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ara-mdk / platform / external / openssl / 98d58bb80c64b02a33662f0ea80351d4a1535267 / . / ssl / s3_srvr.c
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/* ssl/s3_srvr.c */
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
* All rights reserved.
*
* This package is an SSL implementation written
* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
*
* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
*
* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
* the code are not to be removed.
* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
* as the author of the parts of the library used.
* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
* must display the following acknowledgement:
* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
* copied and put under another distribution licence
* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
* distribution.
*
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
* software must display the following acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
*
* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
* openssl-core@openssl.org.
*
* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
*
* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
* acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
* ====================================================================
*
* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
*
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
*
* Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
* SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
*
* The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
* license provided above.
*
* ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
* Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
*
*/
#define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
#define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
#include <stdio.h>
#include "ssl_locl.h"
#include "kssl_lcl.h"
#include <openssl/buffer.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/hmac.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
#include <openssl/dh.h>
#endif
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
#include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
#endif
#include <openssl/md5.h>
static SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
static int nid2curve_id(int nid);
#endif
static SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
{
if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
return(SSLv3_server_method());
else
return(NULL);
}
IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
ssl3_accept,
ssl_undefined_function,
ssl3_get_server_method)
int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
{
BUF_MEM *buf;
unsigned long l,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
int ret= -1;
int new_state,state,skip=0;
RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
ERR_clear_error();
clear_sys_error();
if (s->info_callback != NULL)
cb=s->info_callback;
else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
/* init things to blank */
s->in_handshake++;
if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
if (s->cert == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
return(-1);
}
for (;;)
{
state=s->state;
switch (s->state)
{
case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
s->new_session=1;
/* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
case SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
s->server=1;
if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
if ((s->version>>8) != 3)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
}
s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
if (s->init_buf == NULL)
{
if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
{
ret= -1;
goto end;
}
if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
{
ret= -1;
goto end;
}
s->init_buf=buf;
}
if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
{
ret= -1;
goto end;
}
s->init_num=0;
if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
{
/* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
* the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
*/
if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
}
else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
!(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
{
/* Server attempting to renegotiate with
* client that doesn't support secure
* renegotiation.
*/
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
ret = -1;
goto end;
}
else
{
/* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
* we will just send a HelloRequest */
s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
}
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
s->shutdown=0;
ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
s->init_num=0;
ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
s->shutdown=0;
ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->new_session = 2;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
s->init_num=0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
if (s->hit)
{
if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
else
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
}
#else
if (s->hit)
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
#endif
else
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
s->init_num=0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
/* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH or KRB5 */
if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL)
&& !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aKRB5))
{
ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
else
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
}
else
{
skip = 1;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
}
#else
}
else
skip=1;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
#endif
s->init_num=0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
l=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms;
/* clear this, it may get reset by
* send_server_key_exchange */
if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
&& !(l & SSL_KRB5)
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
)
/* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
* even when forbidden by protocol specs
* (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
* be able to handle this) */
s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
else
s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
/* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
* RSA but we have a sign only certificate
*
* For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
* message only if the cipher suite is either
* ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
* server certificate contains the server's
* public key for key exchange.
*/
if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
|| (l & SSL_kECDHE)
|| (l & (SSL_DH|SSL_kFZA))
|| ((l & SSL_kRSA)
&& (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
|| (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
&& EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
)
)
)
)
{
ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
}
else
skip=1;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
s->init_num=0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
/* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
* don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
/* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
* (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
* and in RFC 2246): */
((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL) &&
/* ... except when the application insists on verification
* (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
/* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aKRB5))
{
/* no cert request */
skip=1;
s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
}
else
{
s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
#ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
#else
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
#endif
s->init_num=0;
}
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
s->init_num=0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
/* This code originally checked to see if
* any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO
* and then flushed. This caused problems
* as documented in PR#1939. The proposed
* fix doesn't completely resolve this issue
* as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING
* still exist. So instead we just flush
* unconditionally.
*/
s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0)
{
ret= -1;
goto end;
}
s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
/* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
if (ret == 2)
s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
else {
if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
{
ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
}
s->init_num=0;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
}
break;
case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
if (ret == 2)
{
/* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
* the client sends its ECDH pub key in
* a certificate, the CertificateVerify
* message is not sent.
*/
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
s->init_num = 0;
}
else
{
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
s->init_num=0;
/* We need to get hashes here so if there is
* a client cert, it can be verified
*/
s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
&(s->s3->finish_dgst1),
&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[0]));
s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
&(s->s3->finish_dgst2),
&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]));
}
break;
case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
/* we should decide if we expected this one */
ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
s->init_num=0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
if (s->hit)
s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
#endif
else
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
s->init_num=0;
break;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
s->init_num=0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
s->init_num=0;
break;
#endif
case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
{ ret= -1; goto end; }
ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
s->init_num=0;
if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
{
ret= -1;
goto end;
}
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
if (s->hit)
s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
else
s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
s->init_num=0;
break;
case SSL_ST_OK:
/* clean a few things up */
ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
s->init_buf=NULL;
/* remove buffering on output */
ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
s->init_num=0;
if (s->new_session == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
{
/* actually not necessarily a 'new' session unless
* SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is set */
s->new_session=0;
ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
/* s->server=1; */
s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept;
if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
}
ret = 1;
goto end;
/* break; */
default:
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
ret= -1;
goto end;
/* break; */
}
if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
{
if (s->debug)
{
if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
goto end;
}
if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
{
new_state=s->state;
s->state=state;
cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
s->state=new_state;
}
}
skip=0;
}
end:
/* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
s->in_handshake--;
if (cb != NULL)
cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
return(ret);
}
int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *p;
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)
{
p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
*(p++)=SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
*(p++)=0;
*(p++)=0;
*(p++)=0;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
/* number of bytes to write */
s->init_num=4;
s->init_off=0;
}
/* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
}
int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
{
int ok;
long n;
/* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
* so permit appropriate message length */
n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A,
SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,
-1,
s->max_cert_list,
&ok);
if (!ok) return((int)n);
s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)
{
/* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
* which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.)
* I hope that tmp.dh is the only thing that may need to be cleared
* when a handshake is not completed ... */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
{
DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
}
#endif
return 2;
}
return 1;
}
int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
{
int i,j,ok,al,ret= -1;
unsigned int cookie_len;
long n;
unsigned long id;
unsigned char *p,*d,*q;
SSL_CIPHER *c;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
SSL_COMP *comp=NULL;
#endif
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL;
/* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
* If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
* This down switching should be handled by a different method.
* If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
* TLSv1.
*/
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
{
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
}
s->first_packet=1;
n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
&ok);
if (!ok) return((int)n);
s->first_packet=0;
d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
/* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
* (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1];
p+=2;
if ((s->version == DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version > s->version) ||
(s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version < s->version))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
{
/* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
s->version = s->client_version;
}
al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
goto f_err;
}
/* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't
* contain one, just return since we do not want to
* allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length...
*/
if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)
{
unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
if (cookie_length == 0)
return 1;
}
/* load the client random */
memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
/* get the session-id */
j= *(p++);
s->hit=0;
/* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow session reuse during renegotiation
* (i.e. when s->new_session is true), option
* SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is new with 0.9.7.
* Maybe this optional behaviour should always have been the default,
* but we cannot safely change the default behaviour (or new applications
* might be written that become totally unsecure when compiled with
* an earlier library version)
*/
if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
{
if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
goto err;
}
else
{
i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
if (i == 1)
{ /* previous session */
s->hit=1;
}
else if (i == -1)
goto err;
else /* i == 0 */
{
if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
goto err;
}
}
p+=j;
if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
{
/* cookie stuff */
cookie_len = *(p++);
/*
* The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
* HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
* does not cause an overflow.
*/
if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie))
{
/* too much data */
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
/* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
cookie_len > 0)
{
memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL)
{
if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
cookie_len) == 0)
{
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
/* else cookie verification succeeded */
}
else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */
{
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
ret = 2;
}
p += cookie_len;
}
n2s(p,i);
if ((i == 0) && (j != 0))
{
/* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
goto f_err;
}
if ((p+i) >= (d+n))
{
/* not enough data */
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers))
== NULL))
{
goto err;
}
p+=i;
/* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
if ((s->hit) && (i > 0))
{
j=0;
id=s->session->cipher->id;
#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers));
#endif
for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++)
{
c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i);
#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
i,sk_num(ciphers),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
#endif
if (c->id == id)
{
j=1;
break;
}
}
if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))
{
/* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may
* not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to
* continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server
* preferences. We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not
* enabled, though. */
c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0)
{
s->session->cipher = c;
j = 1;
}
}
if (j == 0)
{
/* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
* list if we are asked to reuse it */
al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
goto f_err;
}
}
/* compression */
i= *(p++);
if ((p+i) > (d+n))
{
/* not enough data */
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
q=p;
for (j=0; j<i; j++)
{
if (p[j] == 0) break;
}
p+=i;
if (j >= i)
{
/* no compress */
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
goto f_err;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
/* TLS extensions*/
if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
{
if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n, &al))
{
/* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
goto f_err;
}
}
if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
goto err;
}
#endif
/* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
* options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
* algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
if (s->ctx->comp_methods != NULL)
{ /* See if we have a match */
int m,nn,o,v,done=0;
nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
for (m=0; m<nn; m++)
{
comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
v=comp->id;
for (o=0; o<i; o++)
{
if (v == q[o])
{
done=1;
break;
}
}
if (done) break;
}
if (done)
s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
else
comp=NULL;
}
#endif
/* TLS does not mind if there is extra stuff */
#if 0 /* SSL 3.0 does not mind either, so we should disable this test
* (was enabled in 0.9.6d through 0.9.6j and 0.9.7 through 0.9.7b,
* in earlier SSLeay/OpenSSL releases this test existed but was buggy) */
if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
{
if (p < (d+n))
{
/* wrong number of bytes,
* there could be more to follow */
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
}
#endif
/* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
* pick a cipher */
if (!s->hit)
{
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
s->session->compress_meth=0;
#else
s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id;
#endif
if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
if (ciphers == NULL)
{
al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
goto f_err;
}
ciphers=NULL;
c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers,
SSL_get_ciphers(s));
if (c == NULL)
{
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
goto f_err;
}
s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
}
else
{
/* Session-id reuse */
#ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL;
SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL;
if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
{
sk=s->session->ciphers;
for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
{
c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
if (c->algorithms & SSL_eNULL)
nc=c;
if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
ec=c;
}
if (nc != NULL)
s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc;
else if (ec != NULL)
s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec;
else
s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
}
else
#endif
s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
}
/* we now have the following setup.
* client_random
* cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
* ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
* compression - basically ignored right now
* ssl version is set - sslv3
* s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
* s->hit - session reuse flag
* s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
*/
if (ret < 0) ret=1;
if (0)
{
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
}
err:
if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
return(ret);
}
int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *buf;
unsigned char *p,*d;
int i,sl;
unsigned long l,Time;
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
{
buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
p=s->s3->server_random;
Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
l2n(Time,p);
if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
return -1;
/* Do the message type and length last */
d=p= &(buf[4]);
*(p++)=s->version>>8;
*(p++)=s->version&0xff;
/* Random stuff */
memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
/* now in theory we have 3 options to sending back the
* session id. If it is a re-use, we send back the
* old session-id, if it is a new session, we send
* back the new session-id or we send back a 0 length
* session-id if we want it to be single use.
* Currently I will not implement the '0' length session-id
* 12-Jan-98 - I'll now support the '0' length stuff.
*
* We also have an additional case where stateless session
* resumption is successful: we always send back the old
* session id. In this case s->hit is non zero: this can
* only happen if stateless session resumption is succesful
* if session caching is disabled so existing functionality
* is unaffected.
*/
if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
&& !s->hit)
s->session->session_id_length=0;
sl=s->session->session_id_length;
if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
}
*(p++)=sl;
memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);
p+=sl;
/* put the cipher */
i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p);
p+=i;
/* put the compression method */
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
*(p++)=0;
#else
if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
*(p++)=0;
else
*(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
}
#endif
/* do the header */
l=(p-d);
d=buf;
*(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
l2n3(l,d);
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
/* number of bytes to write */
s->init_num=p-buf;
s->init_off=0;
}
/* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
}
int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *p;
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A)
{
p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
/* do the header */
*(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
*(p++)=0;
*(p++)=0;
*(p++)=0;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
/* number of bytes to write */
s->init_num=4;
s->init_off=0;
}
/* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
}
int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
unsigned char *q;
int j,num;
RSA *rsa;
unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
unsigned int u;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
DH *dh=NULL,*dhp;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp;
unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
int encodedlen = 0;
int curve_id = 0;
BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
#endif
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
unsigned char *p,*d;
int al,i;
unsigned long type;
int n;
CERT *cert;
BIGNUM *r[4];
int nr[4],kn;
BUF_MEM *buf;
EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
{
type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_MKEY_MASK;
cert=s->cert;
buf=s->init_buf;
r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;
n=0;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (type & SSL_kRSA)
{
rsa=cert->rsa_tmp;
if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL))
{
rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
if(rsa == NULL)
{
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
goto f_err;
}
RSA_up_ref(rsa);
cert->rsa_tmp=rsa;
}
if (rsa == NULL)
{
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
goto f_err;
}
r[0]=rsa->n;
r[1]=rsa->e;
s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
}
else
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
if (type & SSL_kEDH)
{
dhp=cert->dh_tmp;
if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
if (dhp == NULL)
{
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
goto f_err;
}
if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
{
DH_free(dh);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
goto err;
}
s->s3->tmp.dh=dh;
if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
(s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)))
{
if(!DH_generate_key(dh))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_DH_LIB);
goto err;
}
}
else
{
dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) ||
(dh->priv_key == NULL))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
goto err;
}
}
r[0]=dh->p;
r[1]=dh->g;
r[2]=dh->pub_key;
}
else
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
if (type & SSL_kECDHE)
{
const EC_GROUP *group;
ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL))
{
ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
}
if (ecdhp == NULL)
{
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
goto f_err;
}
if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
{
EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
/* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
if (ecdhp == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (!EC_KEY_up_ref(ecdhp))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
goto err;
}
ecdh = ecdhp;
s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
(EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
(s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
{
if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
goto err;
}
}
if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
(EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
(EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
(EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
goto err;
}
/* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
* keys over named (not generic) curves. For
* supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
*/
if ((curve_id =
nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
== 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
goto err;
}
/* Encode the public key.
* First check the size of encoding and
* allocate memory accordingly.
*/
encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
NULL, 0, NULL);
encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char));
bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
if (encodedlen == 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
goto err;
}
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL;
/* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
* generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
* In this situation, we need four additional bytes
* to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
* structure.
*/
n = 4 + encodedlen;
/* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
* explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
*/
r[0]=NULL;
r[1]=NULL;
r[2]=NULL;
r[3]=NULL;
}
else
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
{
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)
{
nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
n+=2+nr[i];
}
if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL))
{
if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher))
== NULL)
{
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
goto f_err;
}
kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
}
else
{
pkey=NULL;
kn=0;
}
if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+4+kn))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);
goto err;
}
d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
p= &(d[4]);
for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)
{
s2n(nr[i],p);
BN_bn2bin(r[i],p);
p+=nr[i];
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
if (type & SSL_kECDHE)
{
/* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
* In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
* [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
* [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
* the actual encoded point itself
*/
*p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
p += 1;
*p = 0;
p += 1;
*p = curve_id;
p += 1;
*p = encodedlen;
p += 1;
memcpy((unsigned char*)p,
(unsigned char *)encodedPoint,
encodedlen);
OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
p += encodedlen;
}
#endif
/* not anonymous */
if (pkey != NULL)
{
/* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
* and p points to the space at the end. */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
{
q=md_buf;
j=0;
for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
{
EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
(unsigned int *)&i);
q+=i;
j+=i;
}
if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
&(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA);
goto err;
}
s2n(u,p);
n+=u+2;
}
else
#endif
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA)
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
{
/* lets do DSS */
EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_dss1(), NULL);
EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
(unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_DSA);
goto err;
}
s2n(i,p);
n+=i+2;
}
else
#endif
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA)
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
{
/* let's do ECDSA */
EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_ecdsa(), NULL);
EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
(unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_ECDSA);
goto err;
}
s2n(i,p);
n+=i+2;
}
else
#endif
{
/* Is this error check actually needed? */
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
}
*(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
l2n3(n,d);
/* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
* it off */
s->init_num=n+4;
s->init_off=0;
}
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
err:
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
#endif
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
return(-1);
}
int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *p,*d;
int i,j,nl,off,n;
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;
X509_NAME *name;
BUF_MEM *buf;
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A)
{
buf=s->init_buf;
d=p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]);
/* get the list of acceptable cert types */
p++;
n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p);
d[0]=n;
p+=n;
n++;
off=n;
p+=2;
n+=2;
sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
nl=0;
if (sk != NULL)
{
for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
{
name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,4+n+j+2))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
goto err;
}
p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+n]);
if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
{
s2n(j,p);
i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
n+=2+j;
nl+=2+j;
}
else
{
d=p;
i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2;
n+=j;
nl+=j;
}
}
}
/* else no CA names */
p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+off]);
s2n(nl,p);
d=(unsigned char *)buf->data;
*(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
l2n3(n,d);
/* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
* it off */
s->init_num=n+4;
s->init_off=0;
#ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
/* do the header */
*(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
*(p++)=0;
*(p++)=0;
*(p++)=0;
s->init_num += 4;
#endif
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
}
/* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
err:
return(-1);
}
int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
{
int i,al,ok;
long n;
unsigned long l;
unsigned char *p;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
RSA *rsa=NULL;
EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
BIGNUM *pub=NULL;
DH *dh_srvr;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
KSSL_ERR kssl_err;
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
#endif
n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2048, /* ??? */
&ok);
if (!ok) return((int)n);
p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
l=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (l & SSL_kRSA)
{
/* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)
{
if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp;
/* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
* be sent already */
if (rsa == NULL)
{
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
goto f_err;
}
}
else
{
pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
if ( (pkey == NULL) ||
(pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
(pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
{
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
goto f_err;
}
rsa=pkey->pkey.rsa;
}
/* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS, including pre-0.9.8f */
if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION &&
s->client_version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
{
n2s(p,i);
if (n != i+2)
{
if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
goto err;
}
else
p-=2;
}
else
n=i;
}
i=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
al = -1;
if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
{
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
/* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */
}
if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
{
/* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
* ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
* protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
* However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
* version instead if the server does not support the requested
* protocol version.
* If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) &&
(p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))
{
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
/* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */
/* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
* (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
* number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would
* reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext
* made up by the adversary is properly formatted except
* that the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks,
* we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */
}
}
if (al != -1)
{
/* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure
* against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding
* (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */
ERR_clear_error();
i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
p[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2) <= 0) /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
goto err;
}
s->session->master_key_length=
s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
s->session->master_key,
p,i);
OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
}
else
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
if (l & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
{
n2s(p,i);
if (n != i+2)
{
if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
goto err;
}
else
{
p-=2;
i=(int)n;
}
}
if (n == 0L) /* the parameters are in the cert */
{
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS);
goto f_err;
}
else
{
if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL)
{
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
goto f_err;
}
else
dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh;
}
pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL);
if (pub == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr);
if (i <= 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
goto err;
}
DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
s->s3->tmp.dh=NULL;
BN_clear_free(pub);
pub=NULL;
s->session->master_key_length=
s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
s->session->master_key,p,i);
OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
}
else
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
if (l & SSL_kKRB5)
{
krb5_error_code krb5rc;
krb5_data enc_ticket;
krb5_data authenticator;
krb5_data enc_pms;
KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
+ EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
int padl, outl;
krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
n2s(p,i);
enc_ticket.length = i;
if (n < (int)enc_ticket.length + 6)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
goto err;
}
enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
p+=enc_ticket.length;
n2s(p,i);
authenticator.length = i;
if (n < (int)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length) + 6)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
goto err;
}
authenticator.data = (char *)p;
p+=authenticator.length;
n2s(p,i);
enc_pms.length = i;
enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
p+=enc_pms.length;
/* Note that the length is checked again below,
** after decryption
*/
if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
goto err;
}
if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
enc_pms.length + 6))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
goto err;
}
if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
&kssl_err)) != 0)
{
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
if (kssl_err.text)
printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
kssl_err.reason);
goto err;
}
/* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
** but will return authtime == 0.
*/
if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
&authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)
{
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
if (kssl_err.text)
printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
kssl_err.reason);
goto err;
}
if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
goto err;
}
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
if (enc == NULL)
goto err;
memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
goto err;
}
if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl,
(unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
goto err;
}
if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
goto err;
}
if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
goto err;
}
outl += padl;
if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
goto err;
}
if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
{
/* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
* ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
* protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
* However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of
* the protocol version.
* If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
* (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
*/
if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
goto err;
}
}
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
s->session->master_key_length=
s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
s->session->master_key, pms, outl);
if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
{
size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH )
{
s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len);
}
}
/* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
** but it caused problems for apache.
** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
*/
}
else
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
if ((l & SSL_kECDH) || (l & SSL_kECDHE))
{
int ret = 1;
int field_size = 0;
const EC_KEY *tkey;
const EC_GROUP *group;
const BIGNUM *priv_key;
/* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
/* Let's get server private key and group information */
if (l & SSL_kECDH)
{
/* use the certificate */
tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
}
else
{
/* use the ephermeral values we saved when
* generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
*/
tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
}
group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
!EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
/* Let's get client's public key */
if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if (n == 0L)
{
/* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
if (l & SSL_kECDHE)
{
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
goto f_err;
}
if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
== NULL) ||
(clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC))
{
/* XXX: For now, we do not support client
* authentication using ECDH certificates
* so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
* never executed. When that support is
* added, we ought to ensure the key
* received in the certificate is
* authorized for key agreement.
* ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
* the two ECDH shares are for the same
* group.
*/
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
goto f_err;
}
if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
}
else
{
/* Get client's public key from encoded point
* in the ClientKeyExchange message.
*/
if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
/* Get encoded point length */
i = *p;
p += 1;
if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group,
clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
/* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
* currently, so set it to the start
*/
p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
}
/* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
if (field_size <= 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
goto err;
}
i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL);
if (i <= 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
goto err;
}
EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
/* Compute the master secret */
s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \
generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i);
OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
return (ret);
}
else
#endif
{
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
return(1);
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH)
err:
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
#endif
return(-1);
}
int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
{
EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
unsigned char *p;
int al,ok,ret=0;
long n;
int type=0,i,j;
X509 *peer;
n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
-1,
514, /* 514? */
&ok);
if (!ok) return((int)n);
if (s->session->peer != NULL)
{
peer=s->session->peer;
pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer);
type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey);
}
else
{
peer=NULL;
pkey=NULL;
}
if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)
{
s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
if ((peer != NULL) && (type | EVP_PKT_SIGN))
{
al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
goto f_err;
}
ret=1;
goto end;
}
if (peer == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
goto f_err;
}
if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
goto f_err;
}
if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
goto f_err;
}
/* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
n2s(p,i);
n-=2;
if (i > n)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
goto f_err;
}
j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
goto f_err;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
{
i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
pkey->pkey.rsa);
if (i < 0)
{
al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
goto f_err;
}
if (i == 0)
{
al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
goto f_err;
}
}
else
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
{
j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa);
if (j <= 0)
{
/* bad signature */
al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
goto f_err;
}
}
else
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
{
j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec);
if (j <= 0)
{
/* bad signature */
al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
goto f_err;
}
}
else
#endif
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
goto f_err;
}
ret=1;
if (0)
{
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
}
end:
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
return(ret);
}
int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
{
int i,ok,al,ret= -1;
X509 *x=NULL;
unsigned long l,nc,llen,n;
const unsigned char *p,*q;
unsigned char *d;
STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A,
SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,
-1,
s->max_cert_list,
&ok);
if (!ok) return((int)n);
if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)
{
if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
goto f_err;
}
/* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
goto f_err;
}
s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
return(1);
}
if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
{
al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
n2l3(p,llen);
if (llen+3 != n)
{
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
{
n2l3(p,l);
if ((l+nc+3) > llen)
{
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
q=p;
x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l);
if (x == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (p != (q+l))
{
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
x=NULL;
nc+=l+3;
}
if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0)
{
/* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
{
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
goto f_err;
}
/* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
goto f_err;
}
}
else
{
i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
if (i <= 0)
{
al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED);
goto f_err;
}
}
if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
X509_free(s->session->peer);
s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk);
s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
/* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
* when we arrive here. */
if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
{
s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
}
if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk;
/* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
* peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
sk=NULL;
ret=1;
if (0)
{
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
}
err:
if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
return(ret);
}
int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
{
unsigned long l;
X509 *x;
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
{
x=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s);
if (x == NULL &&
/* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms
& (SSL_MKEY_MASK|SSL_AUTH_MASK))
!= (SSL_aKRB5|SSL_kKRB5))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return(0);
}
l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,x);
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
s->init_num=(int)l;
s->init_off=0;
}
/* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
/* This is the complement of curve_id2nid in s3_clnt.c. */
static int nid2curve_id(int nid)
{
/* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-01.txt (Mar 15, 2001)
* (no changes in draft-ietf-tls-ecc-03.txt [June 2003]) */
switch (nid) {
case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
return 1;
case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
return 2;
case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
return 3;
case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
return 4;
case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
return 5;
case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
return 6;
case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
return 7;
case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
return 8;
case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
return 9;
case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
return 10;
case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
return 11;
case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
return 12;
case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
return 13;
case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
return 14;
case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
return 15;
case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
return 16;
case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
return 17;
case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
return 18;
case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
return 19;
case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
return 20;
case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
return 21;
case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
return 22;
case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
return 23;
case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
return 24;
case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
return 25;
default:
return 0;
}
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
{
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A)
{
unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart;
int len, slen;
unsigned int hlen;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
HMAC_CTX hctx;
SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
unsigned char key_name[16];
/* get session encoding length */
slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
/* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
* too long
*/
if (slen > 0xFF00)
return -1;
/* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
* follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length
* bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
* 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
* session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
* length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
*/
if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH +
EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
return -1;
senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen);
if (!senc)
return -1;
p = senc;
i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);
p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
/* do the header */
*(p++)=SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
/* Skip message length for now */
p += 3;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
/* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
* it does all the work otherwise use generated values
* from parent ctx.
*/
if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
{
if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
&hctx, 1) < 0)
{
OPENSSL_free(senc);
return -1;
}
}
else
{
RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16);
EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
}
l2n(s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint, p);
/* Skip ticket length for now */
p += 2;
/* Output key name */
macstart = p;
memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
p += 16;
/* output IV */
memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
/* Encrypt session data */
EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen);
p += len;
EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len);
p += len;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
p += hlen;
/* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
/* Total length */
len = p - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + 1;
l2n3(len - 4, p); /* Message length */
p += 4;
s2n(len - 10, p); /* Ticket length */
/* number of bytes to write */
s->init_num= len;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
s->init_off=0;
OPENSSL_free(senc);
}
/* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
}
int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
{
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A)
{
unsigned char *p;
/* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
* follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
* 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
* + (ocsp response)
*/
if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))
return -1;
p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
/* do the header */
*(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
/* message length */
l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
/* status type */
*(p++)= s->tlsext_status_type;
/* length of OCSP response */
l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
/* actual response */
memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
/* number of bytes to write */
s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
s->init_off = 0;
}
/* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
}
#endif