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ara-mdk / platform / external / chromium / 0abec4daa38319f371ac6555e7887f6b14f34291 / . / net / socket / ssl_client_socket_win.cc
blob: 511a1f697133028ea6402ea0cabcd40eef475b63 [file] [log] [blame]
// Copyright (c) 2011 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
// found in the LICENSE file.
#include "net/socket/ssl_client_socket_win.h"
#include <schnlsp.h>
#include <map>
#include "base/compiler_specific.h"
#include "base/lazy_instance.h"
#include "base/stl_util-inl.h"
#include "base/string_util.h"
#include "base/synchronization/lock.h"
#include "base/utf_string_conversions.h"
#include "net/base/cert_verifier.h"
#include "net/base/connection_type_histograms.h"
#include "net/base/host_port_pair.h"
#include "net/base/io_buffer.h"
#include "net/base/net_log.h"
#include "net/base/net_errors.h"
#include "net/base/ssl_cert_request_info.h"
#include "net/base/ssl_connection_status_flags.h"
#include "net/base/ssl_info.h"
#include "net/socket/client_socket_handle.h"
#pragma comment(lib, "secur32.lib")
namespace net {
//-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
// TODO(wtc): See http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa377188(VS.85).aspx
// for the other error codes we may need to map.
static int MapSecurityError(SECURITY_STATUS err) {
// There are numerous security error codes, but these are the ones we thus
// far find interesting.
switch (err) {
case SEC_E_WRONG_PRINCIPAL: // Schannel - server certificate error.
case CERT_E_CN_NO_MATCH: // CryptoAPI
return ERR_CERT_COMMON_NAME_INVALID;
case SEC_E_UNTRUSTED_ROOT: // Schannel - server certificate error or
// unknown_ca alert.
case CERT_E_UNTRUSTEDROOT: // CryptoAPI
return ERR_CERT_AUTHORITY_INVALID;
case SEC_E_CERT_EXPIRED: // Schannel - server certificate error or
// certificate_expired alert.
case CERT_E_EXPIRED: // CryptoAPI
return ERR_CERT_DATE_INVALID;
case CRYPT_E_NO_REVOCATION_CHECK:
return ERR_CERT_NO_REVOCATION_MECHANISM;
case CRYPT_E_REVOCATION_OFFLINE:
return ERR_CERT_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_REVOCATION;
case CRYPT_E_REVOKED: // CryptoAPI and Schannel server certificate error,
// or certificate_revoked alert.
return ERR_CERT_REVOKED;
// We received one of the following alert messages from the server:
// bad_certificate
// unsupported_certificate
// certificate_unknown
case SEC_E_CERT_UNKNOWN:
case CERT_E_ROLE:
return ERR_CERT_INVALID;
// We received one of the following alert messages from the server:
// decode_error
// export_restriction
// handshake_failure
// illegal_parameter
// record_overflow
// unexpected_message
// and all other TLS alerts not explicitly specified elsewhere.
case SEC_E_ILLEGAL_MESSAGE:
// We received one of the following alert messages from the server:
// decrypt_error
// decryption_failed
case SEC_E_DECRYPT_FAILURE:
// We received one of the following alert messages from the server:
// bad_record_mac
// decompression_failure
case SEC_E_MESSAGE_ALTERED:
// TODO(rsleevi): Add SEC_E_INTERNAL_ERROR, which corresponds to an
// internal_error alert message being received. However, it is also used
// by Schannel for authentication errors that happen locally, so it has
// been omitted to prevent masking them as protocol errors.
return ERR_SSL_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
case SEC_E_LOGON_DENIED: // Received a access_denied alert.
return ERR_BAD_SSL_CLIENT_AUTH_CERT;
case SEC_E_UNSUPPORTED_FUNCTION: // Received a protocol_version alert.
case SEC_E_ALGORITHM_MISMATCH: // Received an insufficient_security alert.
return ERR_SSL_VERSION_OR_CIPHER_MISMATCH;
case SEC_E_NO_CREDENTIALS:
return ERR_SSL_CLIENT_AUTH_CERT_NO_PRIVATE_KEY;
case SEC_E_INVALID_HANDLE:
case SEC_E_INVALID_TOKEN:
LOG(ERROR) << "Unexpected error " << err;
return ERR_UNEXPECTED;
case SEC_E_OK:
return OK;
default:
LOG(WARNING) << "Unknown error " << err << " mapped to net::ERR_FAILED";
return ERR_FAILED;
}
}
//-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
// A bitmask consisting of these bit flags encodes which versions of the SSL
// protocol (SSL 3.0 and TLS 1.0) are enabled.
enum {
SSL3 = 1 << 0,
TLS1 = 1 << 1,
SSL_VERSION_MASKS = 1 << 2 // The number of SSL version bitmasks.
};
// CredHandleClass simply gives a default constructor and a destructor to
// SSPI's CredHandle type (a C struct).
class CredHandleClass : public CredHandle {
public:
CredHandleClass() {
SecInvalidateHandle(this);
}
~CredHandleClass() {
if (SecIsValidHandle(this)) {
SECURITY_STATUS status = FreeCredentialsHandle(this);
DCHECK(status == SEC_E_OK);
}
}
};
// A table of CredHandles.
class CredHandleTable {
public:
CredHandleTable() {}
~CredHandleTable() {
STLDeleteContainerPairSecondPointers(client_cert_creds_.begin(),
client_cert_creds_.end());
}
int GetHandle(PCCERT_CONTEXT client_cert,
int ssl_version_mask,
CredHandle** handle_ptr) {
DCHECK(0 < ssl_version_mask &&
ssl_version_mask < arraysize(anonymous_creds_));
CredHandleClass* handle;
base::AutoLock lock(lock_);
if (client_cert) {
CredHandleMapKey key = std::make_pair(client_cert, ssl_version_mask);
CredHandleMap::const_iterator it = client_cert_creds_.find(key);
if (it == client_cert_creds_.end()) {
handle = new CredHandleClass;
client_cert_creds_[key] = handle;
} else {
handle = it->second;
}
} else {
handle = &anonymous_creds_[ssl_version_mask];
}
if (!SecIsValidHandle(handle)) {
int result = InitializeHandle(handle, client_cert, ssl_version_mask);
if (result != OK)
return result;
}
*handle_ptr = handle;
return OK;
}
private:
// CredHandleMapKey is a std::pair consisting of these two components:
// PCCERT_CONTEXT client_cert
// int ssl_version_mask
typedef std::pair<PCCERT_CONTEXT, int> CredHandleMapKey;
typedef std::map<CredHandleMapKey, CredHandleClass*> CredHandleMap;
// Returns OK on success or a network error code on failure.
static int InitializeHandle(CredHandle* handle,
PCCERT_CONTEXT client_cert,
int ssl_version_mask);
base::Lock lock_;
// Anonymous (no client certificate) CredHandles for all possible
// combinations of SSL versions. Defined as an array for fast lookup.
CredHandleClass anonymous_creds_[SSL_VERSION_MASKS];
// CredHandles that use a client certificate.
CredHandleMap client_cert_creds_;
};
static base::LazyInstance<CredHandleTable> g_cred_handle_table(
base::LINKER_INITIALIZED);
// static
int CredHandleTable::InitializeHandle(CredHandle* handle,
PCCERT_CONTEXT client_cert,
int ssl_version_mask) {
SCHANNEL_CRED schannel_cred = {0};
schannel_cred.dwVersion = SCHANNEL_CRED_VERSION;
if (client_cert) {
schannel_cred.cCreds = 1;
schannel_cred.paCred = &client_cert;
// Schannel will make its own copy of client_cert.
}
// The global system registry settings take precedence over the value of
// schannel_cred.grbitEnabledProtocols.
schannel_cred.grbitEnabledProtocols = 0;
if (ssl_version_mask & SSL3)
schannel_cred.grbitEnabledProtocols |= SP_PROT_SSL3;
if (ssl_version_mask & TLS1)
schannel_cred.grbitEnabledProtocols |= SP_PROT_TLS1;
// The default session lifetime is 36000000 milliseconds (ten hours). Set
// schannel_cred.dwSessionLifespan to change the number of milliseconds that
// Schannel keeps the session in its session cache.
// We can set the key exchange algorithms (RSA or DH) in
// schannel_cred.{cSupportedAlgs,palgSupportedAlgs}.
// Although SCH_CRED_AUTO_CRED_VALIDATION is convenient, we have to use
// SCH_CRED_MANUAL_CRED_VALIDATION for three reasons.
// 1. SCH_CRED_AUTO_CRED_VALIDATION doesn't allow us to get the certificate
// context if the certificate validation fails.
// 2. SCH_CRED_AUTO_CRED_VALIDATION returns only one error even if the
// certificate has multiple errors.
// 3. SCH_CRED_AUTO_CRED_VALIDATION doesn't allow us to ignore untrusted CA
// and expired certificate errors. There are only flags to ignore the
// name mismatch and unable-to-check-revocation errors.
//
// We specify SCH_CRED_REVOCATION_CHECK_CHAIN_EXCLUDE_ROOT to cause the TLS
// certificate status request extension (commonly known as OCSP stapling)
// to be sent on Vista or later. This flag matches the
// CERT_CHAIN_REVOCATION_CHECK_CHAIN_EXCLUDE_ROOT flag that we pass to the
// CertGetCertificateChain calls. Note: we specify this flag even when
// revocation checking is disabled to avoid doubling the number of
// credentials handles we need to acquire.
//
// TODO(wtc): Look into undocumented or poorly documented flags:
// SCH_CRED_RESTRICTED_ROOTS
// SCH_CRED_REVOCATION_CHECK_CACHE_ONLY
// SCH_CRED_CACHE_ONLY_URL_RETRIEVAL
// SCH_CRED_MEMORY_STORE_CERT
schannel_cred.dwFlags |= SCH_CRED_NO_DEFAULT_CREDS |
SCH_CRED_MANUAL_CRED_VALIDATION |
SCH_CRED_REVOCATION_CHECK_CHAIN_EXCLUDE_ROOT;
TimeStamp expiry;
SECURITY_STATUS status;
status = AcquireCredentialsHandle(
NULL, // Not used
UNISP_NAME, // Microsoft Unified Security Protocol Provider
SECPKG_CRED_OUTBOUND,
NULL, // Not used
&schannel_cred,
NULL, // Not used
NULL, // Not used
handle,
&expiry); // Optional
if (status != SEC_E_OK)
LOG(ERROR) << "AcquireCredentialsHandle failed: " << status;
return MapSecurityError(status);
}
// For the SSL sockets to share SSL sessions by session resumption handshakes,
// they need to use the same CredHandle. The GetCredHandle function creates
// and stores a shared CredHandle in *handle_ptr. On success, GetCredHandle
// returns OK. On failure, GetCredHandle returns a network error code and
// leaves *handle_ptr unchanged.
//
// The versions of the SSL protocol enabled are a property of the CredHandle.
// So we need a separate CredHandle for each combination of SSL versions.
// Most of the time Chromium will use only one or two combinations of SSL
// versions (for example, SSL3 | TLS1 for normal use, plus SSL3 when visiting
// TLS-intolerant servers). These CredHandles are initialized only when
// needed.
static int GetCredHandle(PCCERT_CONTEXT client_cert,
int ssl_version_mask,
CredHandle** handle_ptr) {
if (ssl_version_mask <= 0 || ssl_version_mask >= SSL_VERSION_MASKS) {
NOTREACHED();
return ERR_UNEXPECTED;
}
return g_cred_handle_table.Get().GetHandle(client_cert,
ssl_version_mask,
handle_ptr);
}
//-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
// This callback is intended to be used with CertFindChainInStore. In addition
// to filtering by extended/enhanced key usage, we do not show expired
// certificates and require digital signature usage in the key usage
// extension.
//
// This matches our behavior on Mac OS X and that of NSS. It also matches the
// default behavior of IE8. See http://support.microsoft.com/kb/890326 and
// http://blogs.msdn.com/b/askie/archive/2009/06/09/my-expired-client-certificates-no-longer-display-when-connecting-to-my-web-server-using-ie8.aspx
static BOOL WINAPI ClientCertFindCallback(PCCERT_CONTEXT cert_context,
void* find_arg) {
// Verify the certificate's KU is good.
BYTE key_usage;
if (CertGetIntendedKeyUsage(X509_ASN_ENCODING, cert_context->pCertInfo,
&key_usage, 1)) {
if (!(key_usage & CERT_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE_KEY_USAGE))
return FALSE;
} else {
DWORD err = GetLastError();
// If |err| is non-zero, it's an actual error. Otherwise the extension
// just isn't present, and we treat it as if everything was allowed.
if (err) {
DLOG(ERROR) << "CertGetIntendedKeyUsage failed: " << err;
return FALSE;
}
}
// Verify the current time is within the certificate's validity period.
if (CertVerifyTimeValidity(NULL, cert_context->pCertInfo) != 0)
return FALSE;
// Verify private key metadata is associated with this certificate.
DWORD size = 0;
if (!CertGetCertificateContextProperty(
cert_context, CERT_KEY_PROV_INFO_PROP_ID, NULL, &size)) {
return FALSE;
}
return TRUE;
}
//-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
// A memory certificate store for client certificates. This allows us to
// close the "MY" system certificate store when we finish searching for
// client certificates.
class ClientCertStore {
public:
ClientCertStore() {
store_ = CertOpenStore(CERT_STORE_PROV_MEMORY, 0, NULL, 0, NULL);
}
~ClientCertStore() {
if (store_) {
BOOL ok = CertCloseStore(store_, CERT_CLOSE_STORE_CHECK_FLAG);
DCHECK(ok);
}
}
PCCERT_CONTEXT CopyCertContext(PCCERT_CONTEXT client_cert) {
PCCERT_CONTEXT copy;
BOOL ok = CertAddCertificateContextToStore(store_, client_cert,
CERT_STORE_ADD_USE_EXISTING,
&copy);
DCHECK(ok);
return ok ? copy : NULL;
}
private:
HCERTSTORE store_;
};
static base::LazyInstance<ClientCertStore> g_client_cert_store(
base::LINKER_INITIALIZED);
//-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Size of recv_buffer_
//
// Ciphertext is decrypted one SSL record at a time, so recv_buffer_ needs to
// have room for a full SSL record, with the header and trailer. Here is the
// breakdown of the size:
// 5: SSL record header
// 16K: SSL record maximum size
// 64: >= SSL record trailer (16 or 20 have been observed)
static const int kRecvBufferSize = (5 + 16*1024 + 64);
SSLClientSocketWin::SSLClientSocketWin(ClientSocketHandle* transport_socket,
const HostPortPair& host_and_port,
const SSLConfig& ssl_config,
CertVerifier* cert_verifier)
: ALLOW_THIS_IN_INITIALIZER_LIST(
handshake_io_callback_(this,
&SSLClientSocketWin::OnHandshakeIOComplete)),
ALLOW_THIS_IN_INITIALIZER_LIST(
read_callback_(this, &SSLClientSocketWin::OnReadComplete)),
ALLOW_THIS_IN_INITIALIZER_LIST(
write_callback_(this, &SSLClientSocketWin::OnWriteComplete)),
transport_(transport_socket),
host_and_port_(host_and_port),
ssl_config_(ssl_config),
user_connect_callback_(NULL),
user_read_callback_(NULL),
user_read_buf_len_(0),
user_write_callback_(NULL),
user_write_buf_len_(0),
next_state_(STATE_NONE),
cert_verifier_(cert_verifier),
creds_(NULL),
isc_status_(SEC_E_OK),
payload_send_buffer_len_(0),
bytes_sent_(0),
decrypted_ptr_(NULL),
bytes_decrypted_(0),
received_ptr_(NULL),
bytes_received_(0),
writing_first_token_(false),
ignore_ok_result_(false),
renegotiating_(false),
need_more_data_(false),
net_log_(transport_socket->socket()->NetLog()) {
memset(&stream_sizes_, 0, sizeof(stream_sizes_));
memset(in_buffers_, 0, sizeof(in_buffers_));
memset(&send_buffer_, 0, sizeof(send_buffer_));
memset(&ctxt_, 0, sizeof(ctxt_));
}
SSLClientSocketWin::~SSLClientSocketWin() {
Disconnect();
}
void SSLClientSocketWin::GetSSLInfo(SSLInfo* ssl_info) {
ssl_info->Reset();
if (!server_cert_)
return;
ssl_info->cert = server_cert_;
ssl_info->cert_status = server_cert_verify_result_.cert_status;
ssl_info->public_key_hashes = server_cert_verify_result_.public_key_hashes;
ssl_info->is_issued_by_known_root =
server_cert_verify_result_.is_issued_by_known_root;
SecPkgContext_ConnectionInfo connection_info;
SECURITY_STATUS status = QueryContextAttributes(
&ctxt_, SECPKG_ATTR_CONNECTION_INFO, &connection_info);
if (status == SEC_E_OK) {
// TODO(wtc): compute the overall security strength, taking into account
// dwExchStrength and dwHashStrength. dwExchStrength needs to be
// normalized.
ssl_info->security_bits = connection_info.dwCipherStrength;
}
// SecPkgContext_CipherInfo comes from CNG and is available on Vista or
// later only. On XP, the next QueryContextAttributes call fails with
// SEC_E_UNSUPPORTED_FUNCTION (0x80090302), so ssl_info->connection_status
// won't contain the cipher suite. If this is a problem, we can build the
// cipher suite from the aiCipher, aiHash, and aiExch fields of
// SecPkgContext_ConnectionInfo based on Appendix C of RFC 5246.
SecPkgContext_CipherInfo cipher_info = { SECPKGCONTEXT_CIPHERINFO_V1 };
status = QueryContextAttributes(
&ctxt_, SECPKG_ATTR_CIPHER_INFO, &cipher_info);
if (status == SEC_E_OK) {
// TODO(wtc): find out what the cipher_info.dwBaseCipherSuite field is.
ssl_info->connection_status |=
(cipher_info.dwCipherSuite & SSL_CONNECTION_CIPHERSUITE_MASK) <<
SSL_CONNECTION_CIPHERSUITE_SHIFT;
// SChannel doesn't support TLS compression, so cipher_info doesn't have
// any field related to the compression method.
}
if (ssl_config_.ssl3_fallback)
ssl_info->connection_status |= SSL_CONNECTION_SSL3_FALLBACK;
}
void SSLClientSocketWin::GetSSLCertRequestInfo(
SSLCertRequestInfo* cert_request_info) {
cert_request_info->host_and_port = host_and_port_.ToString();
cert_request_info->client_certs.clear();
// Get the certificate_authorities field of the CertificateRequest message.
// Schannel doesn't return the certificate_types field of the
// CertificateRequest message to us, so we can't filter the client
// certificates properly. :-(
SecPkgContext_IssuerListInfoEx issuer_list;
SECURITY_STATUS status = QueryContextAttributes(
&ctxt_, SECPKG_ATTR_ISSUER_LIST_EX, &issuer_list);
if (status != SEC_E_OK) {
DLOG(ERROR) << "QueryContextAttributes (issuer list) failed: " << status;
return;
}
// Client certificates of the user are in the "MY" system certificate store.
HCERTSTORE my_cert_store = CertOpenSystemStore(NULL, L"MY");
if (!my_cert_store) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Could not open the \"MY\" system certificate store: "
<< GetLastError();
FreeContextBuffer(issuer_list.aIssuers);
return;
}
// Enumerate the client certificates.
CERT_CHAIN_FIND_BY_ISSUER_PARA find_by_issuer_para;
memset(&find_by_issuer_para, 0, sizeof(find_by_issuer_para));
find_by_issuer_para.cbSize = sizeof(find_by_issuer_para);
find_by_issuer_para.pszUsageIdentifier = szOID_PKIX_KP_CLIENT_AUTH;
find_by_issuer_para.cIssuer = issuer_list.cIssuers;
find_by_issuer_para.rgIssuer = issuer_list.aIssuers;
find_by_issuer_para.pfnFindCallback = ClientCertFindCallback;
PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT chain_context = NULL;
for (;;) {
// Find a certificate chain.
chain_context = CertFindChainInStore(my_cert_store,
X509_ASN_ENCODING,
0,
CERT_CHAIN_FIND_BY_ISSUER,
&find_by_issuer_para,
chain_context);
if (!chain_context) {
DWORD err = GetLastError();
if (err != CRYPT_E_NOT_FOUND)
DLOG(ERROR) << "CertFindChainInStore failed: " << err;
break;
}
// Get the leaf certificate.
PCCERT_CONTEXT cert_context =
chain_context->rgpChain[0]->rgpElement[0]->pCertContext;
// Copy it to our own certificate store, so that we can close the "MY"
// certificate store before returning from this function.
PCCERT_CONTEXT cert_context2 =
g_client_cert_store.Get().CopyCertContext(cert_context);
if (!cert_context2) {
NOTREACHED();
continue;
}
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> cert = X509Certificate::CreateFromHandle(
cert_context2, X509Certificate::SOURCE_LONE_CERT_IMPORT,
X509Certificate::OSCertHandles());
cert_request_info->client_certs.push_back(cert);
CertFreeCertificateContext(cert_context2);
}
FreeContextBuffer(issuer_list.aIssuers);
BOOL ok = CertCloseStore(my_cert_store, CERT_CLOSE_STORE_CHECK_FLAG);
DCHECK(ok);
}
SSLClientSocket::NextProtoStatus
SSLClientSocketWin::GetNextProto(std::string* proto) {
proto->clear();
return kNextProtoUnsupported;
}
#ifdef ANDROID
// TODO(kristianm): handle the case when wait_for_connect is true
// (sync requests)
#endif
int SSLClientSocketWin::Connect(CompletionCallback* callback
#ifdef ANDROID
, bool wait_for_connect
#endif
) {
DCHECK(transport_.get());
DCHECK(next_state_ == STATE_NONE);
DCHECK(!user_connect_callback_);
net_log_.BeginEvent(NetLog::TYPE_SSL_CONNECT, NULL);
int rv = InitializeSSLContext();
if (rv != OK) {
net_log_.EndEvent(NetLog::TYPE_SSL_CONNECT, NULL);
return rv;
}
writing_first_token_ = true;
next_state_ = STATE_HANDSHAKE_WRITE;
rv = DoLoop(OK);
if (rv == ERR_IO_PENDING) {
user_connect_callback_ = callback;
} else {
net_log_.EndEvent(NetLog::TYPE_SSL_CONNECT, NULL);
}
return rv;
}
int SSLClientSocketWin::InitializeSSLContext() {
int ssl_version_mask = 0;
if (ssl_config_.ssl3_enabled)
ssl_version_mask |= SSL3;
if (ssl_config_.tls1_enabled)
ssl_version_mask |= TLS1;
// If we pass 0 to GetCredHandle, we will let Schannel select the protocols,
// rather than enabling no protocols. So we have to fail here.
if (ssl_version_mask == 0)
return ERR_NO_SSL_VERSIONS_ENABLED;
PCCERT_CONTEXT cert_context = NULL;
if (ssl_config_.client_cert)
cert_context = ssl_config_.client_cert->os_cert_handle();
int result = GetCredHandle(cert_context, ssl_version_mask, &creds_);
if (result != OK)
return result;
memset(&ctxt_, 0, sizeof(ctxt_));
SecBufferDesc buffer_desc;
DWORD out_flags;
DWORD flags = ISC_REQ_SEQUENCE_DETECT |
ISC_REQ_REPLAY_DETECT |
ISC_REQ_CONFIDENTIALITY |
ISC_RET_EXTENDED_ERROR |
ISC_REQ_ALLOCATE_MEMORY |
ISC_REQ_STREAM;
send_buffer_.pvBuffer = NULL;
send_buffer_.BufferType = SECBUFFER_TOKEN;
send_buffer_.cbBuffer = 0;
buffer_desc.cBuffers = 1;
buffer_desc.pBuffers = &send_buffer_;
buffer_desc.ulVersion = SECBUFFER_VERSION;
TimeStamp expiry;
SECURITY_STATUS status;
status = InitializeSecurityContext(
creds_,
NULL, // NULL on the first call
const_cast<wchar_t*>(ASCIIToWide(host_and_port_.host()).c_str()),
flags,
0, // Reserved
0, // Not used with Schannel.
NULL, // NULL on the first call
0, // Reserved
&ctxt_, // Receives the new context handle
&buffer_desc,
&out_flags,
&expiry);
if (status != SEC_I_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
LOG(ERROR) << "InitializeSecurityContext failed: " << status;
if (status == SEC_E_INVALID_HANDLE) {
// The only handle we passed to this InitializeSecurityContext call is
// creds_, so print its contents to figure out why it's invalid.
if (creds_) {
LOG(ERROR) << "creds_->dwLower = " << creds_->dwLower
<< "; creds_->dwUpper = " << creds_->dwUpper;
} else {
LOG(ERROR) << "creds_ is NULL";
}
}
return MapSecurityError(status);
}
return OK;
}
void SSLClientSocketWin::Disconnect() {
// TODO(wtc): Send SSL close_notify alert.
next_state_ = STATE_NONE;
// Shut down anything that may call us back.
verifier_.reset();
transport_->socket()->Disconnect();
if (send_buffer_.pvBuffer)
FreeSendBuffer();
if (SecIsValidHandle(&ctxt_)) {
DeleteSecurityContext(&ctxt_);
SecInvalidateHandle(&ctxt_);
}
if (server_cert_)
server_cert_ = NULL;
// TODO(wtc): reset more members?
bytes_decrypted_ = 0;
bytes_received_ = 0;
writing_first_token_ = false;
renegotiating_ = false;
need_more_data_ = false;
}
bool SSLClientSocketWin::IsConnected() const {
// Ideally, we should also check if we have received the close_notify alert
// message from the server, and return false in that case. We're not doing
// that, so this function may return a false positive. Since the upper
// layer (HttpNetworkTransaction) needs to handle a persistent connection
// closed by the server when we send a request anyway, a false positive in
// exchange for simpler code is a good trade-off.
return completed_handshake() && transport_->socket()->IsConnected();
}
bool SSLClientSocketWin::IsConnectedAndIdle() const {
// Unlike IsConnected, this method doesn't return a false positive.
//
// Strictly speaking, we should check if we have received the close_notify
// alert message from the server, and return false in that case. Although
// the close_notify alert message means EOF in the SSL layer, it is just
// bytes to the transport layer below, so
// transport_->socket()->IsConnectedAndIdle() returns the desired false
// when we receive close_notify.
return completed_handshake() && transport_->socket()->IsConnectedAndIdle();
}
int SSLClientSocketWin::GetPeerAddress(AddressList* address) const {
return transport_->socket()->GetPeerAddress(address);
}
int SSLClientSocketWin::GetLocalAddress(IPEndPoint* address) const {
return transport_->socket()->GetLocalAddress(address);
}
void SSLClientSocketWin::SetSubresourceSpeculation() {
if (transport_.get() && transport_->socket()) {
transport_->socket()->SetSubresourceSpeculation();
} else {
NOTREACHED();
}
}
void SSLClientSocketWin::SetOmniboxSpeculation() {
if (transport_.get() && transport_->socket()) {
transport_->socket()->SetOmniboxSpeculation();
} else {
NOTREACHED();
}
}
bool SSLClientSocketWin::WasEverUsed() const {
if (transport_.get() && transport_->socket()) {
return transport_->socket()->WasEverUsed();
}
NOTREACHED();
return false;
}
bool SSLClientSocketWin::UsingTCPFastOpen() const {
if (transport_.get() && transport_->socket()) {
return transport_->socket()->UsingTCPFastOpen();
}
NOTREACHED();
return false;
}
int SSLClientSocketWin::Read(IOBuffer* buf, int buf_len,
CompletionCallback* callback) {
DCHECK(completed_handshake());
DCHECK(!user_read_callback_);
// If we have surplus decrypted plaintext, satisfy the Read with it without
// reading more ciphertext from the transport socket.
if (bytes_decrypted_ != 0) {
int len = std::min(buf_len, bytes_decrypted_);
memcpy(buf->data(), decrypted_ptr_, len);
decrypted_ptr_ += len;
bytes_decrypted_ -= len;
if (bytes_decrypted_ == 0) {
decrypted_ptr_ = NULL;
if (bytes_received_ != 0) {
memmove(recv_buffer_.get(), received_ptr_, bytes_received_);
received_ptr_ = recv_buffer_.get();
}
}
return len;
}
DCHECK(!user_read_buf_);
// http://crbug.com/16371: We're seeing |buf->data()| return NULL. See if the
// user is passing in an IOBuffer with a NULL |data_|.
CHECK(buf);
CHECK(buf->data());
user_read_buf_ = buf;
user_read_buf_len_ = buf_len;
int rv = DoPayloadRead();
if (rv == ERR_IO_PENDING) {
user_read_callback_ = callback;
} else {
user_read_buf_ = NULL;
user_read_buf_len_ = 0;
}
return rv;
}
int SSLClientSocketWin::Write(IOBuffer* buf, int buf_len,
CompletionCallback* callback) {
DCHECK(completed_handshake());
DCHECK(!user_write_callback_);
DCHECK(!user_write_buf_);
user_write_buf_ = buf;
user_write_buf_len_ = buf_len;
int rv = DoPayloadEncrypt();
if (rv != OK)
return rv;
rv = DoPayloadWrite();
if (rv == ERR_IO_PENDING) {
user_write_callback_ = callback;
} else {
user_write_buf_ = NULL;
user_write_buf_len_ = 0;
}
return rv;
}
bool SSLClientSocketWin::SetReceiveBufferSize(int32 size) {
return transport_->socket()->SetReceiveBufferSize(size);
}
bool SSLClientSocketWin::SetSendBufferSize(int32 size) {
return transport_->socket()->SetSendBufferSize(size);
}
void SSLClientSocketWin::OnHandshakeIOComplete(int result) {
int rv = DoLoop(result);
// The SSL handshake has some round trips. We need to notify the caller of
// success or any error, other than waiting for IO.
if (rv != ERR_IO_PENDING) {
// If there is no connect callback available to call, we are renegotiating
// (which occurs because we are in the middle of a Read when the
// renegotiation process starts). So we complete the Read here.
if (!user_connect_callback_) {
CompletionCallback* c = user_read_callback_;
user_read_callback_ = NULL;
user_read_buf_ = NULL;
user_read_buf_len_ = 0;
c->Run(rv);
return;
}
net_log_.EndEvent(NetLog::TYPE_SSL_CONNECT, NULL);
CompletionCallback* c = user_connect_callback_;
user_connect_callback_ = NULL;
c->Run(rv);
}
}
void SSLClientSocketWin::OnReadComplete(int result) {
DCHECK(completed_handshake());
result = DoPayloadReadComplete(result);
if (result > 0)
result = DoPayloadDecrypt();
if (result != ERR_IO_PENDING) {
DCHECK(user_read_callback_);
CompletionCallback* c = user_read_callback_;
user_read_callback_ = NULL;
user_read_buf_ = NULL;
user_read_buf_len_ = 0;
c->Run(result);
}
}
void SSLClientSocketWin::OnWriteComplete(int result) {
DCHECK(completed_handshake());
int rv = DoPayloadWriteComplete(result);
if (rv != ERR_IO_PENDING) {
DCHECK(user_write_callback_);
CompletionCallback* c = user_write_callback_;
user_write_callback_ = NULL;
user_write_buf_ = NULL;
user_write_buf_len_ = 0;
c->Run(rv);
}
}
int SSLClientSocketWin::DoLoop(int last_io_result) {
DCHECK(next_state_ != STATE_NONE);
int rv = last_io_result;
do {
State state = next_state_;
next_state_ = STATE_NONE;
switch (state) {
case STATE_HANDSHAKE_READ:
rv = DoHandshakeRead();
break;
case STATE_HANDSHAKE_READ_COMPLETE:
rv = DoHandshakeReadComplete(rv);
break;
case STATE_HANDSHAKE_WRITE:
rv = DoHandshakeWrite();
break;
case STATE_HANDSHAKE_WRITE_COMPLETE:
rv = DoHandshakeWriteComplete(rv);
break;
case STATE_VERIFY_CERT:
rv = DoVerifyCert();
break;
case STATE_VERIFY_CERT_COMPLETE:
rv = DoVerifyCertComplete(rv);
break;
case STATE_COMPLETED_RENEGOTIATION:
rv = DoCompletedRenegotiation(rv);
break;
case STATE_COMPLETED_HANDSHAKE:
next_state_ = STATE_COMPLETED_HANDSHAKE;
// This is the end of our state machine, so return.
return rv;
default:
rv = ERR_UNEXPECTED;
LOG(DFATAL) << "unexpected state " << state;
break;
}
} while (rv != ERR_IO_PENDING && next_state_ != STATE_NONE);
return rv;
}
int SSLClientSocketWin::DoHandshakeRead() {
next_state_ = STATE_HANDSHAKE_READ_COMPLETE;
if (!recv_buffer_.get())
recv_buffer_.reset(new char[kRecvBufferSize]);
int buf_len = kRecvBufferSize - bytes_received_;
if (buf_len <= 0) {
LOG(DFATAL) << "Receive buffer is too small!";
return ERR_UNEXPECTED;
}
DCHECK(!transport_read_buf_);
transport_read_buf_ = new IOBuffer(buf_len);
return transport_->socket()->Read(transport_read_buf_, buf_len,
&handshake_io_callback_);
}
int SSLClientSocketWin::DoHandshakeReadComplete(int result) {
if (result < 0) {
transport_read_buf_ = NULL;
return result;
}
if (transport_read_buf_) {
// A transition to STATE_HANDSHAKE_READ_COMPLETE is set in multiple places,
// not only in DoHandshakeRead(), so we may not have a transport_read_buf_.
DCHECK_LE(result, kRecvBufferSize - bytes_received_);
char* buf = recv_buffer_.get() + bytes_received_;
memcpy(buf, transport_read_buf_->data(), result);
transport_read_buf_ = NULL;
}
if (result == 0 && !ignore_ok_result_)
return ERR_SSL_PROTOCOL_ERROR; // Incomplete response :(
ignore_ok_result_ = false;
bytes_received_ += result;
// Process the contents of recv_buffer_.
TimeStamp expiry;
DWORD out_flags;
DWORD flags = ISC_REQ_SEQUENCE_DETECT |
ISC_REQ_REPLAY_DETECT |
ISC_REQ_CONFIDENTIALITY |
ISC_RET_EXTENDED_ERROR |
ISC_REQ_ALLOCATE_MEMORY |
ISC_REQ_STREAM;
if (ssl_config_.send_client_cert)
flags |= ISC_REQ_USE_SUPPLIED_CREDS;
SecBufferDesc in_buffer_desc, out_buffer_desc;
in_buffer_desc.cBuffers = 2;
in_buffer_desc.pBuffers = in_buffers_;
in_buffer_desc.ulVersion = SECBUFFER_VERSION;
in_buffers_[0].pvBuffer = recv_buffer_.get();
in_buffers_[0].cbBuffer = bytes_received_;
in_buffers_[0].BufferType = SECBUFFER_TOKEN;
in_buffers_[1].pvBuffer = NULL;
in_buffers_[1].cbBuffer = 0;
in_buffers_[1].BufferType = SECBUFFER_EMPTY;
out_buffer_desc.cBuffers = 1;
out_buffer_desc.pBuffers = &send_buffer_;
out_buffer_desc.ulVersion = SECBUFFER_VERSION;
send_buffer_.pvBuffer = NULL;
send_buffer_.BufferType = SECBUFFER_TOKEN;
send_buffer_.cbBuffer = 0;
isc_status_ = InitializeSecurityContext(
creds_,
&ctxt_,
NULL,
flags,
0,
0,
&in_buffer_desc,
0,
NULL,
&out_buffer_desc,
&out_flags,
&expiry);
if (isc_status_ == SEC_E_INVALID_TOKEN) {
// Peer sent us an SSL record type that's invalid during SSL handshake.
// TODO(wtc): move this to MapSecurityError after sufficient testing.
LOG(ERROR) << "InitializeSecurityContext failed: " << isc_status_;
return ERR_SSL_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
}
if (send_buffer_.cbBuffer != 0 &&
(isc_status_ == SEC_E_OK ||
isc_status_ == SEC_I_CONTINUE_NEEDED ||
(FAILED(isc_status_) && (out_flags & ISC_RET_EXTENDED_ERROR)))) {
next_state_ = STATE_HANDSHAKE_WRITE;
return OK;
}
return DidCallInitializeSecurityContext();
}
int SSLClientSocketWin::DidCallInitializeSecurityContext() {
if (isc_status_ == SEC_E_INCOMPLETE_MESSAGE) {
next_state_ = STATE_HANDSHAKE_READ;
return OK;
}
if (isc_status_ == SEC_E_OK) {
if (in_buffers_[1].BufferType == SECBUFFER_EXTRA) {
// Save this data for later.
memmove(recv_buffer_.get(),
recv_buffer_.get() + (bytes_received_ - in_buffers_[1].cbBuffer),
in_buffers_[1].cbBuffer);
bytes_received_ = in_buffers_[1].cbBuffer;
} else {
bytes_received_ = 0;
}
return DidCompleteHandshake();
}
if (FAILED(isc_status_)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "InitializeSecurityContext failed: " << isc_status_;
if (isc_status_ == SEC_E_INTERNAL_ERROR) {
// "The Local Security Authority cannot be contacted". This happens
// when the user denies access to the private key for SSL client auth.
return ERR_SSL_CLIENT_AUTH_PRIVATE_KEY_ACCESS_DENIED;
}
int result = MapSecurityError(isc_status_);
// We told Schannel to not verify the server certificate
// (SCH_CRED_MANUAL_CRED_VALIDATION), so any certificate error returned by
// InitializeSecurityContext must be referring to the bad or missing
// client certificate.
if (IsCertificateError(result)) {
// TODO(wtc): Add fine-grained error codes for client certificate errors
// reported by the server using the following SSL/TLS alert messages:
// access_denied
// bad_certificate
// unsupported_certificate
// certificate_expired
// certificate_revoked
// certificate_unknown
// unknown_ca
return ERR_BAD_SSL_CLIENT_AUTH_CERT;
}
return result;
}
if (isc_status_ == SEC_I_INCOMPLETE_CREDENTIALS)
return ERR_SSL_CLIENT_AUTH_CERT_NEEDED;
if (isc_status_ == SEC_I_NO_RENEGOTIATION) {
// Received a no_renegotiation alert message. Although this is just a
// warning, SChannel doesn't seem to allow us to continue after this
// point, so we have to return an error. See http://crbug.com/36835.
return ERR_SSL_NO_RENEGOTIATION;
}
DCHECK(isc_status_ == SEC_I_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
if (in_buffers_[1].BufferType == SECBUFFER_EXTRA) {
memmove(recv_buffer_.get(),
recv_buffer_.get() + (bytes_received_ - in_buffers_[1].cbBuffer),
in_buffers_[1].cbBuffer);
bytes_received_ = in_buffers_[1].cbBuffer;
next_state_ = STATE_HANDSHAKE_READ_COMPLETE;
ignore_ok_result_ = true; // OK doesn't mean EOF.
return OK;
}
bytes_received_ = 0;
next_state_ = STATE_HANDSHAKE_READ;
return OK;
}
int SSLClientSocketWin::DoHandshakeWrite() {
next_state_ = STATE_HANDSHAKE_WRITE_COMPLETE;
// We should have something to send.
DCHECK(send_buffer_.pvBuffer);
DCHECK(send_buffer_.cbBuffer > 0);
DCHECK(!transport_write_buf_);
const char* buf = static_cast<char*>(send_buffer_.pvBuffer) + bytes_sent_;
int buf_len = send_buffer_.cbBuffer - bytes_sent_;
transport_write_buf_ = new IOBuffer(buf_len);
memcpy(transport_write_buf_->data(), buf, buf_len);
return transport_->socket()->Write(transport_write_buf_, buf_len,
&handshake_io_callback_);
}
int SSLClientSocketWin::DoHandshakeWriteComplete(int result) {
DCHECK(transport_write_buf_);
transport_write_buf_ = NULL;
if (result < 0)
return result;
DCHECK(result != 0);
bytes_sent_ += result;
DCHECK(bytes_sent_ <= static_cast<int>(send_buffer_.cbBuffer));
if (bytes_sent_ >= static_cast<int>(send_buffer_.cbBuffer)) {
bool overflow = (bytes_sent_ > static_cast<int>(send_buffer_.cbBuffer));
FreeSendBuffer();
bytes_sent_ = 0;
if (overflow) { // Bug!
LOG(DFATAL) << "overflow";
return ERR_UNEXPECTED;
}
if (writing_first_token_) {
writing_first_token_ = false;
DCHECK(bytes_received_ == 0);
next_state_ = STATE_HANDSHAKE_READ;
return OK;
}
return DidCallInitializeSecurityContext();
}
// Send the remaining bytes.
next_state_ = STATE_HANDSHAKE_WRITE;
return OK;
}
// Set server_cert_status_ and return OK or a network error.
int SSLClientSocketWin::DoVerifyCert() {
next_state_ = STATE_VERIFY_CERT_COMPLETE;
DCHECK(server_cert_);
int flags = 0;
if (ssl_config_.rev_checking_enabled)
flags |= X509Certificate::VERIFY_REV_CHECKING_ENABLED;
if (ssl_config_.verify_ev_cert)
flags |= X509Certificate::VERIFY_EV_CERT;
verifier_.reset(new SingleRequestCertVerifier(cert_verifier_));
return verifier_->Verify(server_cert_, host_and_port_.host(), flags,
&server_cert_verify_result_,
&handshake_io_callback_);
}
int SSLClientSocketWin::DoVerifyCertComplete(int result) {
DCHECK(verifier_.get());
verifier_.reset();
// If we have been explicitly told to accept this certificate, override the
// result of verifier_.Verify.
// Eventually, we should cache the cert verification results so that we don't
// need to call verifier_.Verify repeatedly. But for now we need to do this.
// Alternatively, we could use the cert's status that we stored along with
// the cert in the allowed_bad_certs vector.
if (IsCertificateError(result) &&
ssl_config_.IsAllowedBadCert(server_cert_))
result = OK;
if (result == OK)
LogConnectionTypeMetrics();
if (renegotiating_) {
DidCompleteRenegotiation();
return result;
}
// The initial handshake has completed.
next_state_ = STATE_COMPLETED_HANDSHAKE;
return result;
}
int SSLClientSocketWin::DoPayloadRead() {
DCHECK(recv_buffer_.get());
int buf_len = kRecvBufferSize - bytes_received_;
if (buf_len <= 0) {
NOTREACHED() << "Receive buffer is too small!";
return ERR_FAILED;
}
int rv;
// If bytes_received_, we have some data from a previous read still ready
// for decoding. Otherwise, we need to issue a real read.
if (!bytes_received_ || need_more_data_) {
DCHECK(!transport_read_buf_);
transport_read_buf_ = new IOBuffer(buf_len);
rv = transport_->socket()->Read(transport_read_buf_, buf_len,
&read_callback_);
if (rv != ERR_IO_PENDING)
rv = DoPayloadReadComplete(rv);
if (rv <= 0)
return rv;
}
// Decode what we've read. If there is not enough data to decode yet,
// this may return ERR_IO_PENDING still.
return DoPayloadDecrypt();
}
// result is the number of bytes that have been read; it should not be
// less than zero; a value of zero means that no additional bytes have
// been read.
int SSLClientSocketWin::DoPayloadReadComplete(int result) {
DCHECK(completed_handshake());
// If IO Pending, there is nothing to do here.
if (result == ERR_IO_PENDING)
return result;
// We completed a Read, so reset the need_more_data_ flag.
need_more_data_ = false;
// Check for error
if (result <= 0) {
transport_read_buf_ = NULL;
if (result == 0 && bytes_received_ != 0) {
// TODO(wtc): Unless we have received the close_notify alert, we need
// to return an error code indicating that the SSL connection ended
// uncleanly, a potential truncation attack. See
// http://crbug.com/18586.
return ERR_SSL_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
}
return result;
}
// Transfer the data from transport_read_buf_ to recv_buffer_.
if (transport_read_buf_) {
DCHECK_LE(result, kRecvBufferSize - bytes_received_);
char* buf = recv_buffer_.get() + bytes_received_;
memcpy(buf, transport_read_buf_->data(), result);
transport_read_buf_ = NULL;
}
bytes_received_ += result;
return result;
}
int SSLClientSocketWin::DoPayloadDecrypt() {
// Process the contents of recv_buffer_.
int len = 0; // the number of bytes we've copied to the user buffer.
while (bytes_received_) {
SecBuffer buffers[4];
buffers[0].pvBuffer = recv_buffer_.get();
buffers[0].cbBuffer = bytes_received_;
buffers[0].BufferType = SECBUFFER_DATA;
buffers[1].BufferType = SECBUFFER_EMPTY;
buffers[2].BufferType = SECBUFFER_EMPTY;
buffers[3].BufferType = SECBUFFER_EMPTY;
SecBufferDesc buffer_desc;
buffer_desc.cBuffers = 4;
buffer_desc.pBuffers = buffers;
buffer_desc.ulVersion = SECBUFFER_VERSION;
SECURITY_STATUS status;
status = DecryptMessage(&ctxt_, &buffer_desc, 0, NULL);
if (status == SEC_E_INCOMPLETE_MESSAGE) {
need_more_data_ = true;
return DoPayloadRead();
}
if (status == SEC_I_CONTEXT_EXPIRED) {
// Received the close_notify alert.
bytes_received_ = 0;
return OK;
}
if (status != SEC_E_OK && status != SEC_I_RENEGOTIATE) {
DCHECK(status != SEC_E_MESSAGE_ALTERED);
LOG(ERROR) << "DecryptMessage failed: " << status;
return MapSecurityError(status);
}
// The received ciphertext was decrypted in place in recv_buffer_. Remember
// the location and length of the decrypted plaintext and any unused
// ciphertext.
decrypted_ptr_ = NULL;
bytes_decrypted_ = 0;
received_ptr_ = NULL;
bytes_received_ = 0;
for (int i = 1; i < 4; i++) {
switch (buffers[i].BufferType) {
case SECBUFFER_DATA:
DCHECK(!decrypted_ptr_ && bytes_decrypted_ == 0);
decrypted_ptr_ = static_cast<char*>(buffers[i].pvBuffer);
bytes_decrypted_ = buffers[i].cbBuffer;
break;
case SECBUFFER_EXTRA:
DCHECK(!received_ptr_ && bytes_received_ == 0);
received_ptr_ = static_cast<char*>(buffers[i].pvBuffer);
bytes_received_ = buffers[i].cbBuffer;
break;
default:
break;
}
}
DCHECK(len == 0);
if (bytes_decrypted_ != 0) {
len = std::min(user_read_buf_len_, bytes_decrypted_);
memcpy(user_read_buf_->data(), decrypted_ptr_, len);
decrypted_ptr_ += len;
bytes_decrypted_ -= len;
}
if (bytes_decrypted_ == 0) {
decrypted_ptr_ = NULL;
if (bytes_received_ != 0) {
memmove(recv_buffer_.get(), received_ptr_, bytes_received_);
received_ptr_ = recv_buffer_.get();
}
}
if (status == SEC_I_RENEGOTIATE) {
if (bytes_received_ != 0) {
// The server requested renegotiation, but there are some data yet to
// be decrypted. The Platform SDK WebClient.c sample doesn't handle
// this, so we don't know how to handle this. Assume this cannot
// happen.
LOG(ERROR) << "DecryptMessage returned SEC_I_RENEGOTIATE with a buffer "
<< "of type SECBUFFER_EXTRA.";
return ERR_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_REQUESTED;
}
if (len != 0) {
// The server requested renegotiation, but there are some decrypted
// data. We can't start renegotiation until we have returned all
// decrypted data to the caller.
//
// This hasn't happened during testing. Assume this cannot happen even
// though we know how to handle this.
LOG(ERROR) << "DecryptMessage returned SEC_I_RENEGOTIATE with a buffer "
<< "of type SECBUFFER_DATA.";
return ERR_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_REQUESTED;
}
// Jump to the handshake sequence. Will come back when the rehandshake is
// done.
renegotiating_ = true;
ignore_ok_result_ = true; // OK doesn't mean EOF.
// If renegotiation handshake occurred, we need to go back into the
// handshake state machine.
next_state_ = STATE_HANDSHAKE_READ_COMPLETE;
return DoLoop(OK);
}
// We've already copied data into the user buffer, so quit now.
// TODO(mbelshe): We really should keep decoding as long as we can. This
// break out is causing us to return pretty small chunks of data up to the
// application, even though more is already buffered and ready to be
// decoded.
if (len)
break;
}
// If we decrypted 0 bytes, don't report 0 bytes read, which would be
// mistaken for EOF. Continue decrypting or read more.
if (len == 0)
return DoPayloadRead();
return len;
}
int SSLClientSocketWin::DoPayloadEncrypt() {
DCHECK(completed_handshake());
DCHECK(user_write_buf_);
DCHECK(user_write_buf_len_ > 0);
ULONG message_len = std::min(
stream_sizes_.cbMaximumMessage, static_cast<ULONG>(user_write_buf_len_));
ULONG alloc_len =
message_len + stream_sizes_.cbHeader + stream_sizes_.cbTrailer;
user_write_buf_len_ = message_len;
payload_send_buffer_.reset(new char[alloc_len]);
memcpy(&payload_send_buffer_[stream_sizes_.cbHeader],
user_write_buf_->data(), message_len);
SecBuffer buffers[4];
buffers[0].pvBuffer = payload_send_buffer_.get();
buffers[0].cbBuffer = stream_sizes_.cbHeader;
buffers[0].BufferType = SECBUFFER_STREAM_HEADER;
buffers[1].pvBuffer = &payload_send_buffer_[stream_sizes_.cbHeader];
buffers[1].cbBuffer = message_len;
buffers[1].BufferType = SECBUFFER_DATA;
buffers[2].pvBuffer = &payload_send_buffer_[stream_sizes_.cbHeader +
message_len];
buffers[2].cbBuffer = stream_sizes_.cbTrailer;
buffers[2].BufferType = SECBUFFER_STREAM_TRAILER;
buffers[3].BufferType = SECBUFFER_EMPTY;
SecBufferDesc buffer_desc;
buffer_desc.cBuffers = 4;
buffer_desc.pBuffers = buffers;
buffer_desc.ulVersion = SECBUFFER_VERSION;
SECURITY_STATUS status = EncryptMessage(&ctxt_, 0, &buffer_desc, 0);
if (FAILED(status)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "EncryptMessage failed: " << status;
return MapSecurityError(status);
}
payload_send_buffer_len_ = buffers[0].cbBuffer +
buffers[1].cbBuffer +
buffers[2].cbBuffer;
DCHECK(bytes_sent_ == 0);
return OK;
}
int SSLClientSocketWin::DoPayloadWrite() {
DCHECK(completed_handshake());
// We should have something to send.
DCHECK(payload_send_buffer_.get());
DCHECK(payload_send_buffer_len_ > 0);
DCHECK(!transport_write_buf_);
const char* buf = payload_send_buffer_.get() + bytes_sent_;
int buf_len = payload_send_buffer_len_ - bytes_sent_;
transport_write_buf_ = new IOBuffer(buf_len);
memcpy(transport_write_buf_->data(), buf, buf_len);
int rv = transport_->socket()->Write(transport_write_buf_, buf_len,
&write_callback_);
if (rv != ERR_IO_PENDING)
rv = DoPayloadWriteComplete(rv);
return rv;
}
int SSLClientSocketWin::DoPayloadWriteComplete(int result) {
DCHECK(transport_write_buf_);
transport_write_buf_ = NULL;
if (result < 0)
return result;
DCHECK(result != 0);
bytes_sent_ += result;
DCHECK(bytes_sent_ <= payload_send_buffer_len_);
if (bytes_sent_ >= payload_send_buffer_len_) {
bool overflow = (bytes_sent_ > payload_send_buffer_len_);
payload_send_buffer_.reset();
payload_send_buffer_len_ = 0;
bytes_sent_ = 0;
if (overflow) { // Bug!
LOG(DFATAL) << "overflow";
return ERR_UNEXPECTED;
}
// Done
return user_write_buf_len_;
}
// Send the remaining bytes.
return DoPayloadWrite();
}
int SSLClientSocketWin::DoCompletedRenegotiation(int result) {
// The user had a read in progress, which was usurped by the renegotiation.
// Restart the read sequence.
next_state_ = STATE_COMPLETED_HANDSHAKE;
if (result != OK)
return result;
return DoPayloadRead();
}
int SSLClientSocketWin::DidCompleteHandshake() {
SECURITY_STATUS status = QueryContextAttributes(
&ctxt_, SECPKG_ATTR_STREAM_SIZES, &stream_sizes_);
if (status != SEC_E_OK) {
LOG(ERROR) << "QueryContextAttributes (stream sizes) failed: " << status;
return MapSecurityError(status);
}
DCHECK(!server_cert_ || renegotiating_);
PCCERT_CONTEXT server_cert_handle = NULL;
status = QueryContextAttributes(
&ctxt_, SECPKG_ATTR_REMOTE_CERT_CONTEXT, &server_cert_handle);
if (status != SEC_E_OK) {
LOG(ERROR) << "QueryContextAttributes (remote cert) failed: " << status;
return MapSecurityError(status);
}
if (renegotiating_ &&
X509Certificate::IsSameOSCert(server_cert_->os_cert_handle(),
server_cert_handle)) {
// We already verified the server certificate. Either it is good or the
// user has accepted the certificate error.
DidCompleteRenegotiation();
} else {
server_cert_ = X509Certificate::CreateFromHandle(
server_cert_handle, X509Certificate::SOURCE_FROM_NETWORK,
X509Certificate::OSCertHandles());
next_state_ = STATE_VERIFY_CERT;
}
CertFreeCertificateContext(server_cert_handle);
return OK;
}
// Called when a renegotiation is completed. |result| is the verification
// result of the server certificate received during renegotiation.
void SSLClientSocketWin::DidCompleteRenegotiation() {
DCHECK(!user_connect_callback_);
DCHECK(user_read_callback_);
renegotiating_ = false;
next_state_ = STATE_COMPLETED_RENEGOTIATION;
}
void SSLClientSocketWin::LogConnectionTypeMetrics() const {
UpdateConnectionTypeHistograms(CONNECTION_SSL);
if (server_cert_verify_result_.has_md5)
UpdateConnectionTypeHistograms(CONNECTION_SSL_MD5);
if (server_cert_verify_result_.has_md2)
UpdateConnectionTypeHistograms(CONNECTION_SSL_MD2);
if (server_cert_verify_result_.has_md4)
UpdateConnectionTypeHistograms(CONNECTION_SSL_MD4);
if (server_cert_verify_result_.has_md5_ca)
UpdateConnectionTypeHistograms(CONNECTION_SSL_MD5_CA);
if (server_cert_verify_result_.has_md2_ca)
UpdateConnectionTypeHistograms(CONNECTION_SSL_MD2_CA);
}
void SSLClientSocketWin::FreeSendBuffer() {
SECURITY_STATUS status = FreeContextBuffer(send_buffer_.pvBuffer);
DCHECK(status == SEC_E_OK);
memset(&send_buffer_, 0, sizeof(send_buffer_));
}
} // namespace net