peer);
		s->session->peer=NULL;
		}
	s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;

	x=NULL;
	ret=1;

	if (0)
		{
f_err:
		ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
		}
err:
	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
	X509_free(x);
	sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
	return(ret);
	}

int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
	{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
	unsigned char *q,md_buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE*2];
#endif
	EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
	unsigned char *param,*p;
	int al,i,j,param_len,ok;
	long n,alg_k,alg_a;
	EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
	const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
	RSA *rsa=NULL;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
	DH *dh=NULL;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
	EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL;
	BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
	EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
	int curve_nid = 0;
	int encoded_pt_len = 0;
#endif

	/* use same message size as in ssl3_get_certificate_request()
	 * as ServerKeyExchange message may be skipped */
	n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
		SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A,
		SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B,
		-1,
		s->max_cert_list,
		&ok);
	if (!ok) return((int)n);

	if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)
		{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
		/* In plain PSK ciphersuite, ServerKeyExchange can be
		   omitted if no identity hint is sent. Set
		   session->sess_cert anyway to avoid problems
		   later.*/
		if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)
			{
			s->session->sess_cert=ssl_sess_cert_new();
			if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
				OPENSSL_free(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
			s->ctx->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
			}
#endif
		s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
		return(1);
		}

	param=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
	if (s->session->sess_cert != NULL)
		{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
		if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL)
			{
			RSA_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp);
			s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp=NULL;
			}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
		if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp)
			{
			DH_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp);
			s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp=NULL;
			}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
		if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp)
			{
			EC_KEY_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp);
			s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp=NULL;
			}
#endif
		}
	else
		{
		s->session->sess_cert=ssl_sess_cert_new();
		}

	param_len=0;
	alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
	alg_a=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);

#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
	if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
		{
		char tmp_id_hint[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1];

		al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
		n2s(p,i);
		param_len=i+2;
		/* Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used
		 * in ssl3_send_client_key_exchange.  Assume that the
		 * maximum length of a PSK identity hint can be as
		 * long as the maximum length of a PSK identity. */
		if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
			{
			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
				SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
			goto f_err;
			}
		if (param_len > n)
			{
			al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
				SSL_R_BAD_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT_LENGTH);
			goto f_err;
			}
		/* If received PSK identity hint contains NULL
		 * characters, the hint is truncated from the first
		 * NULL. p may not be ending with NULL, so create a
		 * NULL-terminated string. */
		memcpy(tmp_id_hint, p, i);
		memset(tmp_id_hint+i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1-i);
		if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
			OPENSSL_free(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
		s->ctx->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(tmp_id_hint);
		if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
			{
			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
			goto f_err;
			}	   

		p+=i;
		n-=param_len;
		}
	else
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
	if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
		{
		n2s(p,i);
		param_len=i+2;
		if (param_len > n)
			{
			al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_N_LENGTH);
			goto f_err;
			}
		if (!(s->srp_ctx.N=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
			{
			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
			goto err;
			}
		p+=i;

		n2s(p,i);
		param_len+=i+2;
		if (param_len > n)
			{
			al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_G_LENGTH);
			goto f_err;
			}
		if (!(s->srp_ctx.g=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
			{
			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
			goto err;
			}
		p+=i;

		i = (unsigned int)(p[0]);
		p++;
		param_len+=i+1;
		if (param_len > n)
			{
			al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_S_LENGTH);
			goto f_err;
			}
		if (!(s->srp_ctx.s=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
			{
			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
			goto err;
			}
		p+=i;

		n2s(p,i);
		param_len+=i+2;
		if (param_len > n)
			{
			al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_B_LENGTH);
			goto f_err;
			}
		if (!(s->srp_ctx.B=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
			{
			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
			goto err;
			}
		p+=i;
		n-=param_len;

/* We must check if there is a certificate */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
		if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
			pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
#else
		if (0)
			;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
		else if (alg_a & SSL_aDSS)
			pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].x509);
#endif
		}
	else
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
	if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
		{
		if ((rsa=RSA_new()) == NULL)
			{
			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
			goto err;
			}
		n2s(p,i);
		param_len=i+2;
		if (param_len > n)
			{
			al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_MODULUS_LENGTH);
			goto f_err;
			}
		if (!(rsa->n=BN_bin2bn(p,i,rsa->n)))
			{
			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
			goto err;
			}
		p+=i;

		n2s(p,i);
		param_len+=i+2;
		if (param_len > n)
			{
			al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_E_LENGTH);
			goto f_err;
			}
		if (!(rsa->e=BN_bin2bn(p,i,rsa->e)))
			{
			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
			goto err;
			}
		p+=i;
		n-=param_len;

		/* this should be because we are using an export cipher */
		if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
			pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
		else
			{
			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
			goto err;
			}
		s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp=rsa;
		rsa=NULL;
		}
#else /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
	if (0)
		;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
	else if (alg_k & SSL_kEDH)
		{
		if ((dh=DH_new()) == NULL)
			{
			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
			goto err;
			}
		n2s(p,i);
		param_len=i+2;
		if (param_len > n)
			{
			al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_LENGTH);
			goto f_err;
			}
		if (!(dh->p=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
			{
			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
			goto err;
			}
		p+=i;

		n2s(p,i);
		param_len+=i+2;
		if (param_len > n)
			{
			al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_DH_G_LENGTH);
			goto f_err;
			}
		if (!(dh->g=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
			{
			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
			goto err;
			}
		p+=i;

		n2s(p,i);
		param_len+=i+2;
		if (param_len > n)
			{
			al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_DH_PUB_KEY_LENGTH);
			goto f_err;
			}
		if (!(dh->pub_key=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
			{
			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
			goto err;
			}
		p+=i;
		n-=param_len;

#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
		if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
			pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
#else
		if (0)
			;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
		else if (alg_a & SSL_aDSS)
			pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].x509);
#endif
		/* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */

		s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp=dh;
		dh=NULL;
		}
	else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHr) || (alg_k & SSL_kDHd))
		{
		al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TRIED_TO_USE_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER);
		goto f_err;
		}
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DH */

#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
	else if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
		{
		EC_GROUP *ngroup;
		const EC_GROUP *group;

		if ((ecdh=EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
			{
			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
			goto err;
			}

		/* Extract elliptic curve parameters and the
		 * server's ephemeral ECDH public key.
		 * Keep accumulating lengths of various components in
		 * param_len and make sure it never exceeds n.
		 */

		/* XXX: For now we only support named (not generic) curves
		 * and the ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
		 */
		param_len=3;
		if ((param_len > n) ||
		    (*p != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE) || 
		    ((curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(p + 2))) == 0)) 
			{
			al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
			goto f_err;
			}

		ngroup = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(curve_nid);
		if (ngroup == NULL)
			{
			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_EC_LIB);
			goto err;
			}
		if (EC_KEY_set_group(ecdh, ngroup) == 0)
			{
			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_EC_LIB);
			goto err;
			}
		EC_GROUP_free(ngroup);

		group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh);

		if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
		    (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
			{
			al=SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION;
			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
			goto f_err;
			}

		p+=3;

		/* Next, get the encoded ECPoint */
		if (((srvr_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) ||
		    ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL))
			{
			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
			goto err;
			}

		encoded_pt_len = *p;  /* length of encoded point */
		p+=1;
		param_len += (1 + encoded_pt_len);
		if ((param_len > n) ||
		    (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, srvr_ecpoint, 
			p, encoded_pt_len, bn_ctx) == 0))
			{
			al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
			goto f_err;
			}

		n-=param_len;
		p+=encoded_pt_len;

		/* The ECC/TLS specification does not mention
		 * the use of DSA to sign ECParameters in the server
		 * key exchange message. We do support RSA and ECDSA.
		 */
		if (0) ;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
		else if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
			pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
		else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)
			pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509);
#endif
		/* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
		EC_KEY_set_public_key(ecdh, srvr_ecpoint);
		s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp=ecdh;
		ecdh=NULL;
		BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
		bn_ctx = NULL;
		EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint);
		srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
		}
	else if (alg_k)
		{
		al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
		goto f_err;
		}
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */


	/* p points to the next byte, there are 'n' bytes left */

	/* if it was signed, check the signature */
	if (pkey != NULL)
		{
		if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
			{
			int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
			/* Should never happen */
			if (sigalg == -1)
				{
				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
				goto err;
				}
			/* Check key type is consistent with signature */
			if (sigalg != (int)p[1])
				{
				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
				al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
				goto f_err;
				}
			md = tls12_get_hash(p[0]);
			if (md == NULL)
				{
				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
				al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
				goto f_err;
				}
#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
#endif
			p += 2;
			n -= 2;
			}
		else
			md = EVP_sha1();
			
		n2s(p,i);
		n-=2;
		j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);

		if ((i != n) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
			{
			/* wrong packet length */
			al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
			goto f_err;
			}

#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
		if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
			{
			int num;

			j=0;
			q=md_buf;
			for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
				{
				EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
					EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
				EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
					?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
				EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
				EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
				EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,param,param_len);
				EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,(unsigned int *)&i);
				q+=i;
				j+=i;
				}
			i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j, p, n,
								pkey->pkey.rsa);
			if (i < 0)
				{
				al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
				goto f_err;
				}
			if (i == 0)
				{
				/* bad signature */
				al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
				goto f_err;
				}
			}
		else
#endif
			{
			EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
			EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
			EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
			EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,param,param_len);
			if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&md_ctx,p,(int)n,pkey) <= 0)
				{
				/* bad signature */
				al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
				goto f_err;
				}
			}
		}
	else
		{
		if (!(alg_a & SSL_aNULL) && !(alg_k & SSL_kPSK))
			/* aNULL or kPSK do not need public keys */
			{
			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
			goto err;
			}
		/* still data left over */
		if (n != 0)
			{
			al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
			goto f_err;
			}
		}
	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
	return(1);
f_err:
	ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
err:
	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
	if (rsa != NULL)
		RSA_free(rsa);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
	if (dh != NULL)
		DH_free(dh);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
	BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
	EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint);
	if (ecdh != NULL)
		EC_KEY_free(ecdh);
#endif
	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
	return(-1);
	}

int ssl3_get_certificate_request(SSL *s)
	{
	int ok,ret=0;
	unsigned long n,nc,l;
	unsigned int llen, ctype_num,i;
	X509_NAME *xn=NULL;
	const unsigned char *p,*q;
	unsigned char *d;
	STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk=NULL;

	n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
		SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A,
		SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B,
		-1,
		s->max_cert_list,
		&ok);

	if (!ok) return((int)n);

	s->s3->tmp.cert_req=0;

	if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE)
		{
		s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
		/* If we get here we don't need any cached handshake records
		 * as we wont be doing client auth.
		 */
		if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
			{
			if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
				goto err;
			}
		return(1);
		}

	if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST)
		{
		ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
		goto err;
		}

	/* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
	if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
		{
		if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
			{
			ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,SSL_R_TLS_CLIENT_CERT_REQ_WITH_ANON_CIPHER);
			goto err;
			}
		}

	p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;

	if ((ca_sk=sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp)) == NULL)
		{
		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
		goto err;
		}

	/* get the certificate types */
	ctype_num= *(p++);
	if (ctype_num > SSL3_CT_NUMBER)
		ctype_num=SSL3_CT_NUMBER;
	for (i=0; i<ctype_num; i++)
		s->s3->tmp.ctype[i]= p[i];
	p+=ctype_num;
	if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
		{
		n2s(p, llen);
		/* Check we have enough room for signature algorithms and
		 * following length value.
		 */
		if ((unsigned long)(p - d + llen + 2) > n)
			{
			ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
			goto err;
			}
		if ((llen & 1) || !tls1_process_sigalgs(s, p, llen))
			{
			ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR);
			goto err;
			}
		p += llen;
		}

	/* get the CA RDNs */
	n2s(p,llen);
#if 0
{
FILE *out;
out=fopen("/tmp/vsign.der","w");
fwrite(p,1,llen,out);
fclose(out);
}
#endif

	if ((unsigned long)(p - d + llen) != n)
		{
		ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
		goto err;
		}

	for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
		{
		n2s(p,l);
		if ((l+nc+2) > llen)
			{
			if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
				goto cont; /* netscape bugs */
			ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,SSL_R_CA_DN_TOO_LONG);
			goto err;
			}

		q=p;

		if ((xn=d2i_X509_NAME(NULL,&q,l)) == NULL)
			{
			/* If netscape tolerance is on, ignore errors */
			if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG)
				goto cont;
			else
				{
				ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
				goto err;
				}
			}

		if (q != (p+l))
			{
			ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
			goto err;
			}
		if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk,xn))
			{
			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
			goto err;
			}

		p+=l;
		nc+=l+2;
		}

	if (0)
		{
cont:
		ERR_clear_error();
		}

	/* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
	s->s3->tmp.cert_req=1;
	s->s3->tmp.ctype_num=ctype_num;
	if (s->s3->tmp.ca_names != NULL)
		sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.ca_names,X509_NAME_free);
	s->s3->tmp.ca_names=ca_sk;
	ca_sk=NULL;

	ret=1;
err:
	if (ca_sk != NULL) sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk,X509_NAME_free);
	return(ret);
	}

static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME * const *a, const X509_NAME * const *b)
	{
	return(X509_NAME_cmp(*a,*b));
	}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *s)
	{
	int ok,al,ret=0, ticklen;
	long n;
	const unsigned char *p;
	unsigned char *d;

	n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
		SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A,
		SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B,
		-1,
		16384,
		&ok);

	if (!ok)
		return((int)n);

	if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED)
		{
		s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
		return(1);
		}
	if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET)
		{
		al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
		goto f_err;
		}
	if (n < 6)
		{
		/* need at least ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket length */
		al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
		goto f_err;
		}

	p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
	n2l(p, s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint);
	n2s(p, ticklen);
	/* ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket_length + ticket */
	if (ticklen + 6 != n)
		{
		al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
		goto f_err;
		}
	if (s->session->tlsext_tick)
		{
		OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_tick);
		s->session->tlsext_ticklen = 0;
		}
	s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
	if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
		{
		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
		goto err;
		}
	memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick, p, ticklen);
	s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
	/* There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket sesion.
	 * One is to set an appropriate session ID and then the server
	 * must return a match in ServerHello. This allows the normal
	 * client session ID matching to work and we know much 
	 * earlier that the ticket has been accepted.
	 * 
	 * The other way is to set zero length session ID when the
	 * ticket is presented and rely on the handshake to determine
	 * session resumption.
	 *
	 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with
	 * assumptions elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set
	 * to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is SHA256 is disabled) hash of the
	 * ticket.
	 */ 
	EVP_Digest(p, ticklen,
			s->session->session_id, &s->session->session_id_length,
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
							EVP_sha256(), NULL);
#else
							EVP_sha1(), NULL);
#endif
	ret=1;
	return(ret);
f_err:
	ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
err:
	return(-1);
	}

int ssl3_get_cert_status(SSL *s)
	{
	int ok, al;
	unsigned long resplen,n;
	const unsigned char *p;

	n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
		SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A,
		SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B,
		SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS,
		16384,
		&ok);

	if (!ok) return((int)n);
	if (n < 4)
		{
		/* need at least status type + length */
		al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
		goto f_err;
		}
	p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
	if (*p++ != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
		{
		al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);
		goto f_err;
		}
	n2l3(p, resplen);
	if (resplen + 4 != n)
		{
		al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
		goto f_err;
		}
	if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
		OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
	s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = BUF_memdup(p, resplen);
	if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
		{
		al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
		goto f_err;
		}
	s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = resplen;
	if (s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
		{
		int ret;
		ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
		if (ret == 0)
			{
			al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS,SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE);
			goto f_err;
			}
		if (ret < 0)
			{
			al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
			goto f_err;
			}
		}
	return 1;
f_err:
	ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
	return(-1);
	}
#endif

int ssl3_get_server_done(SSL *s)
	{
	int ok,ret=0;
	long n;

	n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
		SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A,
		SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B,
		SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE,
		30, /* should be very small, like 0 :-) */
		&ok);

	if (!ok) return((int)n);
	if (n > 0)
		{
		/* should contain no data */
		ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_DONE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
		return -1;
		}
	ret=1;
	return(ret);
	}


int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
	{
	unsigned char *p,*d;
	int n;
	unsigned long alg_k;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
	unsigned char *q;
	EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
	KSSL_ERR kssl_err;
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
	EC_KEY *clnt_ecdh = NULL;
	const EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
	EVP_PKEY *srvr_pub_pkey = NULL;
	unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
	int encoded_pt_len = 0;
	BN_CTX * bn_ctx = NULL;
#endif

	if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A)
		{
		d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
		p= &(d[4]);

		alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;

		/* Fool emacs indentation */
		if (0) {}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
		else if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
			{
			RSA *rsa;
			unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];

			if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL)
				rsa=s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp;
			else
				{
				pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
				if ((pkey == NULL) ||
					(pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
					(pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
					{
					SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
					goto err;
					}
				rsa=pkey->pkey.rsa;
				EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
				}
				
			tmp_buf[0]=s->client_version>>8;
			tmp_buf[1]=s->client_version&0xff;
			if (RAND_bytes(&(tmp_buf[2]),sizeof tmp_buf-2) <= 0)
					goto err;

			s->session->master_key_length=sizeof tmp_buf;

			q=p;
			/* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
			if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
				p+=2;
			n=RSA_public_encrypt(sizeof tmp_buf,
				tmp_buf,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
#ifdef PKCS1_CHECK
			if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1) p[1]++;
			if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2) tmp_buf[0]=0x70;
#endif
			if (n <= 0)
				{
				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
				goto err;
				}

			/* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
			if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
				{
				s2n(n,q);
				n+=2;
				}

			s->session->master_key_length=
				s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
					s->session->master_key,
					tmp_buf,sizeof tmp_buf);
			OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_buf,sizeof tmp_buf);
			}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
		else if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
			{
			krb5_error_code	krb5rc;
			KSSL_CTX	*kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
			/*  krb5_data	krb5_ap_req;  */
			krb5_data	*enc_ticket;
			krb5_data	authenticator, *authp = NULL;
			EVP_CIPHER_CTX	ciph_ctx;
			const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
			unsigned char	iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
			unsigned char	tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
			unsigned char	epms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH 
						+ EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
			int 		padl, outl = sizeof(epms);

			EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);

#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
			printf("ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(%lx & %lx)\n",
				alg_k, SSL_kKRB5);
#endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */

			authp = NULL;
#ifdef KRB5SENDAUTH
			if (KRB5SENDAUTH)  authp = &authenticator;
#endif	/* KRB5SENDAUTH */

			krb5rc = kssl_cget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, authp,
				&kssl_err);
			enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
			if (enc == NULL)
			    goto err;
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
			{
			printf("kssl_cget_tkt rtn %d\n", krb5rc);
			if (krb5rc && kssl_err.text)
			  printf("kssl_cget_tkt kssl_err=%s\n", kssl_err.text);
			}
#endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */

			if (krb5rc)
				{
				ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,
						SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
						kssl_err.reason);
				goto err;
				}

			/*  20010406 VRS - Earlier versions used KRB5 AP_REQ
			**  in place of RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper, as in:
			**
			**  Send ticket (copy to *p, set n = length)
			**  n = krb5_ap_req.length;
			**  memcpy(p, krb5_ap_req.data, krb5_ap_req.length);
			**  if (krb5_ap_req.data)  
			**    kssl_krb5_free_data_contents(NULL,&krb5_ap_req);
			**
			**  Now using real RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper
			**  (Thanks to Simon Wilkinson <sxw@sxw.org.uk>)
			**  Note: 2712 "opaque" types are here replaced
			**  with a 2-byte length followed by the value.
			**  Example:
			**  KerberosWrapper= xx xx asn1ticket 0 0 xx xx encpms
			**  Where "xx xx" = length bytes.  Shown here with
			**  optional authenticator omitted.
			*/

			/*  KerberosWrapper.Ticket		*/
			s2n(enc_ticket->length,p);
			memcpy(p, enc_ticket->data, enc_ticket->length);
			p+= enc_ticket->length;
			n = enc_ticket->length + 2;

			/*  KerberosWrapper.Authenticator	*/
			if (authp  &&  authp->length)  
				{
				s2n(authp->length,p);
				memcpy(p, authp->data, authp->length);
				p+= authp->length;
				n+= authp->length + 2;
				
				free(authp->data);
				authp->data = NULL;
				authp->length = 0;
				}
			else
				{
				s2n(0,p);/*  null authenticator length	*/
				n+=2;
				}
 
			    tmp_buf[0]=s->client_version>>8;
			    tmp_buf[1]=s->client_version&0xff;
			    if (RAND_bytes(&(tmp_buf[2]),sizeof tmp_buf-2) <= 0)
				goto err;

			/*  20010420 VRS.  Tried it this way; failed.
			**	EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc, NULL,NULL);
			**	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(&ciph_ctx,
			**				kssl_ctx->length);
			**	EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,NULL, key,iv);
			*/

			memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv);  /* per RFC 1510 */
			EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc, NULL,
				kssl_ctx->key,iv);
			EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx,epms,&outl,tmp_buf,
				sizeof tmp_buf);
			EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(epms[outl]),&padl);
			outl += padl;
			if (outl > (int)sizeof epms)
				{
				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
				goto err;
				}
			EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);

			/*  KerberosWrapper.EncryptedPreMasterSecret	*/
			s2n(outl,p);
			memcpy(p, epms, outl);
			p+=outl;
			n+=outl + 2;

			s->session->master_key_length=
				s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
					s->session->master_key,
					tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf);

			OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf);
			OPENSSL_cleanse(epms, outl);
			}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
		else if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
			{
			DH *dh_srvr,*dh_clnt;

			if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) 
				{
				ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
				goto err;
				}

			if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp != NULL)
				dh_srvr=s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp;
			else
				{
				/* we get them from the cert */
				ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_DH_PARAMETERS);
				goto err;
				}
			
			/* generate a new random key */
			if ((dh_clnt=DHparams_dup(dh_srvr)) == NULL)
				{
				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
				goto err;
				}
			if (!DH_generate_key(dh_clnt))
				{
				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
				DH_free(dh_clnt);
				goto err;
				}

			/* use the 'p' output buffer for the DH key, but
			 * make sure to clear it out afterwards */

			n=DH_compute_key(p,dh_srvr->pub_key,dh_clnt);

			if (n <= 0)
				{
				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
				DH_free(dh_clnt);
				goto err;
				}

			/* generate master key from the result */
			s->session->master_key_length=
				s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
					s->session->master_key,p,n);
			/* clean up */
			memset(p,0,n);

			/* send off the data */
			n=BN_num_bytes(dh_clnt->pub_key);
			s2n(n,p);
			BN_bn2bin(dh_clnt->pub_key,p);
			n+=2;

			DH_free(dh_clnt);

			/* perhaps clean things up a bit EAY EAY EAY EAY*/
			}
#endif

#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH 
		else if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
			{
			const EC_GROUP *srvr_group = NULL;
			EC_KEY *tkey;
			int ecdh_clnt_cert = 0;
			int field_size = 0;

			/* Did we send out the client's
			 * ECDH share for use in premaster
			 * computation as part of client certificate?
			 * If so, set ecdh_clnt_cert to 1.
			 */
			if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) && (s->cert != NULL)) 
				{
				/* XXX: For now, we do not support client
				 * authentication using ECDH certificates.
				 * To add such support, one needs to add
				 * code that checks for appropriate 
				 * conditions and sets ecdh_clnt_cert to 1.
				 * For example, the cert have an ECC
				 * key on the same curve as the server's
				 * and the key should be authorized for
				 * key agreement.
				 *
				 * One also needs to add code in ssl3_connect
				 * to skip sending the certificate verify
				 * message.
				 *
				 * if ((s->cert->key->privatekey != NULL) &&
				 *     (s->cert->key->privatekey->type ==
				 *      EVP_PKEY_EC) && ...)
				 * ecdh_clnt_cert = 1;
				 */
				}

			if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp != NULL)
				{
				tkey = s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp;
				}
			else
				{
				/* Get the Server Public Key from Cert */
				srvr_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session-> \
				    sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509);
				if ((srvr_pub_pkey == NULL) ||
				    (srvr_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC) ||
				    (srvr_pub_pkey->pkey.ec == NULL))
					{
					SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
					    ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
					goto err;
					}

				tkey = srvr_pub_pkey->pkey.ec;
				}

			srvr_group   = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
			srvr_ecpoint = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(tkey);

			if ((srvr_group == NULL) || (srvr_ecpoint == NULL))
				{
				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
				    ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
				goto err;
				}

			if ((clnt_ecdh=EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) 
				{
				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
				goto err;
				}

			if (!EC_KEY_set_group(clnt_ecdh, srvr_group))
				{
				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_EC_LIB);
				goto err;
				}
			if (ecdh_clnt_cert) 
				{ 
				/* Reuse key info from our certificate
				 * We only need our private key to perform
				 * the ECDH computation.
				 */
				const BIGNUM *priv_key;
				tkey = s->cert->key->privatekey->pkey.ec;
				priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
				if (priv_key == NULL)
					{
					SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
					goto err;
					}
				if (!EC_KEY_set_private_key(clnt_ecdh, priv_key))
					{
					SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_EC_LIB);
					goto err;
					}
				}
			else 
				{
				/* Generate a new ECDH key pair */
				if (!(EC_KEY_generate_key(clnt_ecdh)))
					{
					SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
					goto err;
					}
				}

			/* use the 'p' output buffer for the ECDH key, but
			 * make sure to clear it out afterwards
			 */

			field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(srvr_group);
			if (field_size <= 0)
				{
				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 
				       ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
				goto err;
				}
			n=ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, srvr_ecpoint, clnt_ecdh, NULL);
			if (n <= 0)
				{
				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 
				       ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
				goto err;
				}

			/* generate master key from the result */
			s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc \
			    -> generate_master_secret(s, 
				s->session->master_key,
				p, n);

			memset(p, 0, n); /* clean up */

			if (ecdh_clnt_cert) 
				{
				/* Send empty client key exch message */
				n = 0;
				}
			else 
				{
				/* First check the size of encoding and
				 * allocate memory accordingly.
				 */
				encoded_pt_len = 
				    EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group, 
					EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh), 
					POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, 
					NULL, 0, NULL);

				encodedPoint = (unsigned char *) 
				    OPENSSL_malloc(encoded_pt_len * 
					sizeof(unsigned char)); 
				bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
				if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || 
				    (bn_ctx == NULL)) 
					{
					SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
					goto err;
					}

				/* Encode the public key */
				n = EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group, 
				    EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh), 
				    POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, 
				    encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len, bn_ctx);

				*p = n; /* length of encoded point */
				/* Encoded point will be copied here */
				p += 1; 
				/* copy the point */
				memcpy((unsigned char *)p, encodedPoint, n);
				/* increment n to account for length field */
				n += 1; 
				}

			/* Free allocated memory */
			BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
			if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
			if (clnt_ecdh != NULL) 
				 EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh);
			EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey);
			}
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
		else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) 
			{
			/* GOST key exchange message creation */
			EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
			X509 *peer_cert; 
			size_t msglen;
			unsigned int md_len;
			int keytype;
			unsigned char premaster_secret[32],shared_ukm[32], tmp[256];
			EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash;
			EVP_PKEY *pub_key;

			/* Get server sertificate PKEY and create ctx from it */
			peer_cert=s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[(keytype=SSL_PKEY_GOST01)].x509;
			if (!peer_cert) 
				peer_cert=s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[(keytype=SSL_PKEY_GOST94)].x509;
			if (!peer_cert)		{
					SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
					goto err;
				}	
				
			pkey_ctx=EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pub_key=X509_get_pubkey(peer_cert),NULL);
			/* If we have send a certificate, and certificate key

			 * parameters match those of server certificate, use
			 * certificate key for key exchange
			 */

			 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
					
			EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
			  /* Generate session key */	
		    RAND_bytes(premaster_secret,32);
			/* If we have client certificate, use its secret as peer key */
			if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req && s->cert->key->privatekey) {
				if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx,s->cert->key->privatekey) <=0) {
					/* If there was an error - just ignore it. Ephemeral key
					* would be used
					*/
					ERR_clear_error();
				}
			}			
			/* Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific
			 * context data */
			ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
			EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash,EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94));
			EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash,s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
			EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
			EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len);
			EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ukm_hash);
			if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx,-1,EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV,
				8,shared_ukm)<0) {
					SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
						SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
					goto err;
				}	
			/* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
			/*Encapsulate it into sequence */
			*(p++)=V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED;
			msglen=255;
			if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx,tmp,&msglen,premaster_secret,32)<0) {
			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
					SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
				goto err;
			}
			if (msglen >= 0x80)
				{
				*(p++)=0x81;
				*(p++)= msglen & 0xff;
				n=msglen+3;
				}
			else
				{
				*(p++)= msglen & 0xff;
				n=msglen+2;
				}
			memcpy(p, tmp, msglen);
			/* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
			if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
				{
				/* Set flag "skip certificate verify" */
				s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
				}
			EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
			s->session->master_key_length=
				s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
					s->session->master_key,premaster_secret,32);
			EVP_PKEY_free(pub_key);

			}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
		else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
			{
			if (s->srp_ctx.A != NULL)
				{
				/* send off the data */
				n=BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A);
				s2n(n,p);
				BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A,p);
				n+=2;
				}
			else
				{
				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
				goto err;
				}
			if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
				OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
			s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
			if (s->session->srp_username == NULL)
				{
				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
					ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
				goto err;
				}

			if ((s->session->master_key_length = SRP_generate_client_master_secret(s,s->session->master_key))<0)
				{
				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
				goto err;
				}
			}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
		else if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
			{
			char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN];
			unsigned char *t = NULL;
			unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4];
			unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
			int psk_err = 1;

			n = 0;
			if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL)
				{
				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
					SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
				goto err;
				}

			psk_len = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint,
				identity, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN,
				psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
			if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN)
				{
				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
					ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
				goto psk_err;
				}
			else if (psk_len == 0)
				{
				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
					SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
				goto psk_err;
				}

			/* create PSK pre_master_secret */
			pre_ms_len = 2+psk_len+2+psk_len;
			t = psk_or_pre_ms;
			memmove(psk_or_pre_ms+psk_len+4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
			s2n(psk_len, t);
			memset(t, 0, psk_len);
			t+=psk_len;
			s2n(psk_len, t);

			if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
				OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
			s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
			if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
				s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
				{
				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
					ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
				goto psk_err;
				}

			if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
				OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
			s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup(identity);
			if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL)
				{
				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
					ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
				goto psk_err;
				}

			s->session->master_key_length =
				s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
					s->session->master_key,
					psk_or_pre_ms, pre_ms_len); 
			n = strlen(identity);
			s2n(n, p);
			memcpy(p, identity, n);
			n+=2;
			psk_err = 0;
		psk_err:
			OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN);
			OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
			if (psk_err != 0)
				{
				ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
				goto err;
				}
			}
#endif
		else
			{
			ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
			    SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
			    ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
			goto err;
			}
		
		*(d++)=SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE;
		l2n3(n,d);

		s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B;
		/* number of bytes to write */
		s->init_num=n+4;
		s->init_off=0;
		}

	/* SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B */
	return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
err:
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
	BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
	if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
	if (clnt_ecdh != NULL) 
		EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh);
	EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey);
#endif
	return(-1);
	}

int ssl3_send_client_verify(SSL *s)
	{
	unsigned char *p,*d;
	unsigned char data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
	EVP_PKEY *pkey;
	EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx=NULL;
	EVP_MD_CTX mctx;
	unsigned u=0;
	unsigned long n;
	int j;

	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);

	if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A)
		{
		d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
		p= &(d[4]);
		pkey=s->cert->key->privatekey;
/* Create context from key and test if sha1 is allowed as digest */
		pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey,NULL);
		EVP_PKEY_sign_init(pctx);
		if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(pctx, EVP_sha1())>0)
			{
			if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
				s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
						NID_sha1,
						&(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]));
			}
		else
			{
			ERR_clear_error();
			}
		/* For TLS v1.2 send signature algorithm and signature
		 * using agreed digest and cached handshake records.
		 */
		if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
			{
			long hdatalen = 0;
			void *hdata;
			const EVP_MD *md = s->cert->key->digest;
			hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer,
								&hdata);
			if (hdatalen <= 0 || !tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md))
				{
				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY,
						ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
				goto err;
				}
			p += 2;
#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
			fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client alg %s\n",
							EVP_MD_name(md));
#endif
			if (!EVP_SignInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
				|| !EVP_SignUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen)
				|| !EVP_SignFinal(&mctx, p + 2, &u, pkey))
				{
				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY,
						ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
				goto err;
				}
			s2n(u,p);
			n = u + 4;
			if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
				goto err;
			}
		else
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
		if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
			{
			s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
				NID_md5,
			 	&(data[0]));
			if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, data,
					 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,
					&(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0 )
				{
				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY,ERR_R_RSA_LIB);
				goto err;
				}
			s2n(u,p);
			n=u+2;
			}
		else
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
			if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
			{
			if (!DSA_sign(pkey->save_type,
				&(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
				SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,&(p[2]),
				(unsigned int *)&j,pkey->pkey.dsa))
				{
				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY,ERR_R_DSA_LIB);
				goto err;
				}
			s2n(j,p);
			n=j+2;
			}
		else
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
			if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
			{
			if (!ECDSA_sign(pkey->save_type,
				&(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
				SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,&(p[2]),
				(unsigned int *)&j,pkey->pkey.ec))
				{
				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY,
				    ERR_R_ECDSA_LIB);
				goto err;
				}
			s2n(j,p);
			n=j+2;
			}
		else
#endif
		if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) 
		{
		unsigned char signbuf[64];
		int i;
		size_t sigsize=64;
		s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
			NID_id_GostR3411_94,
			data);
		if (EVP_PKEY_sign(pctx, signbuf, &sigsize, data, 32) <= 0) {
			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY,
			ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
			goto err;
		}
		for (i=63,j=0; i>=0; j++, i--) {
			p[2+j]=signbuf[i];
		}	
		s2n(j,p);
		n=j+2;
		}
		else
		{
			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
			goto err;
		}
		*(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
		l2n3(n,d);

		s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B;
		s->init_num=(int)n+4;
		s->init_off=0;
		}
	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
	return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
err:
	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
	return(-1);
	}

int ssl3_send_client_certificate(SSL *s)
	{
	X509 *x509=NULL;
	EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
	int i;
	unsigned long l;

	if (s->state ==	SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A)
		{
		if ((s->cert == NULL) ||
			(s->cert->key->x509 == NULL) ||
			(s->cert->key->privatekey == NULL))
			s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B;
		else
			s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C;
		}

	/* We need to get a client cert */
	if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B)
		{
		/* If we get an error, we need to
		 * ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP; return(-1);
		 * We then get retied later */
		i=0;
		i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);
		if (i < 0)
			{
			s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
			return(-1);
			}
		s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
		if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL))
			{
			s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B;
			if (	!SSL_use_certificate(s,x509) ||
				!SSL_use_PrivateKey(s,pkey))
				i=0;
			}
		else if (i == 1)
			{
			i=0;
			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
			}

		if (x509 != NULL) X509_free(x509);
		if (pkey != NULL) EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
		if (i == 0)
			{
			if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
				{
				s->s3->tmp.cert_req=0;
				ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
				return(1);
				}
			else
				{
				s->s3->tmp.cert_req=2;
				}
			}

		/* Ok, we have a cert */
		s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C;
		}

	if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C)
		{
		s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D;
		l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,
			(s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 2)?NULL:s->cert->key->x509);
		s->init_num=(int)l;
		s->init_off=0;
		}
	/* SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D */
	return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
	}

#define has_bits(i,m)	(((i)&(m)) == (m))

int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
	{
	int i,idx;
	long alg_k,alg_a;
	EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
	SESS_CERT *sc;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
	RSA *rsa;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
	DH *dh;
#endif

	alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
	alg_a=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;

	/* we don't have a certificate */
	if ((alg_a & (SSL_aDH|SSL_aNULL|SSL_aKRB5)) || (alg_k & SSL_kPSK))
		return(1);

	sc=s->session->sess_cert;
	if (sc == NULL)
		{
		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
		goto err;
		}

#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
	rsa=s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
	dh=s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp;
#endif

	/* This is the passed certificate */

	idx=sc->peer_cert_type;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
	if (idx == SSL_PKEY_ECC)
		{
		if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509,
		    						s) == 0) 
			{ /* check failed */
			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
			goto f_err;
			}
		else 
			{
			return 1;
			}
		}
#endif
	pkey=X509_get_pubkey(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509);
	i=X509_certificate_type(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509,pkey);
	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);

	
	/* Check that we have a certificate if we require one */
	if ((alg_a & SSL_aRSA) && !has_bits(i,EVP_PK_RSA|EVP_PKT_SIGN))
		{
		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT);
		goto f_err;
		}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
	else if ((alg_a & SSL_aDSS) && !has_bits(i,EVP_PK_DSA|EVP_PKT_SIGN))
		{
		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT);
		goto f_err;
		}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
	if ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA) &&
		!(has_bits(i,EVP_PK_RSA|EVP_PKT_ENC) || (rsa != NULL)))
		{
		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
		goto f_err;
		}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
	if ((alg_k & SSL_kEDH) &&
		!(has_bits(i,EVP_PK_DH|EVP_PKT_EXCH) || (dh != NULL)))
		{
		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_DH_KEY);
		goto f_err;
		}
	else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHr) && !has_bits(i,EVP_PK_DH|EVP_PKS_RSA))
		{
		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_DH_RSA_CERT);
		goto f_err;
		}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
	else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHd) && !has_bits(i,EVP_PK_DH|EVP_PKS_DSA))
		{
		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_DH_DSA_CERT);
		goto f_err;
		}
#endif
#endif

	if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && !has_bits(i,EVP_PKT_EXP))
		{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
		if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
			{
			if (rsa == NULL
			    || RSA_size(rsa)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher))
				{
				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_RSA_KEY);
				goto f_err;
				}
			}
		else
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
			if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
			    {
			    if (dh == NULL
				|| DH_size(dh)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher))
				{
				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_DH_KEY);
				goto f_err;
				}
			}
		else
#endif
			{
			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
			goto f_err;
			}
		}
	return(1);
f_err:
	ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
err:
	return(0);
	}

#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
int ssl3_send_next_proto(SSL *s)
	{
	unsigned int len, padding_len;
	unsigned char *d;

	if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A)
		{
		len = s->next_proto_negotiated_len;
		padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32);
		d = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
		d[4] = len;
		memcpy(d + 5, s->next_proto_negotiated, len);
		d[5 + len] = padding_len;
		memset(d + 6 + len, 0, padding_len);
		*(d++)=SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO;
		l2n3(2 + len + padding_len, d);
		s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B;
		s->init_num = 4 + 2 + len + padding_len;
		s->init_off = 0;
		}

	return ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE);
}
#endif  /* !OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT && !OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG */

/* Check to see if handshake is full or resumed. Usually this is just a
 * case of checking to see if a cache hit has occurred. In the case of
 * session tickets we have to check the next message to be sure.
 */

#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
int ssl3_check_finished(SSL *s)
	{
	int ok;
	long n;
	/* If we have no ticket it cannot be a resumed session. */
	if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
		return 1;
	/* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate
	 * message, so permit appropriate message length */
	n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
		SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A,
		SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B,
		-1,
		s->max_cert_list,
		&ok);
	if (!ok) return((int)n);
	s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
	if ((s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED)
		|| (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET))
		return 2;

	return 1;
	}
#endif

int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
	{
	int i = 0;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
	if (s->ctx->client_cert_engine)
		{
		i = ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s->ctx->client_cert_engine, s,
						SSL_get_client_CA_list(s),
						px509, ppkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
		if (i != 0)
			return i;
		}
#endif
	if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb)
		i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s,px509,ppkey);
	return i;
	}