| // Copyright (c) 2011 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. |
| // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be |
| // found in the LICENSE file. |
| |
| #include "chrome/common/sandbox_policy.h" |
| |
| #include <string> |
| |
| #include "base/command_line.h" |
| #include "base/debug/debugger.h" |
| #include "base/debug/trace_event.h" |
| #include "base/file_util.h" |
| #include "base/logging.h" |
| #include "base/path_service.h" |
| #include "base/process_util.h" |
| #include "base/stringprintf.h" |
| #include "base/string_number_conversions.h" |
| #include "base/string_util.h" |
| #include "base/win/windows_version.h" |
| #include "chrome/common/chrome_constants.h" |
| #include "chrome/common/chrome_paths.h" |
| #include "chrome/common/chrome_switches.h" |
| #include "content/common/child_process_info.h" |
| #include "content/common/debug_flags.h" |
| #include "sandbox/src/sandbox.h" |
| |
| static sandbox::BrokerServices* g_broker_services = NULL; |
| |
| namespace { |
| |
| // The DLLs listed here are known (or under strong suspicion) of causing crashes |
| // when they are loaded in the renderer. Note: at runtime we generate short |
| // versions of the dll name only if the dll has an extension. |
| const wchar_t* const kTroublesomeDlls[] = { |
| L"adialhk.dll", // Kaspersky Internet Security. |
| L"acpiz.dll", // Unknown. |
| L"avgrsstx.dll", // AVG 8. |
| L"babylonchromepi.dll", // Babylon translator. |
| L"btkeyind.dll", // Widcomm Bluetooth. |
| L"cmcsyshk.dll", // CMC Internet Security. |
| L"cooliris.dll", // CoolIris. |
| L"dockshellhook.dll", // Stardock Objectdock. |
| L"googledesktopnetwork3.dll", // Google Desktop Search v5. |
| L"fwhook.dll", // PC Tools Firewall Plus. |
| L"hookprocesscreation.dll", // Blumentals Program protector. |
| L"hookterminateapis.dll", // Blumentals and Cyberprinter. |
| L"hookprintapis.dll", // Cyberprinter. |
| L"imon.dll", // NOD32 Antivirus. |
| L"ioloHL.dll", // Iolo (System Mechanic). |
| L"kloehk.dll", // Kaspersky Internet Security. |
| L"lawenforcer.dll", // Spyware-Browser AntiSpyware (Spybro). |
| L"libdivx.dll", // DivX. |
| L"lvprcinj01.dll", // Logitech QuickCam. |
| L"madchook.dll", // Madshi (generic hooking library). |
| L"mdnsnsp.dll", // Bonjour. |
| L"moonsysh.dll", // Moon Secure Antivirus. |
| L"npdivx32.dll", // DivX. |
| L"npggNT.des", // GameGuard 2008. |
| L"npggNT.dll", // GameGuard (older). |
| L"oawatch.dll", // Online Armor. |
| L"pavhook.dll", // Panda Internet Security. |
| L"pavshook.dll", // Panda Antivirus. |
| L"pavshookwow.dll", // Panda Antivirus. |
| L"pctavhook.dll", // PC Tools Antivirus. |
| L"pctgmhk.dll", // PC Tools Spyware Doctor. |
| L"prntrack.dll", // Pharos Systems. |
| L"radhslib.dll", // Radiant Naomi Internet Filter. |
| L"radprlib.dll", // Radiant Naomi Internet Filter. |
| L"rapportnikko.dll", // Trustware Rapport. |
| L"rlhook.dll", // Trustware Bufferzone. |
| L"rooksdol.dll", // Trustware Rapport. |
| L"rpchromebrowserrecordhelper.dll", // RealPlayer. |
| L"rpmainbrowserrecordplugin.dll", // RealPlayer. |
| L"r3hook.dll", // Kaspersky Internet Security. |
| L"sahook.dll", // McAfee Site Advisor. |
| L"sbrige.dll", // Unknown. |
| L"sc2hook.dll", // Supercopier 2. |
| L"sguard.dll", // Iolo (System Guard). |
| L"smum32.dll", // Spyware Doctor version 6. |
| L"smumhook.dll", // Spyware Doctor version 5. |
| L"ssldivx.dll", // DivX. |
| L"syncor11.dll", // SynthCore Midi interface. |
| L"systools.dll", // Panda Antivirus. |
| L"tfwah.dll", // Threatfire (PC tools). |
| L"ycwebcamerasource.ax", // Cyberlink Camera helper. |
| L"wblind.dll", // Stardock Object desktop. |
| L"wbhelp.dll", // Stardock Object desktop. |
| L"winstylerthemehelper.dll" // Tuneup utilities 2006. |
| }; |
| |
| enum PluginPolicyCategory { |
| PLUGIN_GROUP_TRUSTED, |
| PLUGIN_GROUP_UNTRUSTED, |
| }; |
| |
| // Returns the policy category for the plugin dll. |
| PluginPolicyCategory GetPolicyCategoryForPlugin( |
| const std::wstring& dll, |
| const std::wstring& list) { |
| std::wstring filename = FilePath(dll).BaseName().value(); |
| std::wstring plugin_dll = StringToLowerASCII(filename); |
| std::wstring trusted_plugins = StringToLowerASCII(list); |
| |
| size_t pos = 0; |
| size_t end_item = 0; |
| while (end_item != std::wstring::npos) { |
| end_item = list.find(L",", pos); |
| |
| size_t size_item = (end_item == std::wstring::npos) ? end_item : |
| end_item - pos; |
| std::wstring item = list.substr(pos, size_item); |
| if (!item.empty() && item == plugin_dll) |
| return PLUGIN_GROUP_TRUSTED; |
| |
| pos = end_item + 1; |
| } |
| |
| return PLUGIN_GROUP_UNTRUSTED; |
| } |
| |
| // Adds the policy rules for the path and path\ with the semantic |access|. |
| // If |children| is set to true, we need to add the wildcard rules to also |
| // apply the rule to the subfiles and subfolders. |
| bool AddDirectory(int path, const wchar_t* sub_dir, bool children, |
| sandbox::TargetPolicy::Semantics access, |
| sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) { |
| FilePath directory; |
| if (!PathService::Get(path, &directory)) |
| return false; |
| |
| if (sub_dir) { |
| directory = directory.Append(sub_dir); |
| file_util::AbsolutePath(&directory); |
| } |
| |
| sandbox::ResultCode result; |
| result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES, access, |
| directory.value().c_str()); |
| if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) |
| return false; |
| |
| std::wstring directory_str = directory.value() + L"\\"; |
| if (children) |
| directory_str += L"*"; |
| // Otherwise, add the version of the path that ends with a separator. |
| |
| result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES, access, |
| directory_str.c_str()); |
| if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) |
| return false; |
| |
| return true; |
| } |
| |
| // Adds the policy rules for the path and path\* with the semantic |access|. |
| // We need to add the wildcard rules to also apply the rule to the subkeys. |
| bool AddKeyAndSubkeys(std::wstring key, |
| sandbox::TargetPolicy::Semantics access, |
| sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) { |
| sandbox::ResultCode result; |
| result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_REGISTRY, access, |
| key.c_str()); |
| if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) |
| return false; |
| |
| key += L"\\*"; |
| result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_REGISTRY, access, |
| key.c_str()); |
| if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) |
| return false; |
| |
| return true; |
| } |
| |
| // Compares the loaded |module| file name matches |module_name|. |
| bool IsExpandedModuleName(HMODULE module, const wchar_t* module_name) { |
| wchar_t path[MAX_PATH]; |
| DWORD sz = ::GetModuleFileNameW(module, path, arraysize(path)); |
| if ((sz == arraysize(path)) || (sz == 0)) { |
| // XP does not set the last error properly, so we bail out anyway. |
| return false; |
| } |
| if (!::GetLongPathName(path, path, arraysize(path))) |
| return false; |
| FilePath fname(path); |
| return (fname.BaseName().value() == module_name); |
| } |
| |
| // Adds a single dll by |module_name| into the |policy| blacklist. |
| // To minimize the list we only add an unload policy only if the dll is |
| // also loaded in this process. All the injected dlls of interest do this. |
| void BlacklistAddOneDll(const wchar_t* module_name, |
| sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) { |
| HMODULE module = ::GetModuleHandleW(module_name); |
| if (!module) { |
| // The module could have been loaded with a 8.3 short name. We use |
| // the most common case: 'thelongname.dll' becomes 'thelon~1.dll'. |
| std::wstring name(module_name); |
| size_t period = name.rfind(L'.'); |
| DCHECK_NE(std::string::npos, period); |
| DCHECK_LE(3U, (name.size() - period)); |
| if (period <= 8) |
| return; |
| std::wstring alt_name = name.substr(0, 6) + L"~1"; |
| alt_name += name.substr(period, name.size()); |
| module = ::GetModuleHandleW(alt_name.c_str()); |
| if (!module) |
| return; |
| // We found it, but because it only has 6 significant letters, we |
| // want to make sure it is the right one. |
| if (!IsExpandedModuleName(module, module_name)) |
| return; |
| // Found a match. We add both forms to the policy. |
| policy->AddDllToUnload(alt_name.c_str()); |
| } |
| policy->AddDllToUnload(module_name); |
| VLOG(1) << "dll to unload found: " << module_name; |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| // Adds policy rules for unloaded the known dlls that cause chrome to crash. |
| // Eviction of injected DLLs is done by the sandbox so that the injected module |
| // does not get a chance to execute any code. |
| void AddDllEvictionPolicy(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) { |
| for (int ix = 0; ix != arraysize(kTroublesomeDlls); ++ix) |
| BlacklistAddOneDll(kTroublesomeDlls[ix], policy); |
| } |
| |
| // Adds the generic policy rules to a sandbox TargetPolicy. |
| bool AddGenericPolicy(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) { |
| sandbox::ResultCode result; |
| |
| // Add the policy for the pipes |
| result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES, |
| sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY, |
| L"\\??\\pipe\\chrome.*"); |
| if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) |
| return false; |
| |
| result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_NAMED_PIPES, |
| sandbox::TargetPolicy::NAMEDPIPES_ALLOW_ANY, |
| L"\\\\.\\pipe\\chrome.nacl.*"); |
| if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) |
| return false; |
| |
| // Add the policy for debug message only in debug |
| #ifndef NDEBUG |
| FilePath app_dir; |
| if (!PathService::Get(chrome::DIR_APP, &app_dir)) |
| return false; |
| |
| wchar_t long_path_buf[MAX_PATH]; |
| DWORD long_path_return_value = GetLongPathName(app_dir.value().c_str(), |
| long_path_buf, |
| MAX_PATH); |
| if (long_path_return_value == 0 || long_path_return_value >= MAX_PATH) |
| return false; |
| |
| string16 debug_message(long_path_buf); |
| file_util::AppendToPath(&debug_message, L"debug_message.exe"); |
| result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_PROCESS, |
| sandbox::TargetPolicy::PROCESS_MIN_EXEC, |
| debug_message.c_str()); |
| if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) |
| return false; |
| #endif // NDEBUG |
| |
| return true; |
| } |
| |
| // Creates a sandbox without any restriction. |
| bool ApplyPolicyForTrustedPlugin(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) { |
| policy->SetJobLevel(sandbox::JOB_UNPROTECTED, 0); |
| policy->SetTokenLevel(sandbox::USER_UNPROTECTED, sandbox::USER_UNPROTECTED); |
| return true; |
| } |
| |
| // Creates a sandbox with the plugin running in a restricted environment. |
| // Only the "Users" and "Everyone" groups are enabled in the token. The User SID |
| // is disabled. |
| bool ApplyPolicyForUntrustedPlugin(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) { |
| policy->SetJobLevel(sandbox::JOB_UNPROTECTED, 0); |
| |
| sandbox::TokenLevel initial_token = sandbox::USER_UNPROTECTED; |
| if (base::win::GetVersion() > base::win::VERSION_XP) { |
| // On 2003/Vista the initial token has to be restricted if the main token |
| // is restricted. |
| initial_token = sandbox::USER_RESTRICTED_SAME_ACCESS; |
| } |
| policy->SetTokenLevel(initial_token, sandbox::USER_LIMITED); |
| policy->SetDelayedIntegrityLevel(sandbox::INTEGRITY_LEVEL_LOW); |
| |
| if (!AddDirectory(base::DIR_TEMP, NULL, true, |
| sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY, policy)) |
| return false; |
| |
| if (!AddDirectory(base::DIR_IE_INTERNET_CACHE, NULL, true, |
| sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY, policy)) |
| return false; |
| |
| if (!AddDirectory(base::DIR_APP_DATA, NULL, true, |
| sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_READONLY, |
| policy)) |
| return false; |
| |
| if (!AddDirectory(base::DIR_PROFILE, NULL, false, /*not recursive*/ |
| sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_READONLY, |
| policy)) |
| return false; |
| |
| if (!AddDirectory(base::DIR_APP_DATA, L"Adobe", true, |
| sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY, |
| policy)) |
| return false; |
| |
| if (!AddDirectory(base::DIR_APP_DATA, L"Macromedia", true, |
| sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY, |
| policy)) |
| return false; |
| |
| if (!AddDirectory(base::DIR_LOCAL_APP_DATA, NULL, true, |
| sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_READONLY, |
| policy)) |
| return false; |
| |
| if (!AddKeyAndSubkeys(L"HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\SOFTWARE\\ADOBE", |
| sandbox::TargetPolicy::REG_ALLOW_ANY, |
| policy)) |
| return false; |
| |
| if (!AddKeyAndSubkeys(L"HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\SOFTWARE\\MACROMEDIA", |
| sandbox::TargetPolicy::REG_ALLOW_ANY, |
| policy)) |
| return false; |
| |
| if (base::win::GetVersion() >= base::win::VERSION_VISTA) { |
| if (!AddKeyAndSubkeys(L"HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\SOFTWARE\\AppDataLow", |
| sandbox::TargetPolicy::REG_ALLOW_ANY, |
| policy)) |
| return false; |
| |
| if (!AddDirectory(base::DIR_LOCAL_APP_DATA_LOW, NULL, true, |
| sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY, |
| policy)) |
| return false; |
| |
| // DIR_APP_DATA is AppData\Roaming, but Adobe needs to do a directory |
| // listing in AppData directly, so we add a non-recursive policy for |
| // AppData itself. |
| if (!AddDirectory(base::DIR_APP_DATA, L"..", false, |
| sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_READONLY, |
| policy)) |
| return false; |
| } |
| |
| return true; |
| } |
| |
| // Launches the privileged flash broker, used when flash is sandboxed. |
| // The broker is the same flash dll, except that it uses a different |
| // entrypoint (BrokerMain) and it is hosted in windows' generic surrogate |
| // process rundll32. After launching the broker we need to pass to |
| // the flash plugin the process id of the broker via the command line |
| // using --flash-broker=pid. |
| // More info about rundll32 at http://support.microsoft.com/kb/164787. |
| bool LoadFlashBroker(const FilePath& plugin_path, CommandLine* cmd_line) { |
| FilePath rundll; |
| if (!PathService::Get(base::DIR_SYSTEM, &rundll)) |
| return false; |
| rundll = rundll.AppendASCII("rundll32.exe"); |
| // Rundll32 cannot handle paths with spaces, so we use the short path. |
| wchar_t short_path[MAX_PATH]; |
| if (0 == ::GetShortPathNameW(plugin_path.value().c_str(), |
| short_path, arraysize(short_path))) |
| return false; |
| // Here is the kicker, if the user has disabled 8.3 (short path) support |
| // on the volume GetShortPathNameW does not fail but simply returns the |
| // input path. In this case if the path had any spaces then rundll32 will |
| // incorrectly interpret its parameters. So we quote the path, even though |
| // the kb/164787 says you should not. |
| std::wstring cmd_final = |
| base::StringPrintf(L"%ls \"%ls\",BrokerMain browser=chrome", |
| rundll.value().c_str(), |
| short_path); |
| base::ProcessHandle process; |
| if (!base::LaunchApp(cmd_final, false, true, &process)) |
| return false; |
| |
| cmd_line->AppendSwitchASCII("flash-broker", |
| base::Int64ToString(::GetProcessId(process))); |
| |
| // The flash broker, unders some circumstances can linger beyond the lifetime |
| // of the flash player, so we put it in a job object, when the browser |
| // terminates the job object is destroyed (by the OS) and the flash broker |
| // is terminated. |
| HANDLE job = ::CreateJobObjectW(NULL, NULL); |
| JOBOBJECT_EXTENDED_LIMIT_INFORMATION job_limits = {0}; |
| job_limits.BasicLimitInformation.LimitFlags = |
| JOB_OBJECT_LIMIT_KILL_ON_JOB_CLOSE; |
| if (::SetInformationJobObject(job, JobObjectExtendedLimitInformation, |
| &job_limits, sizeof(job_limits))) { |
| ::AssignProcessToJobObject(job, process); |
| // Yes, we are leaking the object here. Read comment above. |
| } else { |
| ::CloseHandle(job); |
| return false; |
| } |
| |
| ::CloseHandle(process); |
| return true; |
| } |
| |
| // Creates a sandbox for the built-in flash plugin running in a restricted |
| // environment. This policy is in continual flux as flash changes |
| // capabilities. For more information see bug 50796. |
| bool ApplyPolicyForBuiltInFlashPlugin(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) { |
| policy->SetJobLevel(sandbox::JOB_UNPROTECTED, 0); |
| // Vista and Win7 get a weaker token but have low integrity. |
| if (base::win::GetVersion() > base::win::VERSION_XP) { |
| policy->SetTokenLevel(sandbox::USER_RESTRICTED_SAME_ACCESS, |
| sandbox::USER_INTERACTIVE); |
| policy->SetDelayedIntegrityLevel(sandbox::INTEGRITY_LEVEL_LOW); |
| } else { |
| policy->SetTokenLevel(sandbox::USER_UNPROTECTED, |
| sandbox::USER_LIMITED); |
| |
| if (!AddKeyAndSubkeys(L"HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE", |
| sandbox::TargetPolicy::REG_ALLOW_READONLY, |
| policy)) |
| return false; |
| if (!AddKeyAndSubkeys(L"HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SYSTEM", |
| sandbox::TargetPolicy::REG_ALLOW_READONLY, |
| policy)) |
| return false; |
| |
| if (!AddKeyAndSubkeys(L"HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\SOFTWARE", |
| sandbox::TargetPolicy::REG_ALLOW_READONLY, |
| policy)) |
| return false; |
| } |
| |
| AddDllEvictionPolicy(policy); |
| return true; |
| } |
| |
| // Returns true of the plugin specified in |cmd_line| is the built-in |
| // flash plugin and optionally returns its full path in |flash_path| |
| bool IsBuiltInFlash(const CommandLine* cmd_line, FilePath* flash_path) { |
| std::wstring plugin_dll = cmd_line-> |
| GetSwitchValueNative(switches::kPluginPath); |
| |
| FilePath builtin_flash; |
| if (!PathService::Get(chrome::FILE_FLASH_PLUGIN, &builtin_flash)) |
| return false; |
| |
| FilePath plugin_path(plugin_dll); |
| if (plugin_path != builtin_flash) |
| return false; |
| |
| if (flash_path) |
| *flash_path = plugin_path; |
| return true; |
| } |
| |
| |
| // Adds the custom policy rules for a given plugin. |trusted_plugins| contains |
| // the comma separate list of plugin dll names that should not be sandboxed. |
| bool AddPolicyForPlugin(CommandLine* cmd_line, |
| sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) { |
| std::wstring plugin_dll = cmd_line-> |
| GetSwitchValueNative(switches::kPluginPath); |
| std::wstring trusted_plugins = CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()-> |
| GetSwitchValueNative(switches::kTrustedPlugins); |
| // Add the policy for the pipes. |
| sandbox::ResultCode result = sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK; |
| result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_NAMED_PIPES, |
| sandbox::TargetPolicy::NAMEDPIPES_ALLOW_ANY, |
| L"\\\\.\\pipe\\chrome.*"); |
| if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) { |
| NOTREACHED(); |
| return false; |
| } |
| |
| // The built-in flash gets a custom, more restricted sandbox. |
| FilePath flash_path; |
| if (IsBuiltInFlash(cmd_line, &flash_path)) { |
| // Spawn the flash broker and apply sandbox policy. |
| if (!LoadFlashBroker(flash_path, cmd_line)) { |
| // Could not start the broker, use a very weak policy instead. |
| DLOG(WARNING) << "Failed to start flash broker"; |
| return ApplyPolicyForTrustedPlugin(policy); |
| } |
| return ApplyPolicyForBuiltInFlashPlugin(policy); |
| } |
| |
| PluginPolicyCategory policy_category = |
| GetPolicyCategoryForPlugin(plugin_dll, trusted_plugins); |
| |
| switch (policy_category) { |
| case PLUGIN_GROUP_TRUSTED: |
| return ApplyPolicyForTrustedPlugin(policy); |
| case PLUGIN_GROUP_UNTRUSTED: |
| return ApplyPolicyForUntrustedPlugin(policy); |
| default: |
| NOTREACHED(); |
| break; |
| } |
| |
| return false; |
| } |
| |
| // For the GPU process we gotten as far as USER_LIMITED. The next level |
| // which is USER_RESTRICTED breaks both the DirectX backend and the OpenGL |
| // backend. Note that the GPU process is connected to the interactive |
| // desktop. |
| // TODO(cpu): Lock down the sandbox more if possible. |
| // TODO(apatrick): Use D3D9Ex to render windowless. |
| bool AddPolicyForGPU(CommandLine*, sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) { |
| policy->SetJobLevel(sandbox::JOB_UNPROTECTED, 0); |
| |
| if (base::win::GetVersion() > base::win::VERSION_XP) { |
| policy->SetTokenLevel(sandbox::USER_RESTRICTED_SAME_ACCESS, |
| sandbox::USER_LIMITED); |
| policy->SetDelayedIntegrityLevel(sandbox::INTEGRITY_LEVEL_LOW); |
| } else { |
| policy->SetTokenLevel(sandbox::USER_UNPROTECTED, |
| sandbox::USER_LIMITED); |
| } |
| |
| AddDllEvictionPolicy(policy); |
| return true; |
| } |
| |
| void AddPolicyForRenderer(sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy, |
| bool* on_sandbox_desktop) { |
| policy->SetJobLevel(sandbox::JOB_LOCKDOWN, 0); |
| |
| sandbox::TokenLevel initial_token = sandbox::USER_UNPROTECTED; |
| if (base::win::GetVersion() > base::win::VERSION_XP) { |
| // On 2003/Vista the initial token has to be restricted if the main |
| // token is restricted. |
| initial_token = sandbox::USER_RESTRICTED_SAME_ACCESS; |
| } |
| |
| policy->SetTokenLevel(initial_token, sandbox::USER_LOCKDOWN); |
| policy->SetDelayedIntegrityLevel(sandbox::INTEGRITY_LEVEL_LOW); |
| |
| bool use_winsta = !CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch( |
| switches::kDisableAltWinstation); |
| |
| if (sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK == policy->SetAlternateDesktop(use_winsta)) { |
| *on_sandbox_desktop = true; |
| } else { |
| *on_sandbox_desktop = false; |
| DLOG(WARNING) << "Failed to apply desktop security to the renderer"; |
| } |
| |
| AddDllEvictionPolicy(policy); |
| } |
| |
| } // namespace |
| |
| namespace sandbox { |
| |
| void InitBrokerServices(sandbox::BrokerServices* broker_services) { |
| // TODO(abarth): DCHECK(CalledOnValidThread()); |
| // See <http://b/1287166>. |
| CHECK(broker_services); |
| CHECK(!g_broker_services); |
| broker_services->Init(); |
| g_broker_services = broker_services; |
| } |
| |
| base::ProcessHandle StartProcessWithAccess(CommandLine* cmd_line, |
| const FilePath& exposed_dir) { |
| base::ProcessHandle process = 0; |
| const CommandLine& browser_command_line = *CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess(); |
| ChildProcessInfo::ProcessType type; |
| std::string type_str = cmd_line->GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kProcessType); |
| if (type_str == switches::kRendererProcess) { |
| type = ChildProcessInfo::RENDER_PROCESS; |
| } else if (type_str == switches::kExtensionProcess) { |
| // Extensions are just renderers with another name. |
| type = ChildProcessInfo::RENDER_PROCESS; |
| } else if (type_str == switches::kPluginProcess) { |
| type = ChildProcessInfo::PLUGIN_PROCESS; |
| } else if (type_str == switches::kWorkerProcess) { |
| type = ChildProcessInfo::WORKER_PROCESS; |
| } else if (type_str == switches::kNaClLoaderProcess) { |
| type = ChildProcessInfo::NACL_LOADER_PROCESS; |
| } else if (type_str == switches::kUtilityProcess) { |
| type = ChildProcessInfo::UTILITY_PROCESS; |
| } else if (type_str == switches::kNaClBrokerProcess) { |
| type = ChildProcessInfo::NACL_BROKER_PROCESS; |
| } else if (type_str == switches::kGpuProcess) { |
| type = ChildProcessInfo::GPU_PROCESS; |
| } else if (type_str == switches::kPpapiPluginProcess) { |
| type = ChildProcessInfo::PPAPI_PLUGIN_PROCESS; |
| } else { |
| NOTREACHED(); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| TRACE_EVENT_BEGIN("StartProcessWithAccess", 0, type_str); |
| |
| // To decide if the process is going to be sandboxed we have two cases. |
| // First case: all process types except the nacl broker, and the plugin |
| // process are sandboxed by default. |
| bool in_sandbox = |
| (type != ChildProcessInfo::NACL_BROKER_PROCESS) && |
| (type != ChildProcessInfo::PLUGIN_PROCESS); |
| |
| // Second case: If it is the plugin process then it depends on it being |
| // the built-in flash, the user forcing plugins into sandbox or the |
| // the user explicitly excluding flash from the sandbox. |
| if (!in_sandbox && (type == ChildProcessInfo::PLUGIN_PROCESS)) { |
| in_sandbox = browser_command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kSafePlugins) || |
| (IsBuiltInFlash(cmd_line, NULL) && |
| (base::win::GetVersion() > base::win::VERSION_XP) && |
| !browser_command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisableFlashSandbox)); |
| } |
| |
| // Third case: If it is the GPU process then it can be disabled by a |
| // command line flag. |
| if ((type == ChildProcessInfo::GPU_PROCESS) && |
| (browser_command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisableGpuSandbox))) { |
| in_sandbox = false; |
| VLOG(1) << "GPU sandbox is disabled"; |
| } |
| |
| if (browser_command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kNoSandbox)) { |
| // The user has explicity opted-out from all sandboxing. |
| in_sandbox = false; |
| } |
| |
| #if !defined (GOOGLE_CHROME_BUILD) |
| if (browser_command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kInProcessPlugins)) { |
| // In process plugins won't work if the sandbox is enabled. |
| in_sandbox = false; |
| } |
| #endif |
| if (!browser_command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisable3DAPIs) && |
| !browser_command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisableExperimentalWebGL) && |
| browser_command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kInProcessWebGL)) { |
| // In process WebGL won't work if the sandbox is enabled. |
| in_sandbox = false; |
| } |
| |
| // Propagate the Chrome Frame flag to sandboxed processes if present. |
| if (browser_command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kChromeFrame)) { |
| if (!cmd_line->HasSwitch(switches::kChromeFrame)) { |
| cmd_line->AppendSwitch(switches::kChromeFrame); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| bool child_needs_help = |
| DebugFlags::ProcessDebugFlags(cmd_line, type, in_sandbox); |
| |
| // Prefetch hints on windows: |
| // Using a different prefetch profile per process type will allow Windows |
| // to create separate pretetch settings for browser, renderer etc. |
| cmd_line->AppendArg(base::StringPrintf("/prefetch:%d", type)); |
| |
| if (!in_sandbox) { |
| base::LaunchApp(*cmd_line, false, false, &process); |
| return process; |
| } |
| |
| sandbox::ResultCode result; |
| PROCESS_INFORMATION target = {0}; |
| sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy = g_broker_services->CreatePolicy(); |
| |
| bool on_sandbox_desktop = false; |
| if (type == ChildProcessInfo::PLUGIN_PROCESS) { |
| if (!AddPolicyForPlugin(cmd_line, policy)) |
| return 0; |
| } else if (type == ChildProcessInfo::GPU_PROCESS) { |
| if (!AddPolicyForGPU(cmd_line, policy)) |
| return 0; |
| } else { |
| AddPolicyForRenderer(policy, &on_sandbox_desktop); |
| |
| if (type_str != switches::kRendererProcess) { |
| // Hack for Google Desktop crash. Trick GD into not injecting its DLL into |
| // this subprocess. See |
| // http://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=25580 |
| cmd_line->AppendSwitchASCII("ignored", " --type=renderer "); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (!exposed_dir.empty()) { |
| result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES, |
| sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY, |
| exposed_dir.value().c_str()); |
| if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) |
| return 0; |
| |
| FilePath exposed_files = exposed_dir.AppendASCII("*"); |
| result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES, |
| sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY, |
| exposed_files.value().c_str()); |
| if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (!AddGenericPolicy(policy)) { |
| NOTREACHED(); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| TRACE_EVENT_BEGIN("StartProcessWithAccess::LAUNCHPROCESS", 0, 0); |
| |
| result = g_broker_services->SpawnTarget( |
| cmd_line->GetProgram().value().c_str(), |
| cmd_line->command_line_string().c_str(), |
| policy, &target); |
| policy->Release(); |
| |
| TRACE_EVENT_END("StartProcessWithAccess::LAUNCHPROCESS", 0, 0); |
| |
| if (sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK != result) |
| return 0; |
| |
| ResumeThread(target.hThread); |
| CloseHandle(target.hThread); |
| process = target.hProcess; |
| |
| // Help the process a little. It can't start the debugger by itself if |
| // the process is in a sandbox. |
| if (child_needs_help) |
| base::debug::SpawnDebuggerOnProcess(target.dwProcessId); |
| |
| return process; |
| } |
| |
| } // namespace sandbox |
