| /* |
| * EAP peer method: EAP-AKA (RFC 4187) and EAP-AKA' (RFC 5448) |
| * Copyright (c) 2004-2012, Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> |
| * |
| * This software may be distributed under the terms of the BSD license. |
| * See README for more details. |
| */ |
| |
| #include "includes.h" |
| |
| #include "common.h" |
| #include "pcsc_funcs.h" |
| #include "crypto/crypto.h" |
| #include "crypto/sha1.h" |
| #include "crypto/sha256.h" |
| #include "crypto/milenage.h" |
| #include "eap_common/eap_sim_common.h" |
| #include "eap_config.h" |
| #include "eap_i.h" |
| |
| |
| struct eap_aka_data { |
| u8 ik[EAP_AKA_IK_LEN], ck[EAP_AKA_CK_LEN], res[EAP_AKA_RES_MAX_LEN]; |
| size_t res_len; |
| u8 nonce_s[EAP_SIM_NONCE_S_LEN]; |
| u8 mk[EAP_SIM_MK_LEN]; |
| u8 k_aut[EAP_AKA_PRIME_K_AUT_LEN]; |
| u8 k_encr[EAP_SIM_K_ENCR_LEN]; |
| u8 k_re[EAP_AKA_PRIME_K_RE_LEN]; /* EAP-AKA' only */ |
| u8 msk[EAP_SIM_KEYING_DATA_LEN]; |
| u8 emsk[EAP_EMSK_LEN]; |
| u8 rand[EAP_AKA_RAND_LEN], autn[EAP_AKA_AUTN_LEN]; |
| u8 auts[EAP_AKA_AUTS_LEN]; |
| |
| int num_id_req, num_notification; |
| u8 *pseudonym; |
| size_t pseudonym_len; |
| u8 *reauth_id; |
| size_t reauth_id_len; |
| int reauth; |
| unsigned int counter, counter_too_small; |
| u8 *last_eap_identity; |
| size_t last_eap_identity_len; |
| enum { |
| CONTINUE, RESULT_SUCCESS, RESULT_FAILURE, SUCCESS, FAILURE |
| } state; |
| |
| struct wpabuf *id_msgs; |
| int prev_id; |
| int result_ind, use_result_ind; |
| u8 eap_method; |
| u8 *network_name; |
| size_t network_name_len; |
| u16 kdf; |
| int kdf_negotiation; |
| }; |
| |
| |
| #ifndef CONFIG_NO_STDOUT_DEBUG |
| static const char * eap_aka_state_txt(int state) |
| { |
| switch (state) { |
| case CONTINUE: |
| return "CONTINUE"; |
| case RESULT_SUCCESS: |
| return "RESULT_SUCCESS"; |
| case RESULT_FAILURE: |
| return "RESULT_FAILURE"; |
| case SUCCESS: |
| return "SUCCESS"; |
| case FAILURE: |
| return "FAILURE"; |
| default: |
| return "?"; |
| } |
| } |
| #endif /* CONFIG_NO_STDOUT_DEBUG */ |
| |
| |
| static void eap_aka_state(struct eap_aka_data *data, int state) |
| { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: %s -> %s", |
| eap_aka_state_txt(data->state), |
| eap_aka_state_txt(state)); |
| data->state = state; |
| } |
| |
| |
| static void * eap_aka_init(struct eap_sm *sm) |
| { |
| struct eap_aka_data *data; |
| const char *phase1 = eap_get_config_phase1(sm); |
| struct eap_peer_config *config = eap_get_config(sm); |
| |
| data = os_zalloc(sizeof(*data)); |
| if (data == NULL) |
| return NULL; |
| |
| data->eap_method = EAP_TYPE_AKA; |
| |
| eap_aka_state(data, CONTINUE); |
| data->prev_id = -1; |
| |
| data->result_ind = phase1 && os_strstr(phase1, "result_ind=1") != NULL; |
| |
| if (config && config->anonymous_identity) { |
| data->pseudonym = os_malloc(config->anonymous_identity_len); |
| if (data->pseudonym) { |
| os_memcpy(data->pseudonym, config->anonymous_identity, |
| config->anonymous_identity_len); |
| data->pseudonym_len = config->anonymous_identity_len; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| return data; |
| } |
| |
| |
| #ifdef EAP_AKA_PRIME |
| static void * eap_aka_prime_init(struct eap_sm *sm) |
| { |
| struct eap_aka_data *data = eap_aka_init(sm); |
| if (data == NULL) |
| return NULL; |
| data->eap_method = EAP_TYPE_AKA_PRIME; |
| return data; |
| } |
| #endif /* EAP_AKA_PRIME */ |
| |
| |
| static void eap_aka_deinit(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv) |
| { |
| struct eap_aka_data *data = priv; |
| if (data) { |
| os_free(data->pseudonym); |
| os_free(data->reauth_id); |
| os_free(data->last_eap_identity); |
| wpabuf_free(data->id_msgs); |
| os_free(data->network_name); |
| os_free(data); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| |
| static int eap_aka_umts_auth(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_aka_data *data) |
| { |
| struct eap_peer_config *conf; |
| |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: UMTS authentication algorithm"); |
| |
| conf = eap_get_config(sm); |
| if (conf == NULL) |
| return -1; |
| if (conf->pcsc) { |
| return scard_umts_auth(sm->scard_ctx, data->rand, |
| data->autn, data->res, &data->res_len, |
| data->ik, data->ck, data->auts); |
| } |
| |
| #ifdef CONFIG_USIM_SIMULATOR |
| if (conf->password) { |
| u8 opc[16], k[16], sqn[6]; |
| const char *pos; |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: Use internal Milenage " |
| "implementation for UMTS authentication"); |
| if (conf->password_len < 78) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: invalid Milenage " |
| "password"); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| pos = (const char *) conf->password; |
| if (hexstr2bin(pos, k, 16)) |
| return -1; |
| pos += 32; |
| if (*pos != ':') |
| return -1; |
| pos++; |
| |
| if (hexstr2bin(pos, opc, 16)) |
| return -1; |
| pos += 32; |
| if (*pos != ':') |
| return -1; |
| pos++; |
| |
| if (hexstr2bin(pos, sqn, 6)) |
| return -1; |
| |
| return milenage_check(opc, k, sqn, data->rand, data->autn, |
| data->ik, data->ck, |
| data->res, &data->res_len, data->auts); |
| } |
| #endif /* CONFIG_USIM_SIMULATOR */ |
| |
| #ifdef CONFIG_USIM_HARDCODED |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: Use hardcoded Kc and SRES values for " |
| "testing"); |
| |
| /* These hardcoded Kc and SRES values are used for testing. |
| * Could consider making them configurable. */ |
| os_memset(data->res, '2', EAP_AKA_RES_MAX_LEN); |
| data->res_len = EAP_AKA_RES_MAX_LEN; |
| os_memset(data->ik, '3', EAP_AKA_IK_LEN); |
| os_memset(data->ck, '4', EAP_AKA_CK_LEN); |
| { |
| u8 autn[EAP_AKA_AUTN_LEN]; |
| os_memset(autn, '1', EAP_AKA_AUTN_LEN); |
| if (os_memcmp(autn, data->autn, EAP_AKA_AUTN_LEN) != 0) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA: AUTN did not match " |
| "with expected value"); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| } |
| #if 0 |
| { |
| static int test_resync = 1; |
| if (test_resync) { |
| /* Test Resynchronization */ |
| test_resync = 0; |
| return -2; |
| } |
| } |
| #endif |
| return 0; |
| |
| #else /* CONFIG_USIM_HARDCODED */ |
| |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: No UMTS authentication algorith " |
| "enabled"); |
| return -1; |
| |
| #endif /* CONFIG_USIM_HARDCODED */ |
| } |
| |
| |
| #define CLEAR_PSEUDONYM 0x01 |
| #define CLEAR_REAUTH_ID 0x02 |
| #define CLEAR_EAP_ID 0x04 |
| |
| static void eap_aka_clear_identities(struct eap_sm *sm, |
| struct eap_aka_data *data, int id) |
| { |
| if ((id & CLEAR_PSEUDONYM) && data->pseudonym) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: forgetting old pseudonym"); |
| os_free(data->pseudonym); |
| data->pseudonym = NULL; |
| data->pseudonym_len = 0; |
| eap_set_anon_id(sm, NULL, 0); |
| } |
| if ((id & CLEAR_REAUTH_ID) && data->reauth_id) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: forgetting old reauth_id"); |
| os_free(data->reauth_id); |
| data->reauth_id = NULL; |
| data->reauth_id_len = 0; |
| } |
| if ((id & CLEAR_EAP_ID) && data->last_eap_identity) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: forgetting old eap_id"); |
| os_free(data->last_eap_identity); |
| data->last_eap_identity = NULL; |
| data->last_eap_identity_len = 0; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| |
| static int eap_aka_learn_ids(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_aka_data *data, |
| struct eap_sim_attrs *attr) |
| { |
| if (attr->next_pseudonym) { |
| const u8 *identity = NULL; |
| size_t identity_len = 0; |
| const u8 *realm = NULL; |
| size_t realm_len = 0; |
| |
| wpa_hexdump_ascii(MSG_DEBUG, |
| "EAP-AKA: (encr) AT_NEXT_PSEUDONYM", |
| attr->next_pseudonym, |
| attr->next_pseudonym_len); |
| os_free(data->pseudonym); |
| /* Look for the realm of the permanent identity */ |
| identity = eap_get_config_identity(sm, &identity_len); |
| if (identity) { |
| for (realm = identity, realm_len = identity_len; |
| realm_len > 0; realm_len--, realm++) { |
| if (*realm == '@') |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| data->pseudonym = os_malloc(attr->next_pseudonym_len + |
| realm_len); |
| if (data->pseudonym == NULL) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-AKA: (encr) No memory for " |
| "next pseudonym"); |
| data->pseudonym_len = 0; |
| return -1; |
| } |
| os_memcpy(data->pseudonym, attr->next_pseudonym, |
| attr->next_pseudonym_len); |
| if (realm_len) { |
| os_memcpy(data->pseudonym + attr->next_pseudonym_len, |
| realm, realm_len); |
| } |
| data->pseudonym_len = attr->next_pseudonym_len + realm_len; |
| eap_set_anon_id(sm, data->pseudonym, data->pseudonym_len); |
| } |
| |
| if (attr->next_reauth_id) { |
| os_free(data->reauth_id); |
| data->reauth_id = os_malloc(attr->next_reauth_id_len); |
| if (data->reauth_id == NULL) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-AKA: (encr) No memory for " |
| "next reauth_id"); |
| data->reauth_id_len = 0; |
| return -1; |
| } |
| os_memcpy(data->reauth_id, attr->next_reauth_id, |
| attr->next_reauth_id_len); |
| data->reauth_id_len = attr->next_reauth_id_len; |
| wpa_hexdump_ascii(MSG_DEBUG, |
| "EAP-AKA: (encr) AT_NEXT_REAUTH_ID", |
| data->reauth_id, |
| data->reauth_id_len); |
| } |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| |
| static int eap_aka_add_id_msg(struct eap_aka_data *data, |
| const struct wpabuf *msg) |
| { |
| if (msg == NULL) |
| return -1; |
| |
| if (data->id_msgs == NULL) { |
| data->id_msgs = wpabuf_dup(msg); |
| return data->id_msgs == NULL ? -1 : 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (wpabuf_resize(&data->id_msgs, wpabuf_len(msg)) < 0) |
| return -1; |
| wpabuf_put_buf(data->id_msgs, msg); |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| |
| static void eap_aka_add_checkcode(struct eap_aka_data *data, |
| struct eap_sim_msg *msg) |
| { |
| const u8 *addr; |
| size_t len; |
| u8 hash[SHA256_MAC_LEN]; |
| |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, " AT_CHECKCODE"); |
| |
| if (data->id_msgs == NULL) { |
| /* |
| * No EAP-AKA/Identity packets were exchanged - send empty |
| * checkcode. |
| */ |
| eap_sim_msg_add(msg, EAP_SIM_AT_CHECKCODE, 0, NULL, 0); |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| /* Checkcode is SHA1/SHA256 hash over all EAP-AKA/Identity packets. */ |
| addr = wpabuf_head(data->id_msgs); |
| len = wpabuf_len(data->id_msgs); |
| wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP, "EAP-AKA: AT_CHECKCODE data", addr, len); |
| #ifdef EAP_AKA_PRIME |
| if (data->eap_method == EAP_TYPE_AKA_PRIME) |
| sha256_vector(1, &addr, &len, hash); |
| else |
| #endif /* EAP_AKA_PRIME */ |
| sha1_vector(1, &addr, &len, hash); |
| |
| eap_sim_msg_add(msg, EAP_SIM_AT_CHECKCODE, 0, hash, |
| data->eap_method == EAP_TYPE_AKA_PRIME ? |
| EAP_AKA_PRIME_CHECKCODE_LEN : EAP_AKA_CHECKCODE_LEN); |
| } |
| |
| |
| static int eap_aka_verify_checkcode(struct eap_aka_data *data, |
| const u8 *checkcode, size_t checkcode_len) |
| { |
| const u8 *addr; |
| size_t len; |
| u8 hash[SHA256_MAC_LEN]; |
| size_t hash_len; |
| |
| if (checkcode == NULL) |
| return -1; |
| |
| if (data->id_msgs == NULL) { |
| if (checkcode_len != 0) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: Checkcode from server " |
| "indicates that AKA/Identity messages were " |
| "used, but they were not"); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| hash_len = data->eap_method == EAP_TYPE_AKA_PRIME ? |
| EAP_AKA_PRIME_CHECKCODE_LEN : EAP_AKA_CHECKCODE_LEN; |
| |
| if (checkcode_len != hash_len) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: Checkcode from server " |
| "indicates that AKA/Identity message were not " |
| "used, but they were"); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| /* Checkcode is SHA1/SHA256 hash over all EAP-AKA/Identity packets. */ |
| addr = wpabuf_head(data->id_msgs); |
| len = wpabuf_len(data->id_msgs); |
| #ifdef EAP_AKA_PRIME |
| if (data->eap_method == EAP_TYPE_AKA_PRIME) |
| sha256_vector(1, &addr, &len, hash); |
| else |
| #endif /* EAP_AKA_PRIME */ |
| sha1_vector(1, &addr, &len, hash); |
| |
| if (os_memcmp(hash, checkcode, hash_len) != 0) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: Mismatch in AT_CHECKCODE"); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| |
| static struct wpabuf * eap_aka_client_error(struct eap_aka_data *data, u8 id, |
| int err) |
| { |
| struct eap_sim_msg *msg; |
| |
| eap_aka_state(data, FAILURE); |
| data->num_id_req = 0; |
| data->num_notification = 0; |
| |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: Send Client-Error (error code %d)", |
| err); |
| msg = eap_sim_msg_init(EAP_CODE_RESPONSE, id, data->eap_method, |
| EAP_AKA_SUBTYPE_CLIENT_ERROR); |
| eap_sim_msg_add(msg, EAP_SIM_AT_CLIENT_ERROR_CODE, err, NULL, 0); |
| return eap_sim_msg_finish(msg, NULL, NULL, 0); |
| } |
| |
| |
| static struct wpabuf * eap_aka_authentication_reject(struct eap_aka_data *data, |
| u8 id) |
| { |
| struct eap_sim_msg *msg; |
| |
| eap_aka_state(data, FAILURE); |
| data->num_id_req = 0; |
| data->num_notification = 0; |
| |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Generating EAP-AKA Authentication-Reject " |
| "(id=%d)", id); |
| msg = eap_sim_msg_init(EAP_CODE_RESPONSE, id, data->eap_method, |
| EAP_AKA_SUBTYPE_AUTHENTICATION_REJECT); |
| return eap_sim_msg_finish(msg, NULL, NULL, 0); |
| } |
| |
| |
| static struct wpabuf * eap_aka_synchronization_failure( |
| struct eap_aka_data *data, u8 id) |
| { |
| struct eap_sim_msg *msg; |
| |
| data->num_id_req = 0; |
| data->num_notification = 0; |
| |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Generating EAP-AKA Synchronization-Failure " |
| "(id=%d)", id); |
| msg = eap_sim_msg_init(EAP_CODE_RESPONSE, id, data->eap_method, |
| EAP_AKA_SUBTYPE_SYNCHRONIZATION_FAILURE); |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, " AT_AUTS"); |
| eap_sim_msg_add_full(msg, EAP_SIM_AT_AUTS, data->auts, |
| EAP_AKA_AUTS_LEN); |
| return eap_sim_msg_finish(msg, NULL, NULL, 0); |
| } |
| |
| |
| static struct wpabuf * eap_aka_response_identity(struct eap_sm *sm, |
| struct eap_aka_data *data, |
| u8 id, |
| enum eap_sim_id_req id_req) |
| { |
| const u8 *identity = NULL; |
| size_t identity_len = 0; |
| struct eap_sim_msg *msg; |
| |
| data->reauth = 0; |
| if (id_req == ANY_ID && data->reauth_id) { |
| identity = data->reauth_id; |
| identity_len = data->reauth_id_len; |
| data->reauth = 1; |
| } else if ((id_req == ANY_ID || id_req == FULLAUTH_ID) && |
| data->pseudonym) { |
| identity = data->pseudonym; |
| identity_len = data->pseudonym_len; |
| eap_aka_clear_identities(sm, data, CLEAR_REAUTH_ID); |
| } else if (id_req != NO_ID_REQ) { |
| identity = eap_get_config_identity(sm, &identity_len); |
| if (identity) { |
| eap_aka_clear_identities(sm, data, CLEAR_PSEUDONYM | |
| CLEAR_REAUTH_ID); |
| } |
| } |
| if (id_req != NO_ID_REQ) |
| eap_aka_clear_identities(sm, data, CLEAR_EAP_ID); |
| |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Generating EAP-AKA Identity (id=%d)", id); |
| msg = eap_sim_msg_init(EAP_CODE_RESPONSE, id, data->eap_method, |
| EAP_AKA_SUBTYPE_IDENTITY); |
| |
| if (identity) { |
| wpa_hexdump_ascii(MSG_DEBUG, " AT_IDENTITY", |
| identity, identity_len); |
| eap_sim_msg_add(msg, EAP_SIM_AT_IDENTITY, identity_len, |
| identity, identity_len); |
| } |
| |
| return eap_sim_msg_finish(msg, NULL, NULL, 0); |
| } |
| |
| |
| static struct wpabuf * eap_aka_response_challenge(struct eap_aka_data *data, |
| u8 id) |
| { |
| struct eap_sim_msg *msg; |
| |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Generating EAP-AKA Challenge (id=%d)", id); |
| msg = eap_sim_msg_init(EAP_CODE_RESPONSE, id, data->eap_method, |
| EAP_AKA_SUBTYPE_CHALLENGE); |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, " AT_RES"); |
| eap_sim_msg_add(msg, EAP_SIM_AT_RES, data->res_len * 8, |
| data->res, data->res_len); |
| eap_aka_add_checkcode(data, msg); |
| if (data->use_result_ind) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, " AT_RESULT_IND"); |
| eap_sim_msg_add(msg, EAP_SIM_AT_RESULT_IND, 0, NULL, 0); |
| } |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, " AT_MAC"); |
| eap_sim_msg_add_mac(msg, EAP_SIM_AT_MAC); |
| return eap_sim_msg_finish(msg, data->k_aut, (u8 *) "", 0); |
| } |
| |
| |
| static struct wpabuf * eap_aka_response_reauth(struct eap_aka_data *data, |
| u8 id, int counter_too_small, |
| const u8 *nonce_s) |
| { |
| struct eap_sim_msg *msg; |
| unsigned int counter; |
| |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Generating EAP-AKA Reauthentication (id=%d)", |
| id); |
| msg = eap_sim_msg_init(EAP_CODE_RESPONSE, id, data->eap_method, |
| EAP_AKA_SUBTYPE_REAUTHENTICATION); |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, " AT_IV"); |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, " AT_ENCR_DATA"); |
| eap_sim_msg_add_encr_start(msg, EAP_SIM_AT_IV, EAP_SIM_AT_ENCR_DATA); |
| |
| if (counter_too_small) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, " *AT_COUNTER_TOO_SMALL"); |
| eap_sim_msg_add(msg, EAP_SIM_AT_COUNTER_TOO_SMALL, 0, NULL, 0); |
| counter = data->counter_too_small; |
| } else |
| counter = data->counter; |
| |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, " *AT_COUNTER %d", counter); |
| eap_sim_msg_add(msg, EAP_SIM_AT_COUNTER, counter, NULL, 0); |
| |
| if (eap_sim_msg_add_encr_end(msg, data->k_encr, EAP_SIM_AT_PADDING)) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA: Failed to encrypt " |
| "AT_ENCR_DATA"); |
| eap_sim_msg_free(msg); |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| eap_aka_add_checkcode(data, msg); |
| if (data->use_result_ind) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, " AT_RESULT_IND"); |
| eap_sim_msg_add(msg, EAP_SIM_AT_RESULT_IND, 0, NULL, 0); |
| } |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, " AT_MAC"); |
| eap_sim_msg_add_mac(msg, EAP_SIM_AT_MAC); |
| return eap_sim_msg_finish(msg, data->k_aut, nonce_s, |
| EAP_SIM_NONCE_S_LEN); |
| } |
| |
| |
| static struct wpabuf * eap_aka_response_notification(struct eap_aka_data *data, |
| u8 id, u16 notification) |
| { |
| struct eap_sim_msg *msg; |
| u8 *k_aut = (notification & 0x4000) == 0 ? data->k_aut : NULL; |
| |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Generating EAP-AKA Notification (id=%d)", id); |
| msg = eap_sim_msg_init(EAP_CODE_RESPONSE, id, data->eap_method, |
| EAP_AKA_SUBTYPE_NOTIFICATION); |
| if (k_aut && data->reauth) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, " AT_IV"); |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, " AT_ENCR_DATA"); |
| eap_sim_msg_add_encr_start(msg, EAP_SIM_AT_IV, |
| EAP_SIM_AT_ENCR_DATA); |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, " *AT_COUNTER %d", data->counter); |
| eap_sim_msg_add(msg, EAP_SIM_AT_COUNTER, data->counter, |
| NULL, 0); |
| if (eap_sim_msg_add_encr_end(msg, data->k_encr, |
| EAP_SIM_AT_PADDING)) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA: Failed to encrypt " |
| "AT_ENCR_DATA"); |
| eap_sim_msg_free(msg); |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| } |
| if (k_aut) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, " AT_MAC"); |
| eap_sim_msg_add_mac(msg, EAP_SIM_AT_MAC); |
| } |
| return eap_sim_msg_finish(msg, k_aut, (u8 *) "", 0); |
| } |
| |
| |
| static struct wpabuf * eap_aka_process_identity(struct eap_sm *sm, |
| struct eap_aka_data *data, |
| u8 id, |
| const struct wpabuf *reqData, |
| struct eap_sim_attrs *attr) |
| { |
| int id_error; |
| struct wpabuf *buf; |
| |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: subtype Identity"); |
| |
| id_error = 0; |
| switch (attr->id_req) { |
| case NO_ID_REQ: |
| break; |
| case ANY_ID: |
| if (data->num_id_req > 0) |
| id_error++; |
| data->num_id_req++; |
| break; |
| case FULLAUTH_ID: |
| if (data->num_id_req > 1) |
| id_error++; |
| data->num_id_req++; |
| break; |
| case PERMANENT_ID: |
| if (data->num_id_req > 2) |
| id_error++; |
| data->num_id_req++; |
| break; |
| } |
| if (id_error) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-AKA: Too many ID requests " |
| "used within one authentication"); |
| return eap_aka_client_error(data, id, |
| EAP_AKA_UNABLE_TO_PROCESS_PACKET); |
| } |
| |
| buf = eap_aka_response_identity(sm, data, id, attr->id_req); |
| |
| if (data->prev_id != id) { |
| eap_aka_add_id_msg(data, reqData); |
| eap_aka_add_id_msg(data, buf); |
| data->prev_id = id; |
| } |
| |
| return buf; |
| } |
| |
| |
| static int eap_aka_verify_mac(struct eap_aka_data *data, |
| const struct wpabuf *req, |
| const u8 *mac, const u8 *extra, |
| size_t extra_len) |
| { |
| if (data->eap_method == EAP_TYPE_AKA_PRIME) |
| return eap_sim_verify_mac_sha256(data->k_aut, req, mac, extra, |
| extra_len); |
| return eap_sim_verify_mac(data->k_aut, req, mac, extra, extra_len); |
| } |
| |
| |
| #ifdef EAP_AKA_PRIME |
| static struct wpabuf * eap_aka_prime_kdf_select(struct eap_aka_data *data, |
| u8 id, u16 kdf) |
| { |
| struct eap_sim_msg *msg; |
| |
| data->kdf_negotiation = 1; |
| data->kdf = kdf; |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Generating EAP-AKA Challenge (id=%d) (KDF " |
| "select)", id); |
| msg = eap_sim_msg_init(EAP_CODE_RESPONSE, id, data->eap_method, |
| EAP_AKA_SUBTYPE_CHALLENGE); |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, " AT_KDF"); |
| eap_sim_msg_add(msg, EAP_SIM_AT_KDF, kdf, NULL, 0); |
| return eap_sim_msg_finish(msg, NULL, NULL, 0); |
| } |
| |
| |
| static struct wpabuf * eap_aka_prime_kdf_neg(struct eap_aka_data *data, |
| u8 id, struct eap_sim_attrs *attr) |
| { |
| size_t i; |
| |
| for (i = 0; i < attr->kdf_count; i++) { |
| if (attr->kdf[i] == EAP_AKA_PRIME_KDF) |
| return eap_aka_prime_kdf_select(data, id, |
| EAP_AKA_PRIME_KDF); |
| } |
| |
| /* No matching KDF found - fail authentication as if AUTN had been |
| * incorrect */ |
| return eap_aka_authentication_reject(data, id); |
| } |
| |
| |
| static int eap_aka_prime_kdf_valid(struct eap_aka_data *data, |
| struct eap_sim_attrs *attr) |
| { |
| size_t i, j; |
| |
| if (attr->kdf_count == 0) |
| return 0; |
| |
| /* The only allowed (and required) duplication of a KDF is the addition |
| * of the selected KDF into the beginning of the list. */ |
| |
| if (data->kdf_negotiation) { |
| if (attr->kdf[0] != data->kdf) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA': The server did not " |
| "accept the selected KDF"); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| for (i = 1; i < attr->kdf_count; i++) { |
| if (attr->kdf[i] == data->kdf) |
| break; |
| } |
| if (i == attr->kdf_count && |
| attr->kdf_count < EAP_AKA_PRIME_KDF_MAX) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA': The server did not " |
| "duplicate the selected KDF"); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* TODO: should check that the list is identical to the one |
| * used in the previous Challenge message apart from the added |
| * entry in the beginning. */ |
| } |
| |
| for (i = data->kdf ? 1 : 0; i < attr->kdf_count; i++) { |
| for (j = i + 1; j < attr->kdf_count; j++) { |
| if (attr->kdf[i] == attr->kdf[j]) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA': The server " |
| "included a duplicated KDF"); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| #endif /* EAP_AKA_PRIME */ |
| |
| |
| static struct wpabuf * eap_aka_process_challenge(struct eap_sm *sm, |
| struct eap_aka_data *data, |
| u8 id, |
| const struct wpabuf *reqData, |
| struct eap_sim_attrs *attr) |
| { |
| const u8 *identity; |
| size_t identity_len; |
| int res; |
| struct eap_sim_attrs eattr; |
| |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: subtype Challenge"); |
| |
| if (attr->checkcode && |
| eap_aka_verify_checkcode(data, attr->checkcode, |
| attr->checkcode_len)) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA: Invalid AT_CHECKCODE in the " |
| "message"); |
| return eap_aka_client_error(data, id, |
| EAP_AKA_UNABLE_TO_PROCESS_PACKET); |
| } |
| |
| #ifdef EAP_AKA_PRIME |
| if (data->eap_method == EAP_TYPE_AKA_PRIME) { |
| if (!attr->kdf_input || attr->kdf_input_len == 0) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA': Challenge message " |
| "did not include non-empty AT_KDF_INPUT"); |
| /* Fail authentication as if AUTN had been incorrect */ |
| return eap_aka_authentication_reject(data, id); |
| } |
| os_free(data->network_name); |
| data->network_name = os_malloc(attr->kdf_input_len); |
| if (data->network_name == NULL) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA': No memory for " |
| "storing Network Name"); |
| return eap_aka_authentication_reject(data, id); |
| } |
| os_memcpy(data->network_name, attr->kdf_input, |
| attr->kdf_input_len); |
| data->network_name_len = attr->kdf_input_len; |
| wpa_hexdump_ascii(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA': Network Name " |
| "(AT_KDF_INPUT)", |
| data->network_name, data->network_name_len); |
| /* TODO: check Network Name per 3GPP.33.402 */ |
| |
| if (!eap_aka_prime_kdf_valid(data, attr)) |
| return eap_aka_authentication_reject(data, id); |
| |
| if (attr->kdf[0] != EAP_AKA_PRIME_KDF) |
| return eap_aka_prime_kdf_neg(data, id, attr); |
| |
| data->kdf = EAP_AKA_PRIME_KDF; |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA': KDF %d selected", data->kdf); |
| } |
| |
| if (data->eap_method == EAP_TYPE_AKA && attr->bidding) { |
| u16 flags = WPA_GET_BE16(attr->bidding); |
| if ((flags & EAP_AKA_BIDDING_FLAG_D) && |
| eap_allowed_method(sm, EAP_VENDOR_IETF, |
| EAP_TYPE_AKA_PRIME)) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA: Bidding down from " |
| "AKA' to AKA detected"); |
| /* Fail authentication as if AUTN had been incorrect */ |
| return eap_aka_authentication_reject(data, id); |
| } |
| } |
| #endif /* EAP_AKA_PRIME */ |
| |
| data->reauth = 0; |
| if (!attr->mac || !attr->rand || !attr->autn) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA: Challenge message " |
| "did not include%s%s%s", |
| !attr->mac ? " AT_MAC" : "", |
| !attr->rand ? " AT_RAND" : "", |
| !attr->autn ? " AT_AUTN" : ""); |
| return eap_aka_client_error(data, id, |
| EAP_AKA_UNABLE_TO_PROCESS_PACKET); |
| } |
| os_memcpy(data->rand, attr->rand, EAP_AKA_RAND_LEN); |
| os_memcpy(data->autn, attr->autn, EAP_AKA_AUTN_LEN); |
| |
| res = eap_aka_umts_auth(sm, data); |
| if (res == -1) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA: UMTS authentication " |
| "failed (AUTN)"); |
| return eap_aka_authentication_reject(data, id); |
| } else if (res == -2) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA: UMTS authentication " |
| "failed (AUTN seq# -> AUTS)"); |
| return eap_aka_synchronization_failure(data, id); |
| } else if (res) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA: UMTS authentication failed"); |
| return eap_aka_client_error(data, id, |
| EAP_AKA_UNABLE_TO_PROCESS_PACKET); |
| } |
| #ifdef EAP_AKA_PRIME |
| if (data->eap_method == EAP_TYPE_AKA_PRIME) { |
| /* Note: AUTN = (SQN ^ AK) || AMF || MAC which gives us the |
| * needed 6-octet SQN ^ AK for CK',IK' derivation */ |
| u16 amf = WPA_GET_BE16(data->autn + 6); |
| if (!(amf & 0x8000)) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA': AMF separation bit " |
| "not set (AMF=0x%4x)", amf); |
| return eap_aka_authentication_reject(data, id); |
| } |
| eap_aka_prime_derive_ck_ik_prime(data->ck, data->ik, |
| data->autn, |
| data->network_name, |
| data->network_name_len); |
| } |
| #endif /* EAP_AKA_PRIME */ |
| if (data->last_eap_identity) { |
| identity = data->last_eap_identity; |
| identity_len = data->last_eap_identity_len; |
| } else if (data->pseudonym) { |
| identity = data->pseudonym; |
| identity_len = data->pseudonym_len; |
| } else |
| identity = eap_get_config_identity(sm, &identity_len); |
| wpa_hexdump_ascii(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: Selected identity for MK " |
| "derivation", identity, identity_len); |
| if (data->eap_method == EAP_TYPE_AKA_PRIME) { |
| eap_aka_prime_derive_keys(identity, identity_len, data->ik, |
| data->ck, data->k_encr, data->k_aut, |
| data->k_re, data->msk, data->emsk); |
| } else { |
| eap_aka_derive_mk(identity, identity_len, data->ik, data->ck, |
| data->mk); |
| eap_sim_derive_keys(data->mk, data->k_encr, data->k_aut, |
| data->msk, data->emsk); |
| } |
| if (eap_aka_verify_mac(data, reqData, attr->mac, (u8 *) "", 0)) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA: Challenge message " |
| "used invalid AT_MAC"); |
| return eap_aka_client_error(data, id, |
| EAP_AKA_UNABLE_TO_PROCESS_PACKET); |
| } |
| |
| /* Old reauthentication identity must not be used anymore. In |
| * other words, if no new identities are received, full |
| * authentication will be used on next reauthentication (using |
| * pseudonym identity or permanent identity). */ |
| eap_aka_clear_identities(sm, data, CLEAR_REAUTH_ID | CLEAR_EAP_ID); |
| |
| if (attr->encr_data) { |
| u8 *decrypted; |
| decrypted = eap_sim_parse_encr(data->k_encr, attr->encr_data, |
| attr->encr_data_len, attr->iv, |
| &eattr, 0); |
| if (decrypted == NULL) { |
| return eap_aka_client_error( |
| data, id, EAP_AKA_UNABLE_TO_PROCESS_PACKET); |
| } |
| eap_aka_learn_ids(sm, data, &eattr); |
| os_free(decrypted); |
| } |
| |
| if (data->result_ind && attr->result_ind) |
| data->use_result_ind = 1; |
| |
| if (data->state != FAILURE && data->state != RESULT_FAILURE) { |
| eap_aka_state(data, data->use_result_ind ? |
| RESULT_SUCCESS : SUCCESS); |
| } |
| |
| data->num_id_req = 0; |
| data->num_notification = 0; |
| /* RFC 4187 specifies that counter is initialized to one after |
| * fullauth, but initializing it to zero makes it easier to implement |
| * reauth verification. */ |
| data->counter = 0; |
| return eap_aka_response_challenge(data, id); |
| } |
| |
| |
| static int eap_aka_process_notification_reauth(struct eap_aka_data *data, |
| struct eap_sim_attrs *attr) |
| { |
| struct eap_sim_attrs eattr; |
| u8 *decrypted; |
| |
| if (attr->encr_data == NULL || attr->iv == NULL) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA: Notification message after " |
| "reauth did not include encrypted data"); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| decrypted = eap_sim_parse_encr(data->k_encr, attr->encr_data, |
| attr->encr_data_len, attr->iv, &eattr, |
| 0); |
| if (decrypted == NULL) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA: Failed to parse encrypted " |
| "data from notification message"); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| if (eattr.counter < 0 || (size_t) eattr.counter != data->counter) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA: Counter in notification " |
| "message does not match with counter in reauth " |
| "message"); |
| os_free(decrypted); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| os_free(decrypted); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| |
| static int eap_aka_process_notification_auth(struct eap_aka_data *data, |
| const struct wpabuf *reqData, |
| struct eap_sim_attrs *attr) |
| { |
| if (attr->mac == NULL) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-AKA: no AT_MAC in after_auth " |
| "Notification message"); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| if (eap_aka_verify_mac(data, reqData, attr->mac, (u8 *) "", 0)) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA: Notification message " |
| "used invalid AT_MAC"); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| if (data->reauth && |
| eap_aka_process_notification_reauth(data, attr)) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA: Invalid notification " |
| "message after reauth"); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| |
| static struct wpabuf * eap_aka_process_notification( |
| struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_aka_data *data, u8 id, |
| const struct wpabuf *reqData, struct eap_sim_attrs *attr) |
| { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: subtype Notification"); |
| if (data->num_notification > 0) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-AKA: too many notification " |
| "rounds (only one allowed)"); |
| return eap_aka_client_error(data, id, |
| EAP_AKA_UNABLE_TO_PROCESS_PACKET); |
| } |
| data->num_notification++; |
| if (attr->notification == -1) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-AKA: no AT_NOTIFICATION in " |
| "Notification message"); |
| return eap_aka_client_error(data, id, |
| EAP_AKA_UNABLE_TO_PROCESS_PACKET); |
| } |
| |
| if ((attr->notification & 0x4000) == 0 && |
| eap_aka_process_notification_auth(data, reqData, attr)) { |
| return eap_aka_client_error(data, id, |
| EAP_AKA_UNABLE_TO_PROCESS_PACKET); |
| } |
| |
| eap_sim_report_notification(sm->msg_ctx, attr->notification, 1); |
| if (attr->notification >= 0 && attr->notification < 32768) { |
| eap_aka_state(data, FAILURE); |
| } else if (attr->notification == EAP_SIM_SUCCESS && |
| data->state == RESULT_SUCCESS) |
| eap_aka_state(data, SUCCESS); |
| return eap_aka_response_notification(data, id, attr->notification); |
| } |
| |
| |
| static struct wpabuf * eap_aka_process_reauthentication( |
| struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_aka_data *data, u8 id, |
| const struct wpabuf *reqData, struct eap_sim_attrs *attr) |
| { |
| struct eap_sim_attrs eattr; |
| u8 *decrypted; |
| |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: subtype Reauthentication"); |
| |
| if (attr->checkcode && |
| eap_aka_verify_checkcode(data, attr->checkcode, |
| attr->checkcode_len)) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA: Invalid AT_CHECKCODE in the " |
| "message"); |
| return eap_aka_client_error(data, id, |
| EAP_AKA_UNABLE_TO_PROCESS_PACKET); |
| } |
| |
| if (data->reauth_id == NULL) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA: Server is trying " |
| "reauthentication, but no reauth_id available"); |
| return eap_aka_client_error(data, id, |
| EAP_AKA_UNABLE_TO_PROCESS_PACKET); |
| } |
| |
| data->reauth = 1; |
| if (eap_aka_verify_mac(data, reqData, attr->mac, (u8 *) "", 0)) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA: Reauthentication " |
| "did not have valid AT_MAC"); |
| return eap_aka_client_error(data, id, |
| EAP_AKA_UNABLE_TO_PROCESS_PACKET); |
| } |
| |
| if (attr->encr_data == NULL || attr->iv == NULL) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA: Reauthentication " |
| "message did not include encrypted data"); |
| return eap_aka_client_error(data, id, |
| EAP_AKA_UNABLE_TO_PROCESS_PACKET); |
| } |
| |
| decrypted = eap_sim_parse_encr(data->k_encr, attr->encr_data, |
| attr->encr_data_len, attr->iv, &eattr, |
| 0); |
| if (decrypted == NULL) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA: Failed to parse encrypted " |
| "data from reauthentication message"); |
| return eap_aka_client_error(data, id, |
| EAP_AKA_UNABLE_TO_PROCESS_PACKET); |
| } |
| |
| if (eattr.nonce_s == NULL || eattr.counter < 0) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-AKA: (encr) No%s%s in reauth packet", |
| !eattr.nonce_s ? " AT_NONCE_S" : "", |
| eattr.counter < 0 ? " AT_COUNTER" : ""); |
| os_free(decrypted); |
| return eap_aka_client_error(data, id, |
| EAP_AKA_UNABLE_TO_PROCESS_PACKET); |
| } |
| |
| if (eattr.counter < 0 || (size_t) eattr.counter <= data->counter) { |
| struct wpabuf *res; |
| wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-AKA: (encr) Invalid counter " |
| "(%d <= %d)", eattr.counter, data->counter); |
| data->counter_too_small = eattr.counter; |
| |
| /* Reply using Re-auth w/ AT_COUNTER_TOO_SMALL. The current |
| * reauth_id must not be used to start a new reauthentication. |
| * However, since it was used in the last EAP-Response-Identity |
| * packet, it has to saved for the following fullauth to be |
| * used in MK derivation. */ |
| os_free(data->last_eap_identity); |
| data->last_eap_identity = data->reauth_id; |
| data->last_eap_identity_len = data->reauth_id_len; |
| data->reauth_id = NULL; |
| data->reauth_id_len = 0; |
| |
| res = eap_aka_response_reauth(data, id, 1, eattr.nonce_s); |
| os_free(decrypted); |
| |
| return res; |
| } |
| data->counter = eattr.counter; |
| |
| os_memcpy(data->nonce_s, eattr.nonce_s, EAP_SIM_NONCE_S_LEN); |
| wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: (encr) AT_NONCE_S", |
| data->nonce_s, EAP_SIM_NONCE_S_LEN); |
| |
| if (data->eap_method == EAP_TYPE_AKA_PRIME) { |
| eap_aka_prime_derive_keys_reauth(data->k_re, data->counter, |
| data->reauth_id, |
| data->reauth_id_len, |
| data->nonce_s, |
| data->msk, data->emsk); |
| } else { |
| eap_sim_derive_keys_reauth(data->counter, data->reauth_id, |
| data->reauth_id_len, |
| data->nonce_s, data->mk, |
| data->msk, data->emsk); |
| } |
| eap_aka_clear_identities(sm, data, CLEAR_REAUTH_ID | CLEAR_EAP_ID); |
| eap_aka_learn_ids(sm, data, &eattr); |
| |
| if (data->result_ind && attr->result_ind) |
| data->use_result_ind = 1; |
| |
| if (data->state != FAILURE && data->state != RESULT_FAILURE) { |
| eap_aka_state(data, data->use_result_ind ? |
| RESULT_SUCCESS : SUCCESS); |
| } |
| |
| data->num_id_req = 0; |
| data->num_notification = 0; |
| if (data->counter > EAP_AKA_MAX_FAST_REAUTHS) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: Maximum number of " |
| "fast reauths performed - force fullauth"); |
| eap_aka_clear_identities(sm, data, |
| CLEAR_REAUTH_ID | CLEAR_EAP_ID); |
| } |
| os_free(decrypted); |
| return eap_aka_response_reauth(data, id, 0, data->nonce_s); |
| } |
| |
| |
| static struct wpabuf * eap_aka_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, |
| struct eap_method_ret *ret, |
| const struct wpabuf *reqData) |
| { |
| struct eap_aka_data *data = priv; |
| const struct eap_hdr *req; |
| u8 subtype, id; |
| struct wpabuf *res; |
| const u8 *pos; |
| struct eap_sim_attrs attr; |
| size_t len; |
| |
| wpa_hexdump_buf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: EAP data", reqData); |
| if (eap_get_config_identity(sm, &len) == NULL) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-AKA: Identity not configured"); |
| eap_sm_request_identity(sm); |
| ret->ignore = TRUE; |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| pos = eap_hdr_validate(EAP_VENDOR_IETF, data->eap_method, reqData, |
| &len); |
| if (pos == NULL || len < 1) { |
| ret->ignore = TRUE; |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| req = wpabuf_head(reqData); |
| id = req->identifier; |
| len = be_to_host16(req->length); |
| |
| ret->ignore = FALSE; |
| ret->methodState = METHOD_MAY_CONT; |
| ret->decision = DECISION_FAIL; |
| ret->allowNotifications = TRUE; |
| |
| subtype = *pos++; |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: Subtype=%d", subtype); |
| pos += 2; /* Reserved */ |
| |
| if (eap_sim_parse_attr(pos, wpabuf_head_u8(reqData) + len, &attr, |
| data->eap_method == EAP_TYPE_AKA_PRIME ? 2 : 1, |
| 0)) { |
| res = eap_aka_client_error(data, id, |
| EAP_AKA_UNABLE_TO_PROCESS_PACKET); |
| goto done; |
| } |
| |
| switch (subtype) { |
| case EAP_AKA_SUBTYPE_IDENTITY: |
| res = eap_aka_process_identity(sm, data, id, reqData, &attr); |
| break; |
| case EAP_AKA_SUBTYPE_CHALLENGE: |
| res = eap_aka_process_challenge(sm, data, id, reqData, &attr); |
| break; |
| case EAP_AKA_SUBTYPE_NOTIFICATION: |
| res = eap_aka_process_notification(sm, data, id, reqData, |
| &attr); |
| break; |
| case EAP_AKA_SUBTYPE_REAUTHENTICATION: |
| res = eap_aka_process_reauthentication(sm, data, id, reqData, |
| &attr); |
| break; |
| case EAP_AKA_SUBTYPE_CLIENT_ERROR: |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: subtype Client-Error"); |
| res = eap_aka_client_error(data, id, |
| EAP_AKA_UNABLE_TO_PROCESS_PACKET); |
| break; |
| default: |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: Unknown subtype=%d", subtype); |
| res = eap_aka_client_error(data, id, |
| EAP_AKA_UNABLE_TO_PROCESS_PACKET); |
| break; |
| } |
| |
| done: |
| if (data->state == FAILURE) { |
| ret->decision = DECISION_FAIL; |
| ret->methodState = METHOD_DONE; |
| } else if (data->state == SUCCESS) { |
| ret->decision = data->use_result_ind ? |
| DECISION_UNCOND_SUCC : DECISION_COND_SUCC; |
| /* |
| * It is possible for the server to reply with AKA |
| * Notification, so we must allow the method to continue and |
| * not only accept EAP-Success at this point. |
| */ |
| ret->methodState = data->use_result_ind ? |
| METHOD_DONE : METHOD_MAY_CONT; |
| } else if (data->state == RESULT_FAILURE) |
| ret->methodState = METHOD_CONT; |
| else if (data->state == RESULT_SUCCESS) |
| ret->methodState = METHOD_CONT; |
| |
| if (ret->methodState == METHOD_DONE) { |
| ret->allowNotifications = FALSE; |
| } |
| |
| return res; |
| } |
| |
| |
| static Boolean eap_aka_has_reauth_data(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv) |
| { |
| struct eap_aka_data *data = priv; |
| return data->pseudonym || data->reauth_id; |
| } |
| |
| |
| static void eap_aka_deinit_for_reauth(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv) |
| { |
| struct eap_aka_data *data = priv; |
| eap_aka_clear_identities(sm, data, CLEAR_EAP_ID); |
| data->prev_id = -1; |
| wpabuf_free(data->id_msgs); |
| data->id_msgs = NULL; |
| data->use_result_ind = 0; |
| data->kdf_negotiation = 0; |
| } |
| |
| |
| static void * eap_aka_init_for_reauth(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv) |
| { |
| struct eap_aka_data *data = priv; |
| data->num_id_req = 0; |
| data->num_notification = 0; |
| eap_aka_state(data, CONTINUE); |
| return priv; |
| } |
| |
| |
| static const u8 * eap_aka_get_identity(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, |
| size_t *len) |
| { |
| struct eap_aka_data *data = priv; |
| |
| if (data->reauth_id) { |
| *len = data->reauth_id_len; |
| return data->reauth_id; |
| } |
| |
| if (data->pseudonym) { |
| *len = data->pseudonym_len; |
| return data->pseudonym; |
| } |
| |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| |
| static Boolean eap_aka_isKeyAvailable(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv) |
| { |
| struct eap_aka_data *data = priv; |
| return data->state == SUCCESS; |
| } |
| |
| |
| static u8 * eap_aka_getKey(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, size_t *len) |
| { |
| struct eap_aka_data *data = priv; |
| u8 *key; |
| |
| if (data->state != SUCCESS) |
| return NULL; |
| |
| key = os_malloc(EAP_SIM_KEYING_DATA_LEN); |
| if (key == NULL) |
| return NULL; |
| |
| *len = EAP_SIM_KEYING_DATA_LEN; |
| os_memcpy(key, data->msk, EAP_SIM_KEYING_DATA_LEN); |
| |
| return key; |
| } |
| |
| |
| static u8 * eap_aka_get_emsk(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, size_t *len) |
| { |
| struct eap_aka_data *data = priv; |
| u8 *key; |
| |
| if (data->state != SUCCESS) |
| return NULL; |
| |
| key = os_malloc(EAP_EMSK_LEN); |
| if (key == NULL) |
| return NULL; |
| |
| *len = EAP_EMSK_LEN; |
| os_memcpy(key, data->emsk, EAP_EMSK_LEN); |
| |
| return key; |
| } |
| |
| |
| int eap_peer_aka_register(void) |
| { |
| struct eap_method *eap; |
| int ret; |
| |
| eap = eap_peer_method_alloc(EAP_PEER_METHOD_INTERFACE_VERSION, |
| EAP_VENDOR_IETF, EAP_TYPE_AKA, "AKA"); |
| if (eap == NULL) |
| return -1; |
| |
| eap->init = eap_aka_init; |
| eap->deinit = eap_aka_deinit; |
| eap->process = eap_aka_process; |
| eap->isKeyAvailable = eap_aka_isKeyAvailable; |
| eap->getKey = eap_aka_getKey; |
| eap->has_reauth_data = eap_aka_has_reauth_data; |
| eap->deinit_for_reauth = eap_aka_deinit_for_reauth; |
| eap->init_for_reauth = eap_aka_init_for_reauth; |
| eap->get_identity = eap_aka_get_identity; |
| eap->get_emsk = eap_aka_get_emsk; |
| |
| ret = eap_peer_method_register(eap); |
| if (ret) |
| eap_peer_method_free(eap); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| |
| #ifdef EAP_AKA_PRIME |
| int eap_peer_aka_prime_register(void) |
| { |
| struct eap_method *eap; |
| int ret; |
| |
| eap = eap_peer_method_alloc(EAP_PEER_METHOD_INTERFACE_VERSION, |
| EAP_VENDOR_IETF, EAP_TYPE_AKA_PRIME, |
| "AKA'"); |
| if (eap == NULL) |
| return -1; |
| |
| eap->init = eap_aka_prime_init; |
| eap->deinit = eap_aka_deinit; |
| eap->process = eap_aka_process; |
| eap->isKeyAvailable = eap_aka_isKeyAvailable; |
| eap->getKey = eap_aka_getKey; |
| eap->has_reauth_data = eap_aka_has_reauth_data; |
| eap->deinit_for_reauth = eap_aka_deinit_for_reauth; |
| eap->init_for_reauth = eap_aka_init_for_reauth; |
| eap->get_identity = eap_aka_get_identity; |
| eap->get_emsk = eap_aka_get_emsk; |
| |
| ret = eap_peer_method_register(eap); |
| if (ret) |
| eap_peer_method_free(eap); |
| |
| return ret; |
| } |
| #endif /* EAP_AKA_PRIME */ |