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ara-mdk / platform / external / openssl / 068012174ace0b90f5ef78b89e6d7a673cbf9158 / . / crypto / x509 / x509_vfy.c
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/* crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c */
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
* All rights reserved.
*
* This package is an SSL implementation written
* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
*
* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
*
* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
* the code are not to be removed.
* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
* as the author of the parts of the library used.
* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
* must display the following acknowledgement:
* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
* copied and put under another distribution licence
* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
*/
#include <stdio.h>
#include <time.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include "cryptlib.h"
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
#include <openssl/lhash.h>
#include <openssl/buffer.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/asn1.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
static int null_callback(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *e);
static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer);
static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x);
static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
const char X509_version[]="X.509" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e)
{
return ok;
}
#if 0
static int x509_subject_cmp(X509 **a, X509 **b)
{
return X509_subject_name_cmp(*a,*b);
}
#endif
int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
X509 *x,*xtmp,*chain_ss=NULL;
X509_NAME *xn;
int bad_chain = 0;
X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param;
int depth,i,ok=0;
int num;
int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp=NULL;
if (ctx->cert == NULL)
{
X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY);
return -1;
}
cb=ctx->verify_cb;
/* first we make sure the chain we are going to build is
* present and that the first entry is in place */
if (ctx->chain == NULL)
{
if ( ((ctx->chain=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) ||
(!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,ctx->cert)))
{
X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto end;
}
CRYPTO_add(&ctx->cert->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
ctx->last_untrusted=1;
}
/* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it */
if (ctx->untrusted != NULL
&& (sktmp=sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL)
{
X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto end;
}
num=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1);
depth=param->depth;
for (;;)
{
/* If we have enough, we break */
if (depth < num) break; /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take
* note of it and, if appropriate, use the
* X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error
* code later.
*/
/* If we are self signed, we break */
xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x);
if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x,x)) break;
/* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */
if (ctx->untrusted != NULL)
{
xtmp=find_issuer(ctx, sktmp,x);
if (xtmp != NULL)
{
if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,xtmp))
{
X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto end;
}
CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
(void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp,xtmp);
ctx->last_untrusted++;
x=xtmp;
num++;
/* reparse the full chain for
* the next one */
continue;
}
}
break;
}
/* at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted
* certificates. We now need to add at least one trusted one,
* if possible, otherwise we complain. */
/* Examine last certificate in chain and see if it
* is self signed.
*/
i=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,i-1);
xn = X509_get_subject_name(x);
if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x))
{
/* we have a self signed certificate */
if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1)
{
/* We have a single self signed certificate: see if
* we can find it in the store. We must have an exact
* match to avoid possible impersonation.
*/
ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp))
{
ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT;
ctx->current_cert=x;
ctx->error_depth=i-1;
if (ok == 1) X509_free(xtmp);
bad_chain = 1;
ok=cb(0,ctx);
if (!ok) goto end;
}
else
{
/* We have a match: replace certificate with store version
* so we get any trust settings.
*/
X509_free(x);
x = xtmp;
(void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x);
ctx->last_untrusted=0;
}
}
else
{
/* extract and save self signed certificate for later use */
chain_ss=sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
ctx->last_untrusted--;
num--;
x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1);
}
}
/* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */
for (;;)
{
/* If we have enough, we break */
if (depth < num) break;
/* If we are self signed, we break */
xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x);
if (ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x)) break;
ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
if (ok < 0) return ok;
if (ok == 0) break;
x = xtmp;
if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,x))
{
X509_free(xtmp);
X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
num++;
}
/* we now have our chain, lets check it... */
xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x);
/* Is last certificate looked up self signed? */
if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x))
{
if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss))
{
if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num)
ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY;
else
ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT;
ctx->current_cert=x;
}
else
{
sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,chain_ss);
num++;
ctx->last_untrusted=num;
ctx->current_cert=chain_ss;
ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN;
chain_ss=NULL;
}
ctx->error_depth=num-1;
bad_chain = 1;
ok=cb(0,ctx);
if (!ok) goto end;
}
/* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */
ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx);
if (!ok) goto end;
/* The chain extensions are OK: check trust */
if (param->trust > 0) ok = check_trust(ctx);
if (!ok) goto end;
/* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */
X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain);
/* Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters
* because they may be needed for CRL signature verification.
*/
ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx);
if(!ok) goto end;
/* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */
if (ctx->verify != NULL)
ok=ctx->verify(ctx);
else
ok=internal_verify(ctx);
if(!ok) goto end;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
/* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */
ok = v3_asid_validate_path(ctx);
if (!ok) goto end;
ok = v3_addr_validate_path(ctx);
if (!ok) goto end;
#endif
/* If we get this far evaluate policies */
if (!bad_chain && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK))
ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx);
if(!ok) goto end;
if (0)
{
end:
X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain);
}
if (sktmp != NULL) sk_X509_free(sktmp);
if (chain_ss != NULL) X509_free(chain_ss);
return ok;
}
/* Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any)
*/
static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x)
{
int i;
X509 *issuer;
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++)
{
issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer))
return issuer;
}
return NULL;
}
/* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */
static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer)
{
int ret;
ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x);
if (ret == X509_V_OK)
return 1;
/* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */
if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK))
return 0;
ctx->error = ret;
ctx->current_cert = x;
ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
return 0;
}
/* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */
static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
{
*issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x);
if (*issuer)
{
CRYPTO_add(&(*issuer)->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
return 1;
}
else
return 0;
}
/* Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency
* with the supplied purpose
*/
static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
return 1;
#else
int i, ok=0, must_be_ca, plen = 0;
X509 *x;
int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
int proxy_path_length = 0;
int allow_proxy_certs =
!!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS);
cb=ctx->verify_cb;
/* must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values:
-1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct
use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA).
0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is currently not
used, but the possibility is present for future extensions.
1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used for
all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate.
*/
must_be_ca = -1;
/* A hack to keep people who don't want to modify their software
happy */
if (getenv("OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS"))
allow_proxy_certs = 1;
/* Check all untrusted certificates */
for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++)
{
int ret;
x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
&& (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
{
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION;
ctx->error_depth = i;
ctx->current_cert = x;
ok=cb(0,ctx);
if (!ok) goto end;
}
if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY))
{
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED;
ctx->error_depth = i;
ctx->current_cert = x;
ok=cb(0,ctx);
if (!ok) goto end;
}
ret = X509_check_ca(x);
switch(must_be_ca)
{
case -1:
if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
&& (ret != 1) && (ret != 0))
{
ret = 0;
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
}
else
ret = 1;
break;
case 0:
if (ret != 0)
{
ret = 0;
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA;
}
else
ret = 1;
break;
default:
if ((ret == 0)
|| ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
&& (ret != 1)))
{
ret = 0;
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
}
else
ret = 1;
break;
}
if (ret == 0)
{
ctx->error_depth = i;
ctx->current_cert = x;
ok=cb(0,ctx);
if (!ok) goto end;
}
if (ctx->param->purpose > 0)
{
ret = X509_check_purpose(x, ctx->param->purpose,
must_be_ca > 0);
if ((ret == 0)
|| ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
&& (ret != 1)))
{
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE;
ctx->error_depth = i;
ctx->current_cert = x;
ok=cb(0,ctx);
if (!ok) goto end;
}
}
/* Check pathlen if not self issued */
if ((i > 1) && !(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)
&& (x->ex_pathlen != -1)
&& (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1)))
{
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
ctx->error_depth = i;
ctx->current_cert = x;
ok=cb(0,ctx);
if (!ok) goto end;
}
/* Increment path length if not self issued */
if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
plen++;
/* If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next
certificate must be another proxy certificate or a EE
certificate. If not, the next certificate must be a
CA certificate. */
if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)
{
if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1 && i > x->ex_pcpathlen)
{
ctx->error =
X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
ctx->error_depth = i;
ctx->current_cert = x;
ok=cb(0,ctx);
if (!ok) goto end;
}
proxy_path_length++;
must_be_ca = 0;
}
else
must_be_ca = 1;
}
ok = 1;
end:
return ok;
#endif
}
static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
return 1;
#else
int i, ok;
X509 *x;
int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
cb=ctx->verify_cb;
/* For now just check the last certificate in the chain */
i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0);
if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
return 1;
ctx->error_depth = i;
ctx->current_cert = x;
if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED;
else
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED;
ok = cb(0, ctx);
return ok;
#endif
}
static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
int i, last, ok;
if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK))
return 1;
if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL)
last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
else
last = 0;
for(i = 0; i <= last; i++)
{
ctx->error_depth = i;
ok = check_cert(ctx);
if (!ok) return ok;
}
return 1;
}
static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
X509_CRL *crl = NULL;
X509 *x;
int ok, cnum;
cnum = ctx->error_depth;
x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum);
ctx->current_cert = x;
/* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x);
/* If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except
* notify callback
*/
if(!ok)
{
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
goto err;
}
ctx->current_crl = crl;
ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl);
if (!ok) goto err;
ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x);
err:
ctx->current_crl = NULL;
X509_CRL_free(crl);
return ok;
}
/* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */
static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify)
{
time_t *ptime;
int i;
ctx->current_crl = crl;
if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
else
ptime = NULL;
i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl), ptime);
if (i == 0)
{
ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD;
if (!notify || !ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
return 0;
}
if (i > 0)
{
ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID;
if (!notify || !ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
return 0;
}
if(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl))
{
i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), ptime);
if (i == 0)
{
ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD;
if (!notify || !ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
return 0;
}
if (i < 0)
{
ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED;
if (!notify || !ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
return 0;
}
}
ctx->current_crl = NULL;
return 1;
}
/* Lookup CRLs from the supplied list. Look for matching isser name
* and validity. If we can't find a valid CRL return the last one
* with matching name. This gives more meaningful error codes. Otherwise
* we'd get a CRL not found error if a CRL existed with matching name but
* was invalid.
*/
static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl,
X509_NAME *nm, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
{
int i;
X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL;
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++)
{
crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
if (X509_NAME_cmp(nm, X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl)))
continue;
if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0))
{
*pcrl = crl;
CRYPTO_add(&crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
return 1;
}
best_crl = crl;
}
if (best_crl)
{
*pcrl = best_crl;
CRYPTO_add(&best_crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
}
return 0;
}
/* Retrieve CRL corresponding to certificate: currently just a
* subject lookup: maybe use AKID later...
*/
static int get_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509 *x)
{
int ok;
X509_CRL *crl = NULL;
X509_OBJECT xobj;
X509_NAME *nm;
nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, nm, ctx->crls);
if (ok)
{
*pcrl = crl;
return 1;
}
ok = X509_STORE_get_by_subject(ctx, X509_LU_CRL, nm, &xobj);
if (!ok)
{
/* If we got a near match from get_crl_sk use that */
if (crl)
{
*pcrl = crl;
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
*pcrl = xobj.data.crl;
if (crl)
X509_CRL_free(crl);
return 1;
}
/* Check CRL validity */
static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl)
{
X509 *issuer = NULL;
EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL;
int ok = 0, chnum, cnum;
cnum = ctx->error_depth;
chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
/* Find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer
* is next certificate in chain.
*/
if(cnum < chnum)
issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1);
else
{
issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum);
/* If not self signed, can't check signature */
if(!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer))
{
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER;
ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
if(!ok) goto err;
}
}
if(issuer)
{
/* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) &&
!(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN))
{
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN;
ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
if(!ok) goto err;
}
/* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer);
if(!ikey)
{
ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
if (!ok) goto err;
}
else
{
/* Verify CRL signature */
if(X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0)
{
ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
if (!ok) goto err;
}
}
}
ok = check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1);
if (!ok)
goto err;
ok = 1;
err:
EVP_PKEY_free(ikey);
return ok;
}
/* Check certificate against CRL */
static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
{
int idx, ok;
X509_REVOKED rtmp;
STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *exts;
X509_EXTENSION *ext;
/* Look for serial number of certificate in CRL */
rtmp.serialNumber = X509_get_serialNumber(x);
/* Sort revoked into serial number order if not already sorted.
* Do this under a lock to avoid race condition.
*/
if (!sk_X509_REVOKED_is_sorted(crl->crl->revoked))
{
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
sk_X509_REVOKED_sort(crl->crl->revoked);
CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
}
idx = sk_X509_REVOKED_find(crl->crl->revoked, &rtmp);
/* If found assume revoked: want something cleverer than
* this to handle entry extensions in V2 CRLs.
*/
if(idx >= 0)
{
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED;
ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
if (!ok) return 0;
}
if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
return 1;
/* See if we have any critical CRL extensions: since we
* currently don't handle any CRL extensions the CRL must be
* rejected.
* This code accesses the X509_CRL structure directly: applications
* shouldn't do this.
*/
exts = crl->crl->extensions;
for (idx = 0; idx < sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(exts); idx++)
{
ext = sk_X509_EXTENSION_value(exts, idx);
if (ext->critical > 0)
{
ctx->error =
X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION;
ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
if(!ok) return 0;
break;
}
}
return 1;
}
static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
int ret;
ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain,
ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags);
if (ret == 0)
{
X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
/* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
if (ret == -1)
{
/* Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify
* callback.
*/
X509 *x;
int i;
for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++)
{
x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY))
continue;
ctx->current_cert = x;
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION;
ret = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
}
return 1;
}
if (ret == -2)
{
ctx->current_cert = NULL;
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY;
return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
}
if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY)
{
ctx->current_cert = NULL;
ctx->error = X509_V_OK;
if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx))
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
static int check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
{
time_t *ptime;
int i;
if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
else
ptime = NULL;
i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x), ptime);
if (i == 0)
{
ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD;
ctx->current_cert=x;
if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
return 0;
}
if (i > 0)
{
ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID;
ctx->current_cert=x;
if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
return 0;
}
i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x), ptime);
if (i == 0)
{
ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD;
ctx->current_cert=x;
if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
return 0;
}
if (i < 0)
{
ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED;
ctx->current_cert=x;
if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
int ok=0,n;
X509 *xs,*xi;
EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
cb=ctx->verify_cb;
n=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
ctx->error_depth=n-1;
n--;
xi=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi))
xs=xi;
else
{
if (n <= 0)
{
ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE;
ctx->current_cert=xi;
ok=cb(0,ctx);
goto end;
}
else
{
n--;
ctx->error_depth=n;
xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
}
}
/* ctx->error=0; not needed */
while (n >= 0)
{
ctx->error_depth=n;
/* Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless
* explicitly asked for. It doesn't add any security and
* just wastes time.
*/
if (!xs->valid && (xs != xi || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE)))
{
if ((pkey=X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL)
{
ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
ctx->current_cert=xi;
ok=(*cb)(0,ctx);
if (!ok) goto end;
}
else if (X509_verify(xs,pkey) <= 0)
{
ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
ctx->current_cert=xs;
ok=(*cb)(0,ctx);
if (!ok)
{
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
goto end;
}
}
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
pkey=NULL;
}
xs->valid = 1;
ok = check_cert_time(ctx, xs);
if (!ok)
goto end;
/* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */
ctx->current_issuer=xi;
ctx->current_cert=xs;
ok=(*cb)(1,ctx);
if (!ok) goto end;
n--;
if (n >= 0)
{
xi=xs;
xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
}
}
ok=1;
end:
return ok;
}
int X509_cmp_current_time(ASN1_TIME *ctm)
{
return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL);
}
int X509_cmp_time(ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time)
{
char *str;
ASN1_TIME atm;
long offset;
char buff1[24],buff2[24],*p;
int i,j;
p=buff1;
i=ctm->length;
str=(char *)ctm->data;
if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
{
if ((i < 11) || (i > 17)) return 0;
memcpy(p,str,10);
p+=10;
str+=10;
}
else
{
if (i < 13) return 0;
memcpy(p,str,12);
p+=12;
str+=12;
}
if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+'))
{ *(p++)='0'; *(p++)='0'; }
else
{
*(p++)= *(str++);
*(p++)= *(str++);
/* Skip any fractional seconds... */
if (*str == '.')
{
str++;
while ((*str >= '0') && (*str <= '9')) str++;
}
}
*(p++)='Z';
*(p++)='\0';
if (*str == 'Z')
offset=0;
else
{
if ((*str != '+') && (*str != '-'))
return 0;
offset=((str[1]-'0')*10+(str[2]-'0'))*60;
offset+=(str[3]-'0')*10+(str[4]-'0');
if (*str == '-')
offset= -offset;
}
atm.type=ctm->type;
atm.length=sizeof(buff2);
atm.data=(unsigned char *)buff2;
if (X509_time_adj(&atm,-offset*60, cmp_time) == NULL)
return 0;
if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
{
i=(buff1[0]-'0')*10+(buff1[1]-'0');
if (i < 50) i+=100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */
j=(buff2[0]-'0')*10+(buff2[1]-'0');
if (j < 50) j+=100;
if (i < j) return -1;
if (i > j) return 1;
}
i=strcmp(buff1,buff2);
if (i == 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */
return -1;
else
return i;
}
ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj)
{
return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL);
}
ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj, time_t *in_tm)
{
time_t t;
int type = -1;
if (in_tm) t = *in_tm;
else time(&t);
t+=adj;
if (s) type = s->type;
if (type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) return ASN1_UTCTIME_set(s,t);
if (type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME) return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_set(s, t);
return ASN1_TIME_set(s, t);
}
int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
{
EVP_PKEY *ktmp=NULL,*ktmp2;
int i,j;
if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) return 1;
for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
{
ktmp=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,i));
if (ktmp == NULL)
{
X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY);
return 0;
}
if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp))
break;
else
{
EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
ktmp=NULL;
}
}
if (ktmp == NULL)
{
X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN);
return 0;
}
/* first, populate the other certs */
for (j=i-1; j >= 0; j--)
{
ktmp2=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,j));
EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2,ktmp);
EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp2);
}
if (pkey != NULL) EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey,ktmp);
EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
return 1;
}
int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
{
/* This function is (usually) called only once, by
* SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c). */
return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, argl, argp,
new_func, dup_func, free_func);
}
int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data)
{
return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx,data);
}
void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx)
{
return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx);
}
int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
return ctx->error;
}
void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err)
{
ctx->error=err;
}
int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
return ctx->error_depth;
}
X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
return ctx->current_cert;
}
STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
return ctx->chain;
}
STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
int i;
X509 *x;
STACK_OF(X509) *chain;
if (!ctx->chain || !(chain = sk_X509_dup(ctx->chain))) return NULL;
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
{
x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
}
return chain;
}
void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
{
ctx->cert=x;
}
void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
{
ctx->untrusted=sk;
}
void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk)
{
ctx->crls=sk;
}
int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose)
{
return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0);
}
int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust)
{
return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust);
}
/* This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust
* values. This is intended to be used when another structure has its
* own trust and purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by
* the ctx. If they aren't set then we will usually have a default
* purpose in mind which should then be used to set the trust value.
* An example of this is SSL use: an SSL structure will have its own
* purpose and trust settings which the application can set: if they
* aren't set then we use the default of SSL client/server.
*/
int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose,
int purpose, int trust)
{
int idx;
/* If purpose not set use default */
if (!purpose) purpose = def_purpose;
/* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */
if (purpose)
{
X509_PURPOSE *ptmp;
idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose);
if (idx == -1)
{
X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
return 0;
}
ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT)
{
idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose);
if (idx == -1)
{
X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
return 0;
}
ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
}
/* If trust not set then get from purpose default */
if (!trust) trust = ptmp->trust;
}
if (trust)
{
idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust);
if (idx == -1)
{
X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID);
return 0;
}
}
if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose) ctx->param->purpose = purpose;
if (trust && !ctx->param->trust) ctx->param->trust = trust;
return 1;
}
X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)
{
X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
ctx = (X509_STORE_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
if (!ctx)
{
X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return NULL;
}
memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
return ctx;
}
void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
OPENSSL_free(ctx);
}
int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509,
STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
{
int ret = 1;
ctx->ctx=store;
ctx->current_method=0;
ctx->cert=x509;
ctx->untrusted=chain;
ctx->crls = NULL;
ctx->last_untrusted=0;
ctx->other_ctx=NULL;
ctx->valid=0;
ctx->chain=NULL;
ctx->error=0;
ctx->explicit_policy=0;
ctx->error_depth=0;
ctx->current_cert=NULL;
ctx->current_issuer=NULL;
ctx->tree = NULL;
ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
if (!ctx->param)
{
X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
/* Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set
* use defaults.
*/
if (store)
ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param);
else
ctx->param->flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT|X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE;
if (store)
{
ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup;
}
else
ctx->cleanup = 0;
if (ret)
ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param,
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default"));
if (ret == 0)
{
X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
if (store && store->check_issued)
ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued;
else
ctx->check_issued = check_issued;
if (store && store->get_issuer)
ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer;
else
ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer;
if (store && store->verify_cb)
ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
else
ctx->verify_cb = null_callback;
if (store && store->verify)
ctx->verify = store->verify;
else
ctx->verify = internal_verify;
if (store && store->check_revocation)
ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation;
else
ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation;
if (store && store->get_crl)
ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl;
else
ctx->get_crl = get_crl;
if (store && store->check_crl)
ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl;
else
ctx->check_crl = check_crl;
if (store && store->cert_crl)
ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl;
else
ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl;
ctx->check_policy = check_policy;
/* This memset() can't make any sense anyway, so it's removed. As
* X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup does a proper "free" on the ex_data, we put a
* corresponding "new" here and remove this bogus initialisation. */
/* memset(&(ctx->ex_data),0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); */
if(!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx,
&(ctx->ex_data)))
{
OPENSSL_free(ctx);
X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
/* Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates.
* This avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed.
*/
void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
{
ctx->other_ctx = sk;
ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk;
}
void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
if (ctx->cleanup) ctx->cleanup(ctx);
if (ctx->param != NULL)
{
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
ctx->param=NULL;
}
if (ctx->tree != NULL)
{
X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree);
ctx->tree=NULL;
}
if (ctx->chain != NULL)
{
sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain,X509_free);
ctx->chain=NULL;
}
CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data));
memset(&ctx->ex_data,0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA));
}
void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
{
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
}
void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags)
{
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags);
}
void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags, time_t t)
{
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t);
}
void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
int (*verify_cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *))
{
ctx->verify_cb=verify_cb;
}
X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
return ctx->tree;
}
int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
return ctx->explicit_policy;
}
int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name)
{
const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name);
if (!param)
return 0;
return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param);
}
X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
return ctx->param;
}
void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
{
if (ctx->param)
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
ctx->param = param;
}
IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509)
IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509)
IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_NAME)
IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)
IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)